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  • to the false charges levied against us last June, that we accept the idea that Nasser had been misinformed . Unless we do , resumption of relations is hopeless. Mr . Katzenbach said that we were prepared to resume relations if we had an opportunity. We did
  • , was deeply concerned about the maintenance of peace in the Middle East . In a letter of May 17 to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol , he had declared that the United States Government was well aware of the strain being placed on Israel's patience
  • OF THEIR OWN UNDER CAIRO BACKED PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANITHE WEST BANK ZATION LEADER SHUQAYRI THEY COULD HAVE IT. REPRESENTATIVES QUICKLY ASSURED HIM THAT WAS THE LAST THING THEY DES IRED. 6. ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL, STUNG BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
  • need to hold in reserve. So far the Israelis have succeeded in keeping this apart from the rest of our relationshipo The only counter big enough to sway Eshkol, I suspect, will be the US-Israeli relationship itselfo By purely foreign policy standards
  • and No. 2), suggest that the Isra~li Governme nt is moving toward a more open attitude- towards the Dimona nuclear complex vis-a-.vis the public. The February 3 item refers to a visit to the Dimona p lan t on February 1 by Prime Minister Levi ESHKOL
  • ments capable of both buying off and suppressing revolutionary· opposition. Internal security in the smaller states is not, as it was in Aden, dependent on British troops but on local police and armed levies, trained and officered by the British
  • not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales. '71.U,J& , ~ Nicholas deBo Kat)enba~ Acting SECRE'f
  • . Tuesday, May 23, 1967 -- 11:30 am Mr. President: l was asked to supply to you by·12:00 noon today a readable copy of your May Zl measage to Prime Minister Eshkol (Tab A).. plus the nhistory11 of the document. Along with the copy, Iatta-ch: Esbkol's
  • communication from His Excellency the Prime Minister ot Israel Levi Eshkol to His. Excellency the President or the United States, Lyndon Baines Jotuisonz- noear Mr. President, Your message on tho situation across the Jordan cease-tire lines reached me yesterday
  • Agramat. (They entered the Chicago bar the same year.) The message is via. Goldberg to you from Prime Minister Esbkol. The:re are two points. 1. Eshkol uhopea you understand" the action taken by Israel; that it resulted from a judgment that their security
  • of the Sugar Corporation {CAD) and government offices, gaining widespread acceptance of that charge that CAD employees are subject to political pressures and campaign levies and that at least some CEDULA and civil registry personnel are illegally equipping
  • they have been making. Question: Mr. Secretary, the F-4 for sale to Israel? is there any plane under consideration besides Secretary Clifford: As you know, the F-4 was involved in a conversation held between President Johnson and Premier Eshkol last
  • Locke's fect, his response on him. of Viet Cong Strategy" Vietnamese Government" these-papers were written ·at request. and constitute, in ef­ to a pe~sonal request you levied~ 2. The attached papers coristitute a field r,: study and should
  • on June 14 or 15, details of the delegation to be provided later. When asked if Foreign Minia.t ei: Gromyko would be coming. the Soviet oifi.cer said he didn *t know yet. In this connection, the press is reporting Prime Minister Eshkol as ha.vb1g told his
  • the impression of a hiatua in decision• before he comes. W. W. R.oatow ----- Approve now Approve now but hold until after Eshkol visit Call me ---- SK JilEfL December 21, 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: The Perklna Committee Study oa Foreign
  • joins me in sen.ding our warmest good wt.shes to Ms.ta. Eshkol 1U1d to you. Slnce11ely, i ,. : J Lbj c-::.~ '.·:. - _., . DECLASSIFIED ;.-, Authority AJ LJ 8¥- lt: ~ r -r Hts Excellency Levi Esbkol '.Prime Minister of ,I srael Tel Avlv By_
  • '' · decision Oll tba .mako-u~ of a conunissian which is to "study" inpeachmoru: charges levied against Presicle:\t Robles. In fact, both sidas a1:e waiting fol: evidence the other is complying with the te::1.-.s of the com~~omise :
  • , - April Z3, 1968 MEMORA..'IDUM FOR THE PRESIDi:NT SUBJECT: Su.tu, o! Your Dechlon on Alrcra!t !or Israel You will recall wt, a!ter your blk wlt.'t Eshkol, you a1ked for three report, t:> deter:nine how long you could keep open your decieton on t.'te
  • for U.S. discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol: 1. The U.S. should tell Israel that, while recognizing Israel's growing need for tanks, the U.S. cannot enter into direct supply at this time. 2. However, the U.S. believes that alternate sources
  • 1 s message to Eshkol, which he did fai tL~.L.ly.l. .~r'\':w DE C Authority .J.1>:!:~~~~:,_;::_.:;;..;..._..........- By·_ __...~- HHS aBCR:E'f CLASSIF'!CATION ()A. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT 5 Nov. 21,, 1966 Date Mr. Walt
  • ter Eshkol' s shoes is another qu estion. Eban had laid bare Israeli thinking and we understood it. In any case, the situation on June 8 appeared 11 more manageable than five days or three days a go . " The air battl e had been significant. M1·. Helms
  • of Economics at M. I. T.; and Mr. Milton Chase of the Department of the Interior, who is Chairman of the United States part of the United States-Israel Joint Board. I dis• cussed the desalting project with Prime Minister Eshkol, the Ministers of Agriculture
  • I o-/JI WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) FORM OF DOCUMENT #3a lettei Eshkol PCI #Sa lette1 President to PCI 2 pp. #22 memo Rostow to S 1 p. Rostow to s 1 p.~5'[03 #22a memo to the 2 pp. #23a cabli Rawalpindi #29a cab
  • to Eshkol and Eban. This should be a secret approach to them in Jerusalem. Agreement should be sought both as to substance and method. Specifically, the Israelis should be urged to agree to: (a) flexibilfu about the means by which a final settlement