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  • NOTYETKAVE A NEGOTIABLE POSITIONONTHESEPROCEDURAL ISSUES, V! COtn..O TRYT0~80.BACXTO THIEU. ALTHOUGH·! Al'INOTSUR! THATTKIS WOULD PROJ>UCE AN !"PROVEDPACKAGE IN TIME FORRESll.TS TO a& SHOWN BEFORE CONGRESS CONVENE ONJANUARY L. DTGI 312139% DEC 68 t
  • • •·~ :eu with the 'Vietnamese ::,.nd ~1ith small underdeveloped cowltrles at the Ur.dt:0d Nations ·1$ t..l-iat',}t~·i a vi~•-u:1r:l'iMll~C~~"M ilio.b'., ...~-,....,a.._ . n , . ,... van~e on ...;!] i~ .• ~-' '~r' . . , . - . .;~-:--"'· . ~71 ~':~ ~-~ I
  • ,.MINISTEROF -~EFE~SEVY, :~I~ISTER OF ECONOMY·HO,·CHIEF OF JGS.GEN~RALCAOVANVIE~, ·GE~JERALLAC, DEPUTYMINISTERFOR RD, ANO AMBt\SS~µOR BUI 'DIE~. HE AGREESTHATWESHOULD DOPREPARATORY WORK o~• ..co~~rUNIQUE BEFORE "HIS.ARRIVALHONOLULU .•• .. . . . 3. THIEU
  • with officials who could act in a liaison or observer capacity or who could play a diplomatic role if in the talks. Saigon at some_ point is included 3. Hanoi is represented in Paris through a seven-man Delegation General headed by Mai Van Bo. Until August 1966
  • for popular forces which has been approved. With respect to the manpower gap, Quat said that he had asked Thieu urgently to study this problem with senior officers, particularly with respect to more effective "political mobilization" throughout the country
  • r r o r i s m p e r s i s t e d and on March 19 we c o n d u c t e d r a i d s on North Vietnamese m i l i t a r y d e p o t s a t Phu Van and Vinh Son, S i n c e t h e n , t h e r a i d s have been f r e q u e n t , b u t s o have ou r i n d i c a t
  • of indigenous political development. Otherwise, our defeat of the Viet Cong by force could be followed by a Communist takeover by political means. It could then well be said: The operation was a great success, but the patient died. Tran Van Do, the sagacious
  • private discussion revolves around the subject of the military' s role in any future government.. Sp~culation on whether General Thieu or General Ky will run for president is widespread. So~ politicians are focusing on ways to "force" the military
  • of five trucks, several buildings, two fuel tanks, one artillery weapon, three communications vans, one crane, three fork lifts and a guard tower. The bladder farm was reported 33 percent destroyed. Initial casualties wer'e recorded as one killed and 28
  • . Although Quat has told me that no decisions have been taken, the press and our informants have it that the Council confirmed General "Little" Minh as Commander-in-Chief (he holds this post now on an "Acting" basis), selected General Huynh Van Cao as Chief
  • President Thieu would join in an announcement of the bombing suspension. The President: Asked each per son in turn whether he had any doubts as to the ac t ion proposed. Every person agreed with the proposed action. a. Two weeks ago we had a firm agreement
  • Vietnam war . 2. During conve r sations with both Thieu and Ky, he emphasized the importan ce of the relationship of these two leaders to each other and to the leg islature. 3 . The inaugural speech of Thieu was his own, not ghost written. Thieu i s
  • «-,. FOR THE SECRETARY FROM I saw General Thieu in the direction of negotiations the following· lines: BUNKER (Saigon, 9433) at 9: 00 a. m. on October 24 to discuss further efforts and a peaceful settlement. I spoke to him along 11 My authorities in Washington
  • n '' frozen" in a de ­ fensive posture. The reason for this was that the VC had established a stranglehold around the cities. General Westmo r eland had tol d President Thieu that one could not affo r d to defend a city from the inside and had to go
  • Thieu is a stabilizing force. He prefers to sit in the back ­ ground, consequently, he will not take the post of Prime Minister. The present Saigon Government framework is solid but the members of the new government are not yet well - known to us
  • that he too would have time to visit several Latin American countries to demonstrate our high-level interest in the area . The President asked Mr. Ht:_lms for the latest situation report from Mr. Helms said the Generals are fed up with President Thieu
  • and a broad spectrum of US military and civilian officials. I did not tra·vel in Ill Corps but had good sessions with our old and new Regional Officers. In Saigon, I saw a wide variety of people includi1tg Thieu, Ky, Prime Minister Huong, Interior Minister
  • TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: P r ogress on Vietnamese diplomatic front You will want to know, before you meet the Leadership, that Taylor and Johnson had a very good meeting with Ky, Thieu, and Co on strengthening our international political position at the same
  • FOR AMS BUNKER AND GENERAL VESTMOR£LAND. I KAVZ CALLED t HE PRESIDENT'·S ATTtMT ION . TO TKE A'Dl/AHCE · TEXT or THIEU'S SPIECK OF TODAY, THE PRESIDENT REGARDS It OF THE riIGHE~T, REPEAT HIGHEST, IMPORTANCE TK.i\T YOU MAXE A MAXIMUM t1FORT to GET FULL
  • WITH THE SPEEU .ANDVIGORWE MIGHTHOPE. IN DOINGSO, HE HAS.MADEHIM­ ~SELF VULNERABLE TO CHARGES OF BEI~G UNDULYINFLUE~CEDBY ~THEAMERibANS~ANDTHIS MAYBE ONE OF THE MOTIVESTHAT :LIE BEHINDTHESE NATIONALISTICINITIATIVES BY KY ANDOTHERS . .THIEU COULDTHEREFORE FIND
  • ~ program, Further, Westmor eland repor ts that t he morale of his Air Force personnel may already be showing sir.as of e r osion -­ a n erosion result ing from current operational restrictions . .: President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky are thinking along
  • as possible. Numbers of our Congressmen go to Saigon, are seen by President Thieu, and are welcomed by the Vietnamese. We should t ake this opportunity to see that their Senators are well received here. SFCRE'ff SENSITIVE SERV\CE &t; f • 1 1
  • north to obtain be made Hanoi would The period for a period 24 of Vinh. the concurrence Sunday denounce night, of Thieu the 31st. the project of demonstrated of several weeks. and, restraint, thus, Twelve hours later to know how
  • the viewpoint that I expressed when I quoted the statement of Presi­ dent Thieu of South Vietnam in my interview with the • corr~pondents. • RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION Q. Mr. President, in your judgment, did the interview Premier Kosygin gave to Life