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9 results

  • to a collective force is that .it is alli~nce-wide in its responsibilities, embraces . both SAC and theater fo.r ces, and operates in a way that associates in some way, if only in a final report to NAC, all NATO members in its activity. · GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12
  • to the French, and (3) our overall negotiating stance. There is a further reason for early Presidential involvement. Some of your advisers -- notably Acheson and Ball -- are a bit shellshocked from newspaper stories sug_g esting that they are at odds with you
  • , scheduled for January, will employ the familiar format of senior as well as action level teams. It will ex­ confron­ amine problems associated with a Sino-Indian senior tation circa 1970 with three late afternoon meetings held at five day intervals followed
  • in priYB.te enterprise. " (Emphaaia aupplied.) (Section 1, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law 83-703.·) The 1954 Act ha.a for lta purpose the carrying providing for a number of programs including: out of the above policlea by • • •• . "a program for Oo
  • of tradi­ tional exports, which is fundamental to maintaining reasonable prices on the world scene, is that the export crops have often been the first to have reasonably efficient marketing systems associated with them. It is often more profitable
  • Minister, appeared more preoccupied with a better German association with decisions affecting tactical than with strategic nuclear weapons; President de Gaulle had not yet begun to use the French nuclear force as a diplomatic instrument; and American
  • for attainment weapons with spe-cified delivery vehicles. NATO planning, of compatibility the results of specified J. Safety features of specified atomic weapons and of the operational systems associated with such weapons and information necessary