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94 results
- the backs of our men who are defendil)g our ·nyes. • WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL· DOCUMENTS Until we have some better signs than what we have had these last few days-that I hope any American can see and read loud and clear-that he will not step up
- plans for the arms talks . We should get started even if we handle the talks so as not to bind a successor. It is our hope that Mr. N ixon will agree to our going ahead and we have offered to have Bob Murphy as an obser ver on th e delegation. Secretary
- FOR WAL~ROSTOW REGRETDELAYIN SENDINGWEEKLY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT,~UT HOPE TO GET THIS OF'F TOMORROW. CIRCUiiiSTANCES HERE LAST F~W DAYS HAV~ MA~EIT NECkSSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON EM~RGENCIES.AS WITHYOU, - IT HAS MEANT BEDlG ON THE JOB 24 RE I VIA
- Vietnam could become a m od^l that would eventually attract the people of South Vietnam to a sim ilar system. By 1960, all of these hopes had been dashed. Though South Vietnam had major latent political problems^it must have appeared to Hanoi
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
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- present expect the war to end in some form of negotiations. military effort be decisive 1dll and ARVN,they are not likely to negotiations until this for its results to be fairly Since they hope the the GVN in destroying to give any serious
- ~ES, . -. • • · 4. 1t-tt: (
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
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- too concerned for a public fel:ld between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning
- AND ALTERNATIVES IN HOPE OF IMPROVING PRESS REACTION AND INTERPRETATION AS THE FUTURE UNFOLDS. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS CO?Y IS -PROH:3iTEO UNLESS “UNCLASSInED' COPY LBJ LIBRARY *
- RECENT T R IP . ALTHOUGH SOME ADDITIONAL U .S . FORCES SHOULD PROBABLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER WE SEE HOW THE MARINES DO IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, MY OWN A TTITU D E I S REFLECTED IN EMBTEL 33 84 , WHICH I HOPE WAS CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PR
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- days" dates had high hopes the Khe the document in Hue and Saigon; They appear to be advocating (marked passage, page 5) a second wave of attacks, to be timed with the big cffens ive in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Western highlands areas at the frontiers
- c u l a r tim e i t i s c o n te m p la te d . The l a s t th in g we w ant to do i s become in v o lv e d i n a la n d w ar i n A s ia . Our pow er i s s e a and a i r , and t h a t i s w hat we hope w i l l d e t e r th e C h in e se Communists
Folder, "South Vietnam and U.S. Policies [X-File] [1 of 2], Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 19
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- the election. She reportedly encouraged Saigon to "delay11 in join· ing the Paris peace talks in hopes of getting a better deal if the Republicans won t he White House. Until that story appeared, there were indications that Mrs. Chennault was in line to get
- p. m. Mr. . - .- .. February 17, 1968 flJ_p •& ~ •.S oti---, President: Herewith answers to the three questions you put to Bob Ginsburgh last night. S:ECRE'f I (~- -
- themes em erge.' There i s T : : "the sea rc h f o r o p tio n s , as word o f th e second a tta c k on th e d e strciy ^ ts o |^ ■':'< ■ ■, , chroijology, o f c o v irs e /b a n e v e r hope to c ap tu re th e f u l l f la v o r and ■. ."
- , for h e lic o p te r s, fo r ammunition, for p la n e s, not because we want war, but because the aggressors have made them n ecessary. We w i l l la y a sid e th ese weapons when peace comes -- and we hope i t comes s w if t ly . But th a t i s
- H E O U TS ET AND SC UR R E L A T I O N S WHICH WE HOPE TO SWEETEN. '^’E SHALL HAVE TO TAKE T H I S POINT INTO ACCOUNT. ; ' ' : c . [ . t A3SN.-'IN~ THAT V,£ HAVE ACHIEVED CONTROL AN^ F L E X I B I L I T Y , V/E W I L L THEN NEED TO T H I N K 0
- ation . Max T aylor has m ade one r e se r v a tio n to Bob M cN am ara's statem en t of h is v iew s in B ob's m em orandum of A pril 21, and I think you ought to knov/ about it. It is stated in h is cable 3504 (at Tab A), and the M cN am ara text
- determined attempts to gain a spectacular victory, and is now preparing for another attempt in northern First Corps. I believe that the enemy sees a similarity between ·our base at Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu and hopes, by following a pattern 0£ activity
- help brksg a chants of heart ia K a so i. 2 . I ehare Bob McMamara'a vie '» t i a t v,-e csa re a d ily Xrsnna a specific pro^vam o-v-er t!is moatli tha t w i ll bs accoptablo to Entisaasy w ithout aas.cceptabl« r i s ] ^ o f escalritica. I. layaelf am
- and d o m e stic p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s w hich th e Communists - 2 - COPY LBJ LIBRARY a lm o st c e r t a i n l y hope v i U f o r c e th e US t o c ea se and d e s i s t . N e v e rth e le s s , t h e i r v i l l i n g n e s s t o go
- and A and H i s t o r i c a l Background Paper on Vietnam I a tta c h two documents prepared by p e o p le in Bob M anning's and my o f f i c e s : a Q and A paper on p o lic y toward South Vietnam and an h i s t o r i c a l background paper s e t t i n g fo
- no friend needlessly fear— and no foe vainly hope— that this is a nation divided in this election year. Our free elections— our fiJl and free debate— are America’s strength, not America’s weakness. There are no parties and there is no parti sanship when
- . Re - negotiation would call for Greek concessions. If the treaty laps es, the 10, 000 Greek in Turkey lose their rights . Any deal by Makarios and the Cypriots with the USSR will move slowly. Makarios apparently hopes to delay any action until
- and of the Secretary o~ State, but also of senior officials of all agencies concerned. t . I It is my hope and expectation that the establishment of this committee will permit an energetic, unified and skillful prosecution of :the only war we face at present. cc
- , to establish a task force on Southeast Asian economic and social development. I request each of you to designate a senior official or officials to work with Mr. Bundy in this task force. I hope that you yourself will take a direct interest in this matter, and I
- Bundy, to establish a task force on Southeast Asian economic · and social development. I request each of you to designate a senior official or officials to work with Mr. Bundy in thls task force. I hope that you yourself will take a direct interest
- to the Russians in an effort t o explain why we had to retaliate as we did. Our hope is that they will understand why we acted as we did , at least to the extent of being annoyed by the North Vietnamese action. Mr. Ball informed the group that we had sent
- military forces and limit the size of U. S . forces. Political fragility continues in South Vietn am. We hope that the political situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh
- of the approval of the SEA TO treaty and of the August resolu tion. Secretary McNamara: Political events in Saigon are causing trouble in the military area. There are fewer Vi e tnamese casualti es . We hope that heavy pressure by U. S . forces will carry us ove r
- Of the United States the D.R.V. Governme."l.t and duction of to.r eign troops into not to pull out ot South prove this by actual cieeds. • Vietnam.. If the United States Vletnam, and he hoped the rt must end unconditior:ally_ r ca.lly respects the agree
Folder, "NSAM # 280: South Vietnam, 2/14/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2
(Item)
- commands t~e confidence not only of myself and of the Secretary of State, but also of senior officials of all agencies concei-ned. . I I I It is my hope and expectation that the establislunent of this committee will 1permit an energetic, unified
- U. S. forces which will soon go to 70, 000. The present VC campaign w ill be terminated without serious losses . With more U . S . combat troo p s a nd more U. S. air power, the hope is that we will be able to push Hanoi into negotiations. General
- . The North Vietnamese came to Paris to negotiate seriously. They hope to erode support for the war in the United States by causing high U.S. casualties. They will fail in this . They will conclude that they cannot prevail militarily and will then seek
- offers them no prospect of an early victory . and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damagi ng punitive SEllVtCE SET -4GP. SECRET .. .. • . (J
- :i.. ..} J . ·f .{ Thieu hopes to foster su~h moves, but his plans are va~e and in the hands of poor \ •• executors.. . . . Jn the meantime. Thieu has been having useful meetings with the le8:ders of all significant politic?-1elements
- in this process. We believe that, in embo.rking on these tnctics, the Soviet leaders hoped to work Henoi be.ck to'Wtlrd c. middle position 1n the Sino·Soviet dispute, to discourage the US from broadening the war, and to IJEl.X'ticipate in the Commun.1st
- countries visited, he sa id the acting head of Indonesia, General Suharto, and the Malaysian Prime Minister both told him that if the United States fails in Vietnam, all hope for a free Southeast Asia would be lost . In Malaysia the Prime Minister said
- favorable Qn:--Communist - ... . . ...terms. - ... ·~..:. timetable, rigid results --- -· but they probably ...._.e;~ • • ~-+~-y:~l--~f~cr¢ -- • to a negotiate~ settlf:Inent to have a hope to achieve Comnunist forces