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  • •s-u C. Secu.. aa -bd N....._ apace• • IUwr Te'""'• Geac
  • has no source legal this to Produce Nuclear Japan could 1970, without potential as 1966 if those of uranium free Japan's the capability force, potential change. capacity, treated * NIE 4-2-64, Japan will actually ultimate decision
  • enriched two year,. sive force of the fission triger. -tes Ma An Sdoaao, = ,,....., PRESERVATION cu.-Y PRESS RELEASE The UDlted Stat.a nuclear baa detected teat la the atmoapbere tu i8tb ol December uother Chine•• Comm-.mbt at taelr te•t
  • for a neutral Europe and nuclear-free zones in Europe. c. Have East Germany announce their of any development of nukes. renunciation d. Hold out vague promises of detente and de-escalation of the arms race if West Germany desists (even though we proceed
  • threat to the United States and the free world comes from the Soviet Union and Communist China. In order proper!y to understand the scope and magnitude of this threat, the Joint Committee has over the years held executive hearin~ at which nuclear
  • Vallon, increasing has limited declares severe relations when enough to call That is never explained, superfluous so as to when France for again be­ has made such obvious gains. "If France were without nuclear weapons, is the rest of free
  • • r• is totlaePr JS = Tmara HOUS• .i WASHINGTON & WHITE poa• • e T, 9 6 tw foz far i .. y!Meda :y free to C a plmty ol probl• Hal.Sa•"-• SIT p Li)bilAFT MSMQIU...JU>UMFOil THI: PllDmENT Inell•• wl•r W• Jll,c:ke4.. --lraa,t
  • level, but vould be free to designate repreaentative1 at eh• Ambassadorial level it they 4eaired. The purpose of the meeting would bei a) to take stock, diacuas and define the substantive issues involved; b) to auggest approaches toward
  • years, which would, because of lags in converting raw materials into end products, 9-ECRB'f' SBCRJ31f 7 still yield production for up to a third year of conflict and (2) that most free world nations be regarded as available sources of supply
  • to the paramount objective to the common defenae and security; ''b. the development_. use, and control of atomic energy ahall be directed •o u to promote world peace, improve the 1eueral W9lfare, increa~e ·the •tanda~d of liring, and atrencthen free competition
  • , not get off scot-free. 4. The Future. The period after mid-1970 is not currently at issue. If our developments work out as planned, we should have an improved detection capability and our missiles should be less vulnerable to pindown. DECLASSIFIED
  • that would increase the cohesion of NATO and the North.Atlantic community. These should embrace two kinds of measures: a. Military and non-military programs affecting primarily the affairs of the Free World; b. Constructive political, diplomatic, and economic
  • to be clear about two other matters, to the G·e rmana as well as among ourselves: a. It is Paris, not Washington, that is pressing oa the aerm.aaa a choice between ~....ranee anc:l the u. s. ; 5. We ought to accompany the NATO reorsanb:ation with as manr
  • States to •1t a terrible price to pay for a pack o! Mr. HOS:\!ER. l\ir. Speakrr, today we ·selectively proliferate purely defensive words v.·hich could be quite meaningless re-~~!\·ed a message from the t>-residc:nt nuclear armaments to hard-pressed U.S
  • Government can and does offer the fullest assurances that it will nev!!r use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive i..Ttter;t., But the United States, like other free nations, must be fully prepared to exercise effe(:tively the inherent right
  • be prudent to continue the techniee.l i'rork now unde:r-.·:ay revision cf tt.1;:, cu1'".i-entembargo c:.efini­ 2.-:d to press in cooa1tor a realistic tion. With respect to the computer complex that Control D:1.t.e.Co:..1>oration proposed to ID..'Portto East
  • to be an atomic bomb. United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bishop Oxnam anc. John Foster Dulles ask suspension of atomic bomb use. Soviet press urges atomic knowledge pooling and hints at international rac:e to better US bomb. Major General
  • a feasibility study brought about by the French, British, and U.S. SSTpro­ posals being publicized in the Western press. By 1962 Soviet press articles car­ ried sketches of an SST obviously derived from the Bounder bomber prototype. Al­ though not an economical
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • -80WOlEI _.ll)hidl _CHASE _COOPER AYNES n:: M f'_KLE,N I"> _j(CW_ - __a."tDY 5:::ilRs - N a:: ~ -;r~ Following publication of the John Finney article in the Paris edition of the NewYork Time·s on April 18, British press coverage of the subject
  • FRANCE DASA DCA DIA ./ZEN DSA · J.··. ·' ·, I 1 •.' ' .·.. ! ... , P. ."• DISTRIBUTION: . OASD(PA)- 10 -F. a·. -1 P&P~5 DIS-1 DSR-2 DCR-1. : l'l ,r-. e. c -/ .' INFO: .· PRESS SECRETARY .TO THE PRESIDENT :., . . 3179
  • on the same basis as units of the US Sixth Fleet are currently supported. As the Council is aware, the US Sixth.Fleet is eannarked for assignment to NATO in view of 1 wish to reiterate the state­ recent inaccurate press reports, ... ·.•• .ment the United
  • . This will be a tough one to handle because the Department of Defense is pressing for this weapon even though the technical studies make it of more doubtful value than previously thought. I . New weapons in the other major categories of increase are the deployment of lv
  • Securi;: y Af:c..i:.· ;:; J::ick V.:;.lc:1::i, Special _.:,.ssistant to the President \'/alter Jenki ns, Special Assistant to the Presiden t: G...-or ~ e Ret::dy, Press Se cre t ;:i.ry to the ?:resident _..lajo ::- General Chester V . Cliiton, Militu.1-y
  • - -tomorrow, Thursday, December 12, 2 - 3 :30 p. m Room SC-1042, Pentagon You may recall that you answered General Wheeler's invitation by saying that you would try to attend but could not promise. There is no pressing reason for you to do so unless you would
  • HOMELASTEVENINGA NUMBER OF FRENCHMEN SPOKETO HIM ABOUTTHE PRESIDENTfSCo.NENTSAT PRESS CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED CONSID£RAB~E BITTERNESSOVERWORDS HE USEDIN CONDEMNING FRENCHNUCLEAR PROGRAM.THE WORD"INIMICAL" UNFORTUNATELY HASA MUCHSTRONGER CONNOTATION IN FRENCH
  • on. In early 1970, incontrovertible US intelligence that the Soviet Union was committed to achieving uclear su eriorit. It also had been confirmed In the Middle being pressed indicated strategic that the with outside-help. Although~ _ _.increased trade