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  • Abrams and Ambassado:i:?er called on Ky. He was in a black mood. He talked of resigning e. men lil'ei19g shot up by our helicopter. We have a potential problem with Ky and General Tha•g. Killing his allies has put him very down in the dumps. It is a very
  • . operations had been reduced from 800 on his last trip to 30-40 on this trip •. i . On the political front, the Secretary reported: ·- The "greate_st . ~angertt I I is facing us. t A possible split betwee·n Ky and Thieu. 1· i The r.e is "no· real
  • would be asked to specify which countries it would eliminate if the re is a cut back in foreign assistance funds. o Secretary Rusk said that Senator McClellan planned an investigation of corruption in Vietnamo "Ky intimate s will be invol ved . 11
  • handwriting. 5. There are some differences between Ky and Thieu, but Ky told me that he will do his best to cooperate. 6. The South Vietnamese Army is not a superior force, but General Abrams told me there has been much improvement in the ARYN. There were
  • counts show. It was agreed that the infiltration rate give the most fuzzy figures. retary Nitze said we just do not know what the precise figures are. Sec­ Mr. Clifford made the following points: (1) There were valuable visits with Ky and Thieu. (2
  • not deserve U.S. support. The Vice President said that Thieu and Ky have lowered the draft age and have established a very good blueprint for progress. co:NFIDi:NTTAL M!E ilNG f~OfES COPYAIQMfEO­ a.,~li1.•tiert A•cr"ic°' .. SERVICE SET P.,tm11u10A ef
  • are interested in what Secretary Rusk has to aay. Why are you ao worr'ied al:out Saigon. The President: There ii instability between Ky and Thieu. He doesn't like sitting in the back row after all of the command positions he has held. CIA Director Helms
  • in Vietnam this year. We should talk about Honolulu when we asked them to draft a constitution; we should talk about Manila, when we asked them to elect a President; we should talk about Guam, when Ky and Thieu gave us their constitution; we should talk about
  • of the senior U.S. commanders. I also talked with Ambassador Bunker, President Thieu and Vice President Ky. There were a number of factors which surprised me. I certainly learned things I did not know before: The TET attack was very powerful and nationwideo
  • . The President: Are you concerned about Thieu's problem in forming a new cabinet. Secretary Rusk: Yes, but Ky will go along if there are no changes in Generals. Walt Rostow: The "deal" is that Ky will be main negotiator in "your side, our side" situation. CIA
  • Vietnam from being overrun. We have invested 29, 000 dead and $75 billion. We must be careful not to flush this down the drain. But we do have the right to expect cooperation from South Vietnam. Thieu and Ky agreed to this. Bunker said they needed more
  • have passed it. They are at How much trouble is the President having? General Abrams: He is stronger. to him. The Prime Minister is a great boost The President: Is Ky a threat, a dangerous threat? General Abrams: He's not helpful. Thieu
  • in the government - - most improved. There has been a change in the political situation for the better. There now are local people getting involved in local government at the village level. We are urging Ky and Thieu to put land control in the hands of the local
  • 3. The matter of reconnaissance. South and have their intelligence. We must have this. They are in the 4. Important political issues. Go ahead and get their views on more formal talks and views on terms for settlement. Thieu and Ky suggested "our
  • and unbending. We will stop bombing under right conditions. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS: We have tried to come up with formula to let us stop the bombing with no public Vance: They have refused to suggest anything at this point. will not permit the Thieu-Ky
  • about the NLF. Questions of procedure must be taken up. Saigon cannot be ready for November 2 because Thieu and Ky cannot be ready. They do not want to participate in what the President is trying to do. 2. The President has been urged to stop
  • than I expected. Ky is putting in 65, 000 men and dropping his draft age. go to war, nobody wants to die. Nobody wants to W ., are not in a stalemate. We expect to receive more troops from Australia, Thailand and from Korea. Don't kid yourselves
  • overseeing group thought the Thieu-Ky election was a fraud. The President asked Director Helms to check this and if it is not true, get the information to the Senator. Secretary Katzenbach: Reported on tre Rusk-Gromyko talks which were underway in New York
  • us any cooperation we will in return cooperate with them. There are no big decisions looming. The problem is how to get free and honest elections and not have a coup. Ky denies he said some of the things he has been reported as saying during the last
  • of the Politburo. We need to stir Thieu and Ky up to probe around more with the NLFo Bunker should ask Thieu and Ky to get something going. This one is purely our thing" We need to get them going on somethingo Mr. Ro stow: It would be excellent for Thieu to say
  • that President Thieu and Vice President Ky have almost identical priorities which is encouraging. The President asked if President Thieu States. planned to come to the United Ambassador Bunker said yes at a later date when he settles down the government a bit
  • Times story by Rick Smith and Marvin Kalb at 8:00 a. m. today may be put together. The President: Tell Bunker to get Thieu moving on telling his people now. Thieu must tell Ky, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister and draft a statement. The President
  • , but it is better to have them there when they are needed than to need them there and not have them. General Wheeler: I will call now and get my men drafting the order. (General Wheeler left the room.) The President: What is the status of Buttercup? I see where Ky
  • and self-confidence. l There is a conflict between Thieu and Ky but I am not worried about it. I think they both should stay. There is friction between Thieu and Vien because of quarrel between two wives. Vien will resign when I leave {Westmoreland
  • concern is the tactics of the South Vietnamese Government. Last word is that Ky won't get there until the 9th. You stopped bombing 32 days ago. I fear we will have this package fall apart and get back to heavy fighting. Saigon appears to be stalling until
  • ACCEPTED BY THE GVN IN THE COURSE OF THESE CONSULTA­ TIONS AS THE ONLY VAY, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THAT WE COULD HOPE TO HOLD TALKS VITH THE OTHER SIDE. I THINK VICE PRESIDENT KY SAID ONCE THAT AS A NATTER OF PRINCIPLE WE OUGHT NOT TALK WITH ·THElltt- IUT
  • ~ght 5 p Holder· w Thomes-Johnson The President: Will you get 135, 000? General Abrams: Yes. The President: Are they drafting 18 year olds? General Abrams: -Yes. Thieu and Ky are determined to do it. The President: What ·percent of the ARYN
  • , call up 18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they are doing as much as we. Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18 and 19 year olds. The President
  • was talked over with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time. In mid-September
  • politicai groups. 3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make dear that we "'.vish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must 1novc fa~t to b_ring their forces back /.'-v'1 to strength
  • Clifford, a highly forceful approach to the GVN (Thieu and Ky) to get certain key commitments for impro~ement, tied to our own increased effort and to increased US support for the ARVN. De­ tails are in Tab B. 3. Early approval of a Reserve call-up