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  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • I flL&'°Pl lo UBCUSSlFIED June 16, 1964 ~i::IP &EGR£Ta t' f''?T"IGT~ rnT>. NJ.Tl0N/ L SECUP..ITY / .CTI0N M.Ei-.{v~DUI.! N0. 305 ot State ni. Secretary oi ~l&UH "f O: The &.>crete.ry The Ch&trtnan. J tomlc .t:.zwrgy c~...unb•ion 1'he
  • with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7122 iREV. 5-82) CONFI DEN'fIAL DECLASSIFIED-~~-~- _::~ ,.~ w. w.. Rostow E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 _NY 2 7 - /lo;;J.. By ~ • NARA. Date 11-S"- g7 November 19, 1964
  • tentatively assigned to these alternatives. Some disagreement does exist concerning the specific circumstances in which given actions might be taken, and it is generally agreed that these uncertainties cannot be resolved at this time. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958
  • \· rumpri!'r. our operating mr.di11111.'" :\,J. • mirnl Dnvicl I.. McDonald, then c-hief it :uul «'Xploiting its nnturnl re­ tlm Navy." ,-11ur.-1•:
  • SECft:E I WASHINOTON Wednesday, October 30 , 1968 ... MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT : DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 / 'lo-131). NtJ 8v ~ Meeting on Stockpile Objectives Noon - - October 31 - - Cabinet Room NARA O:ue · I -JI- 'JI
  • that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time
  • that Soviet defenses could, at the present time, drastically reduce the destructive capa­ bilities of the current US family of ICBMs. It is possible, through underground testing and ex­ trapolation of past test data, to determine the effi­ cacy of various
  • lnformaUon. (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the documenL (C) Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In the donor's deed at gift. ' j P' DD~sn~ I u , , l\Ilt.l lll,} JdU1 USP f • , • I • r ) TH~ NEW YORK TIMES
  • coatrilMator lo tbe We•n ..._ of Ua.e armr ..,x1 •. U:CUT DECLASSIFIED E.O 1,:,,::n, Sec. 3.4 Ei'.4.a,J~. NARA, D3to~-/~ .. - .,, ~-OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department ~ATE, OCOWCI . ~~w ~ of ·state I . • ' '\ 'SECRET '\ 53 1 °' f I~ ,..,, DAC
  • Presidential decision on the substance of a programo I believe this is a realistic schedule which will make possible the timely and orderly considera­ tion by the President of the subjects covered by NSAM 335. This proposed schedule presents one difficulty
  • ?ff'Il)iW. If..!. I : protect Ilo non-nuclear Po...-ers~ CONCLUSIONS. Based on the discussion below, the following preliminary conclusiODS are suggested: lo If the object to induce a non•nuclear of a guarantee State potential by that State
  • ­ priate time . The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prosI>ects for international negotiations. }n ~4v IS-f McGeorge Bundy CO~l FiDEN n
  • to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need
  • at Hiroshima, are readily available and it would require only a few years for a new nuclear power to weapon­ ize a bomb to fit. Moreover, missiles may in time become cheaper and more readily available: through the satellite programs or surface­ to-air missile
  • , Game Director) . As one of the participanta aaid at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, con­ people in tributed by so many knowledgeable
  • India it is not so much one of influencing to stick tactical to a decision approach s.ee.R:e'fi HOP8:1Ul LIMITEDDISTRIBlTfION at this it has time is to S.8CRJff/NOFOaN _ LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION - 6 - accept that of using requests
  • -~-ol- SE CRET­ --&:EC !tEI -2­ The Pr esid ent introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from
  • a single approval action for a series of similar tests will suffice, the Secretary of State will be consulted with respect to the timing of each test. aunches involving nuclear devices ~ 'a ~ 6a ' ·-- Ji #... 'ifCuv:. J .. t The Executive Secretary
  • time until the Indians came to accep t the necessity for Western assistance; b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely by the specialis t s concentrating on arms control or by the country or area specialis ts. We must
  • . 'interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be • d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued. The study should balance the price of each
  • is threatening time in this century. c. Need to cooperate holocaust. 2. overall rather is FRG nuclear world peace for third than face nuclear Vis a vis Europe: a. Same as a. above. b. Same as b. above. c. Separate US and Europe on high-risk short of all
  • anything to do with the Committee of Principals. It might be possible to find something by talking personally to Bromley, but the time hasn't seemed to arrive; if you want to talk with him, that might help. * Attached. Ina