Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Collection > National Security Files (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Meeting notes (remove)
  • Subject > Vietnam (remove)

23 results

  • but this may not be s o. We should look again at our programs and examine all ideas without thinking whether or not they can be done without increasing our expenditures . {8) The Defense Department i s studying several new military recommendations made
  • their new military plans. It is unlikely that present political actions will meet th e situation. should plan for a bigger political effort to reverse the current trend . political actions should be proposed for consideration. We New An overall
  • there are str onger. Willia1n Bundy: As to South Vietnam, Prime Minister Khanh has suspended the constitution and t he Buddhists have made their demands on the government. The Military Council will meet tonight to elect a new President. A new Na tional Asse m
  • the sending of U . S. military forces to Vietnam would require a new Congressional Re solution. He felt that our sending troops to Europe i n the early 1 50s was not a relevant analogy. The President asked the group what Ambassador Taylor wou l d be taking
  • Thieu is a stabilizing force. He prefers to sit in the back ­ ground, consequently, he will not take the post of Prime Minister. The present Saigon Government framework is solid but the members of the new government are not yet well - known to us
  • pressur es . McGeorge Bundy summarized briefly the latest U.S . intelligence estimate of Hanoi ' s reaction to a new U. S . air strike . (A copy is attache d. ) ( Tab D) The President sugg ested w e discuss our position w ith the Soviet Ambas­ sador
  • : Reviewed in summary form the Vietnam negotiations since October 9 when the new phase opened in Paris. a. On October 14 he informed the three Presidential can didates tha t the DRV was prepared to sit down with representatives of the South Vietnamese
  • calm. The President 1 s message to De Gaulle and the latter's reply probably had a favorable effect on the market, over and above its political impact. 2. First assessment of the measures taken by the French government: The new exchange controls are s
  • In response to a reques t from t he President, Mr. lvlcCone reported that there was nothing new out of Vi etnam this morning worthy of mention . Secretary Rusk said that we had preliminary information about what might become an important new development , l. e
  • of evidence from the North Vietnamese. General McCon n ell: Our bombing is ineffective because of the restrictions placed upon the Air Force . We should lift these restrictions and we would then g et results . l'OP SECRET/SENSII lvE ­ SERVICE SET .. New
  • , 000 men. The Chiefs are opposed t o the deployment of U.S. forces in t he highlan ds of South V ietnam and want t he new forces to be used as a mobile rese rv e near the coast. Gene r al Wheele r: The ARVN fo rc es d i d not do as well a s we expected
  • elections in which the Communist Party did better than the Socialists . The result will be difficult negotiations before a new Government can be formed . Current East German act ivity, such as travel restrictions now being ilnposed, indicate that the East
  • to avoi d undermi ning the confidence which exists between the President and Ambassador Taylor. No great new decisions are expected to result. Under Secretary Ball Reviewed the problem of military assistance to Jordan. The Arab States are jointly tryi ng
  • , the new Thai troops are doing very well, the Koreans are e.>..1:ra­ ordinary, and the Australian units' morale is very high. Two problems which need attention: 1. The Communists are trying to win over the youth of South Vietnam. In Saigon, the youth
  • the present period. The President reviewed thr ee years of involvem e nt in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt chat an unusually large amount of tim e w;i.s spent consider ing new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy has been the same for three
  • . He declined to tell our Charge in Vientiane whether the Hanoi leaders told him anything new. The President: We must get the news fastest about the Ronning mission . Secretary Rusk: Prior to executing any new orders on bon1bing, we must give 24
  • to a question as to what the Cong r essional leaders should be told when they joined the group for the formal NSC Meeting at 10: 30, the President said he would ask Secretary McNamara to report on the South Vietnamese raid and to give any new information about
  • of a coalition government before negotiations could be under­ taken. e . Prime Minister Wilson spoke of a new British initia tiv e as IC C co ­ chairman. He asked that the peace offensive be prolon ged long enough for the Soviets to react on the basis
  • terms . 2 . The milita r y case for a ttack on POL: Sec r eta r y McNamara; and then poll the Chiefs one by one . 3. Anticipatory messages to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. FYI. I personally do not believe it is necessar y to info r C'l
  • is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to g i ve us . d . The U. S . actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are d etermined
  • be engaged in fighting under the new progra m . He also asked whether U . S. planes were being adequately maintained, adding that many people had ex ­ pressed their concern to him on this p oint. Secretary McNarnal'a r eplied that U . S . soldiers
  • the enemy militarily; we must make demons trable progress in pacification; at the same time, we must add a new ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position by gett ing ourselves into a military posture that we credibly
  • zed but have no interes t in the control of conventional a r ms . Our immediat e p r obl em is to gi ve King Hassan a sense of stability. Therefore , we have r ecommended a $14 million a rms sale and a new food ag reement. In this p r ocess , however