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- i't_' ES
RAPPO RTEUR - MANF ULL
DI SCUSSIO N TOP I C III. EXTE i:SIO il OF
P~ESElff :
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BE YO t-i D SVtl ,
TAYL OR , J OHMSON , 1:JESTMOi1EL1HlO , P.DA\iS
REPRIS fl. L PLANNH 1G r1ND RE LATIOil TO PHASE II
B. EFF ECT IVE n:::ss OF ATT ACK
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Dong Hoi Bks
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8
8
4o
Vit ~hu Lu Bks
. " 24 ·
8 ~~ 36
39
Chap Le .Army Bks · ..' .. 4o ·.
12 _2±_ --22...
0ption I Totals
~ ~ 16
132 __
33
~36.
OPTION II . -
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28
Option I plus
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Chanh ·Hoa Bks :
Vu Con Bks
- McNamara said that if we had to destroy the MIG airplanes
now in North Vietnam we would have to adop t Phase II of th e December progra m
plus additional actions.
General Wheeler commented that soone r or later the MIGs would come in.
As U. S. air strikes
-
that U . S . shipments o.f la::-d to Cuba be allowed . The President saw
nothing inconsisten t.
Mr . Bundy expressed grave doubts about the wiscior.i of obtaining
support of about thirteen small states ii the six large states opposed
th e reBolutio:i
- CTZ
15 MINOR
4 MAJOR
II CTZ
7 MINOR
0 MAJOR
2/0
III CTZ
8 MINOR
0 MAJOR
0/0
IV CTZ
24 MINOR
2 MAJOR
1/0
9
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MAJOR ATTACKS WERE GROUND/FIRE ATTACKS ON TWO REFUGEE CAMPS
AND ONE HAMLET
-
tives in South Vietnam; II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam;
Ill. The Prese nt Situation; IV.
Alternative Present Courses of Ac·
tion; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But
Rejected; and VII. Recommendations.
I.
U. S
- ADMINISTRATION
GSA
FOAM
7122
(7·72)
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5, 19 66
THE SECllETAP-.-i
Tii!! UWJER SECW::l'tillY
1. We hEi v~ cont'1
- of government to guerr illa
ground forces had to be 10 : l. During his testimony before the Senate
For e i gn Relations Committee, he had been asked this question . Comment
had been made about the astronomical size of U. S. forces r equire d ii
- .
When the President returned to the room, Ambassador Goldbe r g said that the
maximum military risk is that Chinese Communists w ill mo ve in troops . The
decision to bomb POL will mean that we w ill be isolating ourselves internationally.
Ii we lose
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DEMARCATION LINE
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deliberately provoking a major crisis in some other area of the
world, e.g., Berlin or Cuba.
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