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  • i't_' ES RAPPO RTEUR - MANF ULL DI SCUSSIO N TOP I C III. EXTE i:SIO il OF P~ESElff : 11.'f\ f{ BE YO t-i D SVtl , TAYL OR , J OHMSON , 1:JESTMOi1EL1HlO , P.DA\iS REPRIS fl. L PLANNH 1G r1ND RE LATIOil TO PHASE II B. EFF ECT IVE n:::ss OF ATT ACK
  • Dong Hoi Bks . ·. ~4 8 8 4o Vit ~hu Lu Bks . " 24 · 8 ~~ 36 39 Chap Le .Army Bks · ..' .. 4o ·. 12 _2±_ --22...­ 0ption I Totals ~ ~ 16 132 __ 33 ~36. OPTION II . - - O+ 0 '.' ",· 28 Option I plus . ~ . 2-S Chanh ·Hoa Bks : Vu Con Bks
  • McNamara said that if we had to destroy the MIG airplanes now in North Vietnam we would have to adop t Phase II of th e December progra m plus additional actions. General Wheeler commented that soone r or later the MIGs would come in. As U. S. air strikes
  • that U . S . shipments o.f la::-d to Cuba be allowed . The President saw nothing inconsisten t. Mr . Bundy expressed grave doubts about the wiscior.i of obtaining support of about thirteen small states ii the six large states opposed th e reBolutio:i
  • CTZ 15 MINOR 4 MAJOR II CTZ 7 MINOR 0 MAJOR 2/0 III CTZ 8 MINOR 0 MAJOR 0/0 IV CTZ 24 MINOR 2 MAJOR 1/0 9 ·3/3* 19 ""} .: .uvti.s "c..f 2 . 4 '" fvJ F 1 *- MAJOR ATTACKS WERE GROUND/FIRE ATTACKS ON TWO REFUGEE CAMPS AND ONE HAMLET
  • tives in South Vietnam; II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam; Ill. The Prese nt Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Ac· tion; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations. I. U. S
  • ADMINISTRATION GSA FOAM 7122 (7·72) / - -- ,, -----....-..-...--.--..-i;1:• 0 1~; WWW 1 ' :~ ~~}'.'\ . _·. ~ '· t .for.~:.:-: ry ,•, II - , •• :,·jD ; • . ­ ' ...(..: 5, 19 66 THE SECllETAP-.-i Tii!! UWJER SECW::l'tillY 1. We hEi v~ cont'1
  • of government to guerr illa ground forces had to be 10 : l. During his testimony before the Senate For e i gn Relations Committee, he had been asked this question . Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U. S. forces r equire d ii
  • . When the President returned to the room, Ambassador Goldbe r g said that the maximum military risk is that Chinese Communists w ill mo ve in troops . The decision to bomb POL will mean that we w ill be isolating ourselves internationally. Ii we lose
  • I 1(1G \. I I 1 '··"'·\ . Vl~TNAM • ' 7 do 108 ong Hoi NORTl:f\ ..... ,­ DEMARCATION LINE i--: _,, .ou ~ U .ll.NG TR't Tchepone' ' \_fj· 0 . -1 6- '·· - · .THUA THI E, ~ .. , 0 ,...J c./l .saravane c; - II . ~-J
  • by deliberately provoking a major crisis in some other area of the world, e.g., Berlin or Cuba. - 8 ­ ggg_p S-fc9s 8 F II LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SERVICE SET 2 ,,.. .. ~ R a E %8 aw ·... LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ' . . '. . DRV Ree.ctions Initiation