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- reporters mistaken for demonstrators. Secretary McNamara said his information was that they had hid their cre dentials and went along to the detention camp for the story. SECRETARY RUSK: I am going tomorrow to Los Angeles to make a speech at the same hotel
- Sanh at a later time. --- We had a report of Frog Missiles being mounted on the front of enemy tanks. These missiles are similar to our Honest John. They carry an 800 pound warhead. These could pose problems. - - - In Hue there is still fighting
Folder, "October 14, 1968 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisory Group," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
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- . Secretary Rusk: Abrams expresses considerable confidence. But if Hanoi demands new government in Saigon it might appeal to the New York Times. We will reject it. We do not want a 'give away 11 schedule. George Christian: They will cooperate for a period
- - scale or acci dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only
- on the first day -- mortar fire. Nothing since that time. There were a couple of small attacks against small population centers in the last 24-hours. The President: I figured they would do this to save a little face. General Wheeler: The North
- and Secretary Clifford have followed this meeting closely. I want to hear from people who are not regular advisers from time to time. I asked General Abram.s to come here today . . General Wheeler has been conferring with General Westmoreland. I want to hear
- !-J7 SECRET.ARY RUSK: We must carefully prepare the briefings for the candidates and the T. V. speech. SECRET ARY CLIFFORD: Hanoi chose Sunday as the day to relent and accept the GVN at the conference table. WALT ROST OW: ivlid-month was time
- : The President: Walt Rostow: 9:00 a. m. Saigon time Saturday. Should we refer to reconnaissance? Yes. Reconnaissance will continue. The President: When would we announce/ UECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 M'!fTTNG t110T!S COPYRIGMl~O -Pe
- of the time the GVN delegates are there, and when Hanoi can get the NLF delegates there. Bill Bundy: I agree. It is the only way to keep the Armed Services with us. Secretary Clifford: We must make it clear that we have no intention of stopping the bombing
- ) will excuse my putting back on my uniform for a minute, it is my opinion that the military advantages do not out weigh the political disadvantages. General McConnell: I'd rather face them from China. only one half the time over target because of fuel
- ? Secretary Rusk: The most difficult problem is the Jerusalem problem. CIA Director Helms: is not bard to explain. -•• --- ... VIETNAM -- The war is at the tensest point. Lo•t 128, 000 men Needed to fill out unit a Units now coming back Attack could
- concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement - - not push on to something new. The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's -- it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything
- Irish or a Negro from Louisiana. For a long time the Negro has been dis criminated against, but I don't believe there is a white boy who would like to go down to a bhck country and be treated second class. There are more blacks and browns than whites
- : It is a pure question of when you all are agreed on statement. Thieu plans to talk at 7 :00 p. m. Washington time. What does Bus say? General Wheeler: midnight. The President: We can is sue orders at midday - - stop bombing by Can we agree on how
- • ' ·.:.. .·..·.. . ... ....: ~--- :_,;.:;....~ - - ..... ... · · i-· SE~VJCESET i I ! --·.. ..· ; :.. ' o . .. . . :.. . •· - - - - - - - - - --- -- -- '7. *° • ..·, ·: '.•: . . .. ~ ...... : ... . .. - . ·-; .. o ·'. . . . -·- z . • ... ~:..... ··- -:. ,• -·· lo' Mffl-1-NG. N()t~5 Ct
- the .capability of providing in this time period. I recommend that we send him these men as soon as we can. Of course, it will be necessary to call up the reserves to do this. The President: Can we relate this 30, 000 to a specific request from General
- you have any trouble with it? Secretarv Rusk: General 'Wheeler: Secretary Rusk: No. Do locks bother you. No. General Wheeler: No civilian casualties would result. Secretary Rusk: Time is running out. t ; I•' - 2 - The President: MiiTl
- know if they are moving substantial number of troops and supplies north of the DMZ. Some black Monday they might pour over the DMZ and kill many of our men. We have stopped bombing for 26 days -- not it is time for them to produce. MttTtt•C ..~OTES
- . We are on a sound military basis for con In the North, they are rebuilding LOC's and their facilities. moving much materiel south. The President: They are Have we lost or gained by the action of March 31? General Wheeler: at this time. Secretary
- all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p. m. Ea.stern Standard Time, October 29th. We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris
- COP~TED PubUtatlon Reqoires P1rmi11iuH af Eutttright Holder. W. Jho.na; JeliMon NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE CABINET, 1v1A Y 14, 1968 CLIFFORD: There has been a change of tactics between the time of Tet and now. The wearing
Folder, "September 25, 1968 - 12:17 p.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
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- in the war. The Communist theory of war is that they are helping out a revolution in the South. When they are attacked they are outraged. I think the Soviets want to help. They can't until war is reduced to war in the South. Time pressures are on them to do
- about Vietnam. He wanted Mansfield and John Sherman Cooper at the discussions in Paris. Fulbright wanted to know how seriously the President wanted peace. told him, "Bill, about 50 times as much as you do." I The President: I have told the press
- . McConnell said if we were to stop the bombing, now is the time to do it. THE PRESIDENT: If they used the week badly it could hurt us. GENERAL WHEELER: I'm more concerned about the effect on the ARYN. They have been doing well. They will sit on their hands
- no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must begin to take steps to disengage. That view was shared by: George Ball Arthur Dean Cy Vance Douglas Dillon and myself (McGeorgc Bundy) We do think we should do everything possible
- ' - ;;~-.ft Stop at 11: 00 a. m. - announced. Let's stop it so I can announce at 7 today or at 7 tomorrow. General Wheeler: We can stop it at 0800 Saigon time or 7: 00 p. m. tomorrow. There is nothing to do. Clark Clifford: Do we have information about
- conventional attacks for the first time. Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northerr. provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along? General
- it was not prudent from a military standpoint for them to be there. General Wheeler: That is correct, Mr. President. I have General Brown sorting out all the facts. There are several reasons why no planes were sent. This includes the location .of the ship, the time
- ? . NARA, Date (;. -.:;J.1)_!'1 ct=l? , MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED Publication Requir" Permiuion of Copyri_ght Hofdw: W. Thomas Johnson Secretary Clifford: I thought final clearance with Thieu was mere formality. I thought we said -- now, here's the time
Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 10:30 a.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
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- to be given by the President on the Pueblo and Vietnam developments. Secretary Rusk: Some parts of the speech are unnecessary. I do not think it should be given at this time. Extending tours of duty in Vietnam could have a serious effect on the morale
- Westmoreland over the phone and received a number of cables from him. Westmoreland reported the following: - - The enemy apparently will start new attacks on the 10th. St.'1.\f\~E SET That is tonight our time. This is based on communications intelligence
Folder, "November 8, 1967 - 9:42 a.m. Vice President and Walt Rostow," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
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- military, diplomatic and political problems in that part of the world. However, the Vice President has had a chance to go and spend some time in the area. -- Since the Honolulu Conference 18 months ago there have been five elections in Vietnam
- a letter from the President asking for more time. The President approved the dispatch of the letter to Vance. Secretary Rusk said the Greeks told the Cypriots that the Turks are bluffing .. The President said it also appears that the Russians want to see
- additional cuts. Congressman Pollock: Mr. President, I want to thank you very deeply for your help in meeting the emergency needs of my people in Alaska. All of the agencies of government and you have been so helpful in our time of need. The President: I am
- : territorial waters. We are almost certain we did not violate SECRETARY RUSK: We need to take more time on this. GENERAL TAYLOR: Would the fear of military reprisal make the North Koreans hold the men longer? SECRETARY RUSK: They know enough to assume we do
Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 1:14 p.m. Tuesday Luncheon Meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
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- is that there was no unusual North Korean activity during the ten day period to indicate that at any time the ship strayed into territorial waters. I do not believe that it did. The President: Ambassador Goldberg said he had a position report two days before which
- this was the first time the North Koreans knew that the ship would be in t..'1e area. Three thi.'1.gs are clear: 1. It was a conscious effort to provoke a response O!" a lack of response. 2. The Soviets knew of it in advance. 3. T!ie North Koreans have
- talking about either substance of stopping or row we get together for talks. The odds are against talks at this time. I think there is a poss_ibility, although not a very good one. The chances of getting Vietnam resolved before November, 1968, 02pends
- on these questions in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Walt Rostow: That is correct. Clark Clifford: Paul Nitze and I started to work on this Friday night. As you could understand, with the time pressure we placed upon ourselves there still may need
- separate occasions did they actually fire on us. up in the DMZ wouldn't be good at this time. To build We first went in to find prisoners. To increase the level of the forces sent in would heighten the level. They'll move them in. This is a bad