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- . McGeor ge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential
speech and discussed the proposed plan for a Southeast Asia D evelopment
Association. Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr . Rusk both indicated their
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Communist plot?
Was it a
USIA Director Rowan :
Peter Arnett of the Associated Press didn't write
his story out of the blue. We should find out about his background.
Secretary McNamara gave his account of how the gas story got started and,
in reply
- over Senators by merely citing numbers, but we can win them over by
discussing our overall strategy.
General Whe ele r: W e should resume the bombing as soon as practicable on
infiltration-associated targets which we have advised on the basis
- grew when we began our bombing. This bombing
is effective in that it reminds Hanoi of the increasing cost of the war to them.
As to the effect of the bombing pause, on balance it was neutral -- not all good
and not all bad.
As to the press, thanks
- at once. We must double the number of those in the Rural
Development cadres. The manpower needed a small claim on military resources.
Bill Moyers: Curr e nt press speculation is harmful. No comment should be
made to the press until Ambassador Lodge
- to be issued by the White House was approved and g iven to
George Reedy for release to the press.)
Secretary Dillon:
If we encou ra ge an air strike by the South Vietnamese,
e veryone will think it is a U . S. attack. Therefore , we should send along U.S.
plan
- of Shelepin 1 s visit.
USIA Dir ector Marks summarized world press reaction to the peace offensive.
The USIA summary is attached.
ln general, the peace initiative is welcomed but doubts are expressed that
it will produce results. Some writers think the p eace
- by Foreign
Minister Spaak, the text of which the State Department is to obtain
(copy attached).
1. France -- The difficulties we are encountering with France
in NATO are limited to the military field. We should press France to
support NATO in all other fields
- of officers .
USIA Director Marks: World press reaction to the Paris talks has been good .
A study made by USIA of the world press supports this conclusion.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Turning to the German problem, he first commented
on recent Italian
- leader recommends anything
other than proceeding with this program.
The President:
Would General Taylor give me his views .
General Taylor:
I a 1n optimistic. I think we have to press hard on
all four fronts - - economic , political, military
- which
they originated; and to provide press guidance that put a positive cast on
prospects. Mr. Martin had done much the same in calls to his Dutch and Swiss
counte rpar ts.
Deming had called his counte rpart in the UK Treasury who had had mixed
- .
Senator Dirksen asked what use could be made of the information which he had
h eard during the meeting.
The President replied that he had instructed McGeorge Bundy to talk to the
press, telling them as much as he possibly could without affecting
- into the Southeast Asia a rea for political reasons. He
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SERVIC
SECREJ:f--
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TOP SEC.BET
suggested that r ather than announce the moven'1ent of these fo r ces into the area
we c o uld informally gi v e the press the list of U .S. forces which
- be en
exaggerated. The security situation is much better th;-in as reported
in the press. In the n1ost i·ecent large engagc1nent; the Vietnamese
stood and fought very well.
General Wheeler said he agreed. He called.·attention to a page one
story
- of
the inadequacy of their treatment of U. S. correspondents. As for the U. S.
press corps in South Vietnam, most responsible correspondents support our
goals, even though they may be critical of certa in actions which we have taken.
Turning to the other two
- a firm determ
ination to achieve them. We would stress the dangers we see t o both of us in
Chinese expansion, and we would recognize the Soviet need to fol low a course wh i ch
does not destroy its leadership in the Corrmunist world. We would press
- is that, as was the
case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula , the catalyst ,
for training and inspirin~ them into effective action.
2 . Recommended actions. In such an umpromising state of affairs , what
should we do? We must continue to press
- , and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, went to his office
where a draft press statement was revised and lat e r issued.
(Copy attached)
Bromley Smith
SEC RET--
..
IMMEDIATE RELEA3E
Office of the White House Press Secretary
- l ki n g to the press or even to staff members
who m i ght talk to the p r ess. The h ighest security must be n1a intaine d.
Secret ar y Rusk:
vVe have an ele111entary obligation to suppo rt our combat
troops when t hey are c arry ing out a n assi
- of Central Intelligence
Director McDermott, Office of Emergency Planning
Director Rowan~ U. S. Information Age:icy
Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson
McGeorge Bundy, Special As3istant to the President
Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary
- the negotiations until it is certain there is no
alternative and the n decide to give the supers onic s . Assistant Secretary Talbot
should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the
r oad, he should refer back to Washington
