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  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been declassified
  • ~ B) .-pou,, fall -.h as._. ue of or ap~ation • ·..-1a1 of "war crimes &" of treaties,. with new er fo~biddem cllemieata. C) hemb:btgof eiviliaa taqets,, aehoolao .ad. dibs; 'I LIMITEDOFFICIALUSE I I at one time or another- with Che
  • ) TICO STEAMDED v a r i o u s COURSES V IC IN I T Y PT ^ Yankee ci6N, 1 1 0 E) d uri ng p ie r c e arrow ops» longitude L a t it u d e TIME X
  • of the decision to make a reprisal strike only. The President: We need to know the ex-tent of the damage c aused by yesterday's strike . Thi s will have a bearing on future decisions. We should g ive considera ­ tion to Taylor• s recorrunendation but for the time
  • A R C H IV ES PRO C ESSIN G N O TE You w ill find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in th is file . The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • of nickel, platinum, beryl ore, magnesium, and castor oil, all cur­ rently in short supply in the commercial market. 3. Accurate, comprehensive, and timely statistics are ~ential to the development of sound economic policies by government, business
  • talks - combat President at any time. such troops 1968, peace. for that operations - forum a de-escalation revealed afterwards toward the 31st of March that the U.S. the next deployed these in the current was preparing five months
  • of the Vietnamese Gover~ment do not fall below the levels sustained .b y the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not · exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP acc9unt with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments
  • will be appointed Deputy for Pacification {Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador. To this end the present functions and personnel of: the Office of Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of MACY. For the time being
  • of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nbon. As of that time , o ne U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20 missing. Presumably, the missing soldie rs are bur ied under the rubble of the billet. Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion
  • and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way . We should be escalating . Personally I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating , and that it will continue to go
  • Tuesday night, because we are accepting Secretary Rusk's judgment that there are enough activities going on to make it prudent to wait until that time before you speak. We rejected the idea of a personally delivered message to Congress because proposed
  • . At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are Hill 861 ended yesterday described in the succeeding paragraphs. 2. At 3:00 PM EST
  • Vietnam . W e have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have hea rd nothing to date in reply. c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
  • from third countries, fate and other influences and to prepare a scenario projection. Three such moves were· followed by final critiques on 27 September. (Col T. J. McDonald, USA, Chier, Cold War ~ivision) The initial scenario for SIGMAadvanced time
  • ing for a long time. The President: The North Vietnamese made a pretty good bade. They get partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris. Under Secretary Katzenbach : The fate of the discussions in Paris turns
  • ; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken. · ~
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • and that it must gain victory this year or collapse? l. Hanoi's strategy warfare in South of revol~tionary Vietnam has always en.braced two propositions: protracted time. to prepare for a struggle-and to seek victory in the shortest of large US forces
  • to their international agreements," development in cooperation. ·6. honor Actions. In order to meet the pres sure s against us, and demonstrate the unity and will of the American people at this critical time, I am asking the .Congress to do the following: -- help
  • ..--ik,would be a de:a.l vrith ·.·North Vict.i'1am:for a truce in the war, a complete removal.of fae US presence, and a "neutralist" or 11Titoist 11 but still separate ·souL.'t Viet-Nam . .. .. ... ' .. ' •• . • .... . .Atthe same time, I would
  • , at which time the tempo will s t ep up . In r e sponse to the President 1 s questions, General Wheeler gave these answers: a. Iniiltration from North to South V i etnam is estimated a t about 4, 500 men per month. b. Air operations in the north have
  • vis~t should be clear d with his office." t At that time Governor Harriman wa As 1st nt Secre• ry for Fr tern ffairs . I b 11 ve it w s your int ntion that offici 1 vi it b coordinated with the ssi tant Secretary for F r Eastern Affairs
  • believes it is pos~ible ~o forge a national political movement at this time. All agree that the . .. , National Front surfaced under the leadership of Tran Van Don on . .i February 19, will not and can not develop into a real political movement
  • for service in Vietnam, increase allowances, provide better leave arrange­ ments for time with families, authorize accelerated promotions and give top level recognition and support to the statement that the way to advance is through service in Vietnam
  • sporadic firing incidents in the center of Saigon just before midnight their· time. Snipers are around the American Embassy and near 1 Ambassador Bunker s residence •. The report is attached. ~ Bromley Smith DECLASSIFIED Authority bS/J /b-J..S-'K ' sc
  • , it was later decided to spend the meeting time discussing the President's Asian trip . Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior to the NSC Meeting
  • was en route to Saigon,• Diem und Nhu ordered the Army into the pagodas in Saigon, bringing to a fl::i.shpoint tho simmering Buddhist crisis tl1at had been going on sh1ce i.,tiy., ·The timing must have been related to-Lodge's arrival, • . .. 3. .After
  • intelligence which was available in the cir­ cumstances? b. Was the evaluation of the available intelligence sound and did that evaluation reach the-decision-makers in time to assist the~ in taking appropriate action? I ! ' I The answer to these general
  • clear the huge amount of time which we spend defending our selves from our domesti c opponent s . More time should be spent on new initiatives. Perhaps we should have two Councils - - one defensive and one offensive. New initiatives are required. We can
  • IN RECEIPT OF JCS TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CINCPAC OPLAN 37P, HQ ARSTRIKE, DTD 5 AUG 6k OR DESTINATION AIRFIELDS TO BE PROVIDED BY USARPACCM MATS MUST HAVE THESE REQUIREMENTS AND THE RELATED DESTINATION AIRFIELDS TO DETERMINE CLOSURE TIMES. THIS IS ONE
  • assistance should be maintained at auch levele that their magnitude and effectiveness 1n the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United State• ln tho time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude
  • elections in SVN indicate popular support for the. war. The time has now arrived to achieve decisive military victory even if it requires escalation of our efforts. After the enemy has been defeated, we can devote our tremendous resources to social
  • not feel that he should strike north before his security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological requirement t o hit North Vietnam at a later time . He feels
  • whoever comes out on top. It is a messed up situation. Secretary Rusk: We should not call off Ambassado r Taylor 's planned trip to Washington. We have a strong t eam in the field and we don 2 t know when would be a better time for him to come. r:f'OP
  • . The Kennedy statement at Fort Bragg referring to th e U.S. G over nment's position at the time of the Geneva Conference. 2 . The Taylor Report, 196 1 -- that part which discussed what might be necessary if current moves did not work in Vietnam . 3. The Geneva
  • funds at this time - - it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA. 3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12
  • SIGMAII-65 as the first politico-military simulation of the FY 66 program. Unlike interagency senior or cabinet level exercises, usually conducted three or four times each in the year, SIGMAII was carried out with participants grades of Lt Colonel
  • approved a program of further pressure against North Vietnam but did not initiate actions for the time being, in order to allow Ambassador Taylor a period of time in which we hoped he would be able to assis t the Vietnamese in creating a stable government