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  • FI LE LOCATION NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File NSC Meetings, vol . l Tab 4, 3/5/64, Secretary M::Namara's Mission to Vietnam OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache RESTRICTIClll CODES (A) C losed by Executive Order 11652 qovemlnq
  • Latin America
  • Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Secretary McNamara's Mission to Vietnam; OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache, 3/5/1964, Volume 1, Tab 4," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1
  • . Re - negotiation would call for Greek concessions. If the treaty laps es, the 10, 000 Greek in Turkey lose their rights . Any deal by Makarios and the Cypriots with the USSR will move slowly. Makarios apparently hopes to delay any action until
  • Congo (Democratic Republic)
  • of the inadequacy of their treatment of U. S. correspondents. As for the U. S. press corps in South Vietnam, most responsible correspondents support our goals, even though they may be critical of certa in actions which we have taken. Turning to the other two
  • do everything he could to work for a settlement. c. Italian leaders favored the bombing lull. been helpful to the Moro government. They believed our action had T OI SEGRE I /$ENSITIVE -2­ TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE d. De Gaulle was polite
  • - French relations. Schiller had said with indignation that he had been summoned to Paris the week before the Bonn meeting. He had instead sent his Deputy, Schoellhorn. The French had then threatened drastic action if the Germans did not revalue
  • later to take the war to North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said he had no additional comm ents to make but asked General Taylor to present the mili tary actions dis cussed in the r epo rt. General Taylor began by commenting that high - level overflights
  • for the North Vietnamese attack. If so, they may have b e en mouse-trapped by Hanoi. If they had known of the attack, the Russians might not have sent Kosygin to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese action has put the Russians on the spot. We have tal ke d
  • agencies and our Embassy in Saigon were developing some proposals for non- militar y actions in Vietnam . Secretary Vance reported that VC actions during the past week declined somewhat - - except for the dramatic bombing of the E mbassy . The Department
  • from all of Vietnam and strictly observe the Geneva Agreement of 1954. d. The U.S. continues its bombing of Laos and has opposed the holding of a conference on Laos. e . U.S . actions in Vietnam -- as well as support of the MLF -- create
  • is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to g i ve us . d . The U. S . actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are d etermined
  • / SENSITIVE Ambassador Thompson: We have completed ou r reprisal action for the North Vietnamese surprise attack. Another attack cannot be called reprisal. The punishment should fit the crime. No additional air strikes should be made now. (Th e statement
  • Communist oppos i­ tion. Kosygi n is expected to stay two days in No rth Korea. U . S . Action now puts heavy pressure on the Soviets . We should hold off a n y repri sal action until Kosygin leaves the a r ea . Ambassado r Thompson a dded that ou r
  • last visit. The number of people under Viet Cong control and the amount. of Vietnamese territory they control is increasing. The Viet Cong holds the initiative in the military action . The Khanh government is frag ­ mented a nd a religious crisis
  • in the Se curity Council w o uld be lh e best w ay to deal with Lhe situation. The USSR is the only Communist country represented there, and would have a special resp~nsibilit y to defend the DR V actions and thus might adopt a less forthcoming stance than
  • . The purpose of this private session was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam. The meeting in the President's office included, in addition
  • are fewer , smaller, of s h orte r durat ion and less frequent than in the early mo n t hs of the year. I at tribute this f all -off inlarge and moder ate scale combat actions by VC/NVA units to the attrition of supplies b y our air campaign against North
  • . M . Vietnam -- POL The P r esident summa ri zed the actions r equired and the j udgments wh ich wi ll have to be made in the next several weeks , emphasiz ing the decision to strike POL targets . In genera l, we should seek J with min imum loss
  • President Thieu would join in an announcement of the bombing suspension. The President: Asked each per son in turn whether he had any doubts as to the ac t ion proposed. Every person agreed with the proposed action. a. Two weeks ago we had a firm agreement
  • -- if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons --therefor it is difficult for us to provide them. There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we
  • are taking actions in anticipation of a resumption of the bombing. The y have improved their air defense. Equipment is being airlifted to Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese are moving forces up to their border wit h North Vietnam. The infiltration of North Vietnamese
  • force deployments in Vietnam. It is doubtful that we should go back to Congress to get additional authority every t ime we take a new action. The President already has , under the Constitution, all the power he needs to depl oy additional forces abroad
  • . underground testing. li 1.-nplies the Soviet Union ha8 been ta.ken in. Carl T. l:ow:m Director 5ECRE'f NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECORD OF ACTIONS NSC Action 2.482. VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE FAR EAST Noted Secretary Rusk's report
  • that they can allow this significant action to pass without reaction of some kind . ) - - Attrition of friends a.broad and people at home . This would be regarded in the world as a major step and there are bound to be reactions. What are the alternativ?s? Don't