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  • than territory gained. In fact, 40 percent of Vietnam is uninhabited and 80 percent of the people live on less than 40 percent of the land. In addition, we must remember that we have not been here for years. Indeed, our first combat troops arrived only
  • than territory gained. In fact, 40 percent of Vietnam is uninhabited and 80 percent of the people live on less than 40 percent of the land. In addition, we must remember that we have not been here for years. Indeed, our first combat troops arrived only
  • , in open session. his annual review but not be limited 7. Have Secretary Rusk offer to appear in executive to discuss Vietnam or other matters i1?.-open session members still want to. -TOP
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • 111un1ni: c,f the EA;,lonar.c OI' hY$UOll pt wlUc:la 1A llll1 maccer \G 1111\IAIIU\Aelr&acl peROll la prohll:lltccl 1>7 law. MATlON Rt::Por.r,, ~9!. ;:'JNAL.LY l60L~20Z :ZVALUATED aTE COUNTRY: ·sourH VIETNAM DoI:. A?~IL SU3JECT: ! COR?S
  • . ( Pams. 4-18) B. Another major problem for Sato is his identification with gen­ erally unpopular US policies in Vietnam. If extremists who now lead the opposition Socialist Party succeed in exploiting the issue to mount mass demonstrations on the. scale
  • going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam
  • to encourage sympathetic nonaligned nations willing to speak up against those who are blindly critical of the US position in Vietnam. One of the more imminent focal points of this effort should be to prevent the Algiers Chiefs of State Conference in late June
  • Vietnam criticism
  • p- 1p [DttpHeate of 132a., l"~SF, GawAky liiJ.e, Y.ietnam, "JC(e}, 2{13-20168, tietletai MititMJ Aeti¥it3/"] #64b cable #~n'Pff'tn-t---- Intelligence Cable ~ '+ l&- 9 a- /JL. \,-9/,· ~, s 1p [Duplicate of #32b , NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(6
  • ~ Clll--~ #30e rpt Bio Sketch M'4'NvJ~~-oi C 2p /14:Sarpt Vietnam Political Situation Report~ S 1 pJ. tJ-? 4 ':SD NWC\4-· ~-C\-G5 i #48 memo Rostow to President, 6.10 p.111. PCI 1 p (\'O' 4-li-'\S t-lLS°C\~-l,f-53 #48a drttff €ioldbe1g
  • TO PAGE 2 RUFNCR 10084 -S E C R E T .·•THE JUST POSITION OF VIETNAM AS IT HAD BEEN DEFINED BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ' HIS DECLARATIONS OF JAN. 28 AND DEC. 29, QOYU•. THESE STATEMENTS CONFIRM AND CLARIFY AN ARTICLE IN 'CHAN-DAN' DATED FEB. 5
  • - !VLT 11-,, 1-It. , -[Duplicate of #24, NSF, Country File, Conga, Vel. 14} e C 2p -- ,, " le [Duplicate of #24a, NSF, Country File, Congo, Vol. 14] '"f"'- s--,,-9.s- NL J 91/-.;>7 Ip [Duplicate of #8, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "5D (3) Allies
  • with the North Vietnamese representatives. lt,.has been suggested that General Goodpaster and General Seignious be the initial advisors with General Goodpaster returning after the first week or two. 4. Vietnam A report by General including: Westmoreland
  • MILITARYANDCIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS--ARE ALREADY AWARE OF THE VIGOROUS RESPONSEOF THE GOVERNMENT OF THEREPUBLICOF PAGE3 RUEHGN18716 UNCLAS VIETNAME TO THE DESTRUCTIVE.EFFECTS OF THE ATTACKS.THEIR PERFORMANCE IN THESECRITICALDAYSHASOFFEREDA POWERFUL DEMONSTRATION
  • [Duplicate of #82a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), General Military Activity"}-&bK_J 2/68 A Rostow to President, 7·25 p.m. S 1 p ~ ;/ A/LT?t,-l'i'f ~./?. 'If [Duplicate of #85, NSI( CountJy File, Vietnam, "2C(5), General M" · · · " 6()x 10 2/7/68
  • , the following information might be useful: Bilateral Relations: We have no serious problems with Denmark; it is unlikely that Krag will raise any bilateral issues. Vietnam: In his UN speech last Friday, Krag endorsed a bombing halt followed by a reduction
  • is unpatriotic, you quote out of context a statement of bi's in which you say ·be 0 derided those who make Vietnam •a topic of cocktail pant.ea.' etc. u The p':i-eaident was at Fort Benning oa this occasion. He was talking to •me·nwho ue going to Vietnam
  • is unpatriotic, you quote out of context a statement of bi's in which you say ·be 0 derided those who make Vietnam •a topic of cocktail pant.ea.' etc. u The p':i-eaident was at Fort Benning oa this occasion. He was talking to •me·nwho ue going to Vietnam
  • participate in a peace or protest movement chiefly aimed at the draft and at Vietnam policies by staging campus sit-ins, picketing _government and industrial recruiters, or marching in antigovernment demonstrations such as the one in Washington in October 1967
  • ..SOO-.;t3 \ Sec1et 1 p ~-~7>=,S-Nl.-i-'1-s--dd- f"lt.e: l.OCATION South Vietnam and U.S. Policies RESTRICTION COCES (Al Closed by Executive Order 12356'governing 11Cc:ess to national security informttion. (Bl Cloeed by statute or by agency which o
  • See all scanned items from file unit "South Vietnam and U.S. Policies"
  • Vietnam
  • Folder, "South Vietnam and U.S. Policies [X-File] [1 of 2], Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 19
  • of the impending large-scale . cities and towns of South Vietnam .. I recognize • of _making such a determination at this distance of impeding current operation-related activities sembling a detailed investigation. Nevertheless, to· be in the interest of the entire
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • ~ -/.S-- 79 Authority By TOP SECRET McG. B. .J Znuari 27. 1965 DECL S IFIED MEMORANDUM l'OR THE PRESB>ENTi thor· y Re: Ba•lc Polley In Vietnam By hsc;/Z:u /dr/?~ '~ 'NARS, Date /@9'/z7 l. Bob McNamatta and I have aekad tor the meetlna wUh
  • . ( We've averaged $3 million a year since 1960; France provides about $45 mlllion a. year.) Vietnam Ahidjo bas been scrupulously neutral on Vietnam in public, to us in private. He walked away from an anti-U. S. communique to Moscow last summer. Main Talking
  • relations result from President Johnson having allowed the day-to-day control over such matters to slip out of Presidential hands because of his preoccupation with Vietnam and domestic political difficulties stemming from the Vietnam war. Kie singer told
  • ---+-- A (dup. #55, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 8) (dup. #124c, NSF Country File, Vietnam, A (dup. #124d, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 8) FILE LOCATION NSF McGeorge Bundy, Memos for the President, Vol. 4, 5/1-27/64 RESTRICTION CODES (A) Closed
  • the Pope soon, presumably to talk about Vietnam., He implied I might contribute information which could be useful in that regard. ##### 8ECHET DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NIJ t £ --~SI y 1wic& , NARA, Date cl-cJ t-tf>J> - U: S • r
  • . It includes some interesting information on DZ"u on pages 4-- S. W. W. Rostow SECRET DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12 58, NLJ '1 '-\ .... 3 NARA, VIETNAM STATION REPORT NO. 46/67 (26 AUGUST - 3 SEPiE"'BER 1967) A BARE AND BLESSED PLURALITY THE F'INAL FIGURES
  • they are careful, "may find themselves in curious position of being more pro-Hanoi than Prime Minister of Soviet Union. 11 3. Significantly, Guardian. which has been major voice opposing U.S. Involvement in Vietnam, today expresses analysis of war which ;,goes much
  • : o #78a memo l-#--P#--m:eml8-- ecret /., "1') /,;;.>. , .- 'jf Nortn Vietnam »J... _J ~ /? S ~- to Bromley Smith from Paul Nitze Secret ---+-- ~ l p- O.§/J0/66 A 1 p 05/31/66 A 5 p 05/23/66 A &C .P48-s4.-dent--f r..olll
  • e ft=E-'f SB :.?AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONALESTIMATES 26 February 1968 ---------·- SUSJE'CC '1. of ~ a\ '"'{heOutlook in Vietnam 1h (s Memorandum does not seek to explore c,i t
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • ._meroo 4-i meDlQ. -Bator to the Fre. C 2 pp. re IDA 42c memo Barr to Rusk and Fowler re IDA C 4 pp. 3 / 23/67 A 42n letter Fowler to George Woods C 4 pp. undated A 3 / 29/67 A '' Restow to the Pres. re Vietnam.. p ~ =>- ~ .~ ~ N L-3 q
  • then arranged to have the same tune played at him hard by people he respects, be ginning with Averell Harriman and Adam Yarmolinsky, both of whom are very solid and effective on this particular issue of Vietnam -­ and both of whom are friends of his. 3. None
  • to President~q.,,J'l4C/ 2p S #14a ltr President to Banda PCI 1p 12/11/67 ~1--i'1· 0 A J A 1·-Z.1.1:>"J I s #21a cable opn~rt·ff2, t'\~Jo1-· S5" #23 memo #23a rpt 2,p ~1-~,·0J Seoul 2769 s 3p [Duplicate of #74a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "50(3
  • ~. NARA. Daa: ), -.2t./-1 ~ THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON February 19, 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENf SUBJECT: General Wheeler's Visit to Vietnam Reflecting on the possible objectives of General Wheeler's visit, I would hope that he would obtain
  • with Governor Docking, Thu1·sday, 11:30 A. M. Governor Docking asked to see you to report on ~is August 13 ...22 trip to Vietnam. He will be accompanied by Ambassador Win Brown who was recently appointed Special Assistant to Secretary Rusk to deal with State
  • -1~·13 ALJf~-~3a l p ..... [Duplicate of #24a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "81--Taylor Memos-General"] s . , . . . {~ ~ li,-~-(J/ ~ IJ; ,1.AJS~U, l'flJ, ~ -IJ::"I/ 4- ,t,:,A,~.;,~,) G --of s #14a cable a.m. t1pfYl,ofA-1/or NLJ" Of• 22'3 1p
  • thought of withdrawing elements of Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam and returning them to Korea. In addition, every effort should be made to re-open negotiations regarding the proposed ROK light division deployment as soon as the situation in Korea
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • -.. drive a• well u c1... U. S. - llar••• OVK coordlaat:loa. w. w. BCUT attadamellt llonow JJ, S:&CH E T,4.,IMDIS Saturday, February 3, 1968 FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 17607} SUBJECT: Government of Vietnam-U. S. Mission Task Force to Deal
  • Date 7-ll,,-01 INFORMATION - ci, " f'/ ./flY" Monday, Mr. May 27, 1968 -- 5:45 p. m. President: You may be interested in a conversation today with ..{ ______ ).. .3.~lb)(J) His theme: military victory for us in Vietnam is by no means ruled
  • >lSITIVE -3­ North Vie t nam; that they were trying to create fear in South Korea; that they were trying to create problems for us in South Vietnam. including the effect of a dive r sion in Korea on possible negotiations and on our military actions