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  • impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons .we learn for further operations --in heavily populated areas. C. Economic Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon Retail Index was down two
  • Chairman Ho's teaching: !More .diffi.culties. and har_dship~ Jo· .P.e :encounter.ed when reaching victory 11 so that they w·ould harden their standpoint and accomplish th~ir missions under all circumstances . - 2 - In regard to the Paris Peace Talks, A5
  • , to hold elections. The moral indignation· over· that looks odd coming from Commun.lats, who are hardly experts at holding the type of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. And laa.t weekend Ho Chi Minh was wrong not to let the Ame~lcans have
  • . MAURER THEN WAUNCH.ED INTO WHAT .. WAS VIRTUALLY~~,rJ,wo·-:HOUll .,MONO-LOGUE HE SAID HE DID ·o·ur· ·or.~--~A~~~T.HREE~:~Ho•u-:'rt::~b--1scuss"fo:N:: . ~~T-KNOW DIRECTLY WHY SAN ANTONIO OFFER HAO BEEN TURNED DOWN SINCE~' • SPEECH WAS GIVEN ON LAST DAY
  • political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh 1 s political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period
  • for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow
  • Source: 25X1X II I 25X1A (!UMMAJ\ Y: Two Sovi,t otticiah ladlcat~d independently theb a.Ue! that captured American flier• 'in North Vietnam will aot be· executed. They intimated tllat their aovernm.eat llad or would atr••• thi• view with Ho Chi Minh
  • . so URCE wHo :-HA~_.:-_:·~:··.';-· :p,._FURNISHED ·.RELI ABLE- INFORM AT ION IN THE~ PAST, - AND:_J~HO-1S •CLOSE'.'·TO\:.(i;~:i]:-:--:,::_/~ -·~ ''. ~tr:_ ;~ ;f·sr ANLE.Y· ~EVI SON,· CON~IDENT I_~L ADVI~OR ·T9.:·MAR,!IN/L~HER -~ ~.NG;.A~H/{/,.!~4
  • TO VIET-NAM, WANT THE FIGIITING TO CEASE? UNLESS THESE TWO BIG POWERS, OR ONE OF THEM, EXERTS .. DIRECT INFLUENCE, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT, HO CHI MINH WILL AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO us. GENERAL DE GAULLE: IT DOES NOT, INDEED
  • , whose nationalists gained obvious encouragement and learned from Ho Chi Minh's techniques of revolutionary warfare. France, of course, was fighting for colonial reasons to stay in Indochina and Algeria while we hope to get out of Vietnam once it's
  • BLY : · -· :.l .. BIG MINH), AND NOW THEY NA,D "THIS KHANH". HE · SAID THE . . :: .- ... :1 HAR IN ESSENCE WA S THE SAME ONE THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN '. . . I FIGHTING SI NCE THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II; THAT THE VIET- · . "\ '-. NAMESE HAD NO TASTE
  • in the course of the upcoming NPG meeting in Bonn. Although the § Jtrrcip•~r r ·e;J.:.~.on· fo r iny_]-iiiiY{~~J9._Jittinu:.a~iff..'~J~i.-·n1.~gt ~~o.f "t_!f1f.:~AT.Ct 'Ji :.Chi~fs _.of .Staff l n .Brussels1 which was called '.1 -*~onsiaer ·""the-~~p)i.cat ~::J
  • the ofter yoG make la your letter to me ot Juae, 16. lt ie my laueat -- aud my co11vtetloa •· that the cootlngeacy ahall not ,a rise. Slncuely, Tbe Ho®rable Sohn Keneth Galbraith Harvard Umveralty ·C ambridge. Maa·e achu••U• LBJ:WWRostow:rln
  • '!ES£ TARGETS ,: I.N :1R£TALiATIO?f:,fOR ~:V.I£T.: - co»G ::BOMBING-: Qy\:A:,'. U~s • ..BARRACKS: AT QUr--·· ~HO~i;; '...TH£.:c VICC:' ·PRESIDEEMT ;"ATTENOEIJ~\BlJT :. 5£CRETAR't · . RUSK-·WAS •srriL :otiT .·. or: TOWN~ .; · · QUOTE ., l~f: RESPONsf
  • h is tiiinking on th e introductiou of in te r ­ national f o r c e s . Wc found that ho v/aa fu ll of the su b ject, having d is c u s s e d rci&x)y a s p e c ts of the m ilitary' rsanpovver sh o rta g e with G en era ls T h ieu and Minh o v er
  • forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both Air Attache and I. de spite our several years• experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The "t:tall. fJ even
  • that ·such a ·t;aboo rno u n cls o ( books great d es s:,! r v ~ -~ to th.e thioJ it tvith you some good long the book is shar~ ~I is . burni·ng agains~t that ••• lo h g -s ho u l"d have destroyed: b c 0 k th a t you t!ler'e is_ so
  • that contained in Ho Chi Minh' s letter to me of February 15. The reasons quite apparent. 6. Q. • General A. why that formula is unacceptable are, I am sure, What is the purpose of the consultations with Ambassador Westmoreland, and Ambassador Komer? (see
  • 'Ith St:re•t. • C. h'&Uli'., ,1 1,VU LBJ / WGB:mm 2 15 / 68 • 1 a ntiuhi.t• 1• oa ,-.r •leotloo •• S.CJ'eial'J 0.•n.l ef U.. o,... tU~_at1oa A • r _aa ••· TM ollle• 1• oa. special cballe ge d oppo, .. t..Ur •• the re lo l ho , ente.r • • MW
  • the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea and respecting the waters, respecting the demilitarized zone and waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone ·and to this land UNQTE. ·The PUEBLO engaged in no ho~tilities at all~ What provision of the Armistice
  • CTIO N WITH iHE CHANGES IN PROVINCE CHI EFS, HE SAID THAT THE PRO- - P ~1riH'x---t~2S-f.-i' e E e2 rre r , INCE CHIEF I N LA M DONG HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED AND THAT HE PLANS TO GO AHEAD -WITH OTHERS. 3. I ,'\ SKED THIEU HOW ·HE FELT ABOUT THE NEW
  • lea.twee of till• plae•om•••l ••c••• l■ that the "9rwtt.bnl .. pl'oportlaa of tile•• tnck "kW• .. Ila•• NeD oa rtNte• 911ud 912 la tile aol'tllel'IIIDGat ••aclae• of the Ho CM M1ab trail etract1are. Stace a ''kill" l• DOt cn41tecl -■le•• tu ft.lakle l
  • Vietminh battalions marched on the C:entr:11 Hi~hlands or what is now South Vietnam for attacks on Kontum and Pleiku. Although a decade later there were still many newcomers in Vietnam who refused to believe it existed, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become
  • TV TO DRAW THEM OUT ON SUBJEC TS SUGGESTED IN LA ST THREE PARAS OF R E F T E L . FRENCH EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMESE S ITU A TIO N IS THAT I T I S , IN ONE WORD, HO PELESS. FRENCH EMBASSY O FFIC ERS CLAIM TO KNOW FROM FIR ST-H A N D EXPERIENCE
  • TORTURE CAME TO SE R£GARDSDAS A "ORMAL PRACTICE DURING PARTY ORGMHZATION. ft ft AS A RESULT OF THIS OPPRESSION, IN NOVEi'laER 1956 A S?ONTMlEOUS PEASANT RE3ELLION BROKE our IN PRESIDENT HO CHI MINWS HOME f'KOVU~ce:: AND HAD TO BE PlJT _Down.BRUTALLY
  • there will be great pressure at the outset of the nego.tiations to stop the .fighting as the first order of business, we might consider initiating i::n.'"llediate cea·se.fire negotiations by the opposing military commanders on the pattern of the French Army-Viet Minh
  • Tlauaday. Fel:tnaary 5:25 p. m. a. 1968 Mr. PreaW.nt: Herewith Ho'• order of the tlay for the Tet offea•lve. I l>elleve Ile meaat e"Ntry word. w. w. B.oatow Sal1on 18562 . GE>NPl&ENTIAL WWRoatow:rln DECLASSIFIED E.O . 12356 , Ser , .4(b} \~'h:it.e
  • -uce b .J:.-c~odsb.edp I c:li.~e a 11e.got:latS.cm in wl:d.
  • conomy is such t hat Rollin~ Thunder can affect directly only a small f racti on of the ponulati on. There is very l ittle hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government ..,ill l ose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The l essons of t he Korean War
  • on negotiations or on "talks" in themselves-and to expect too much, too soon. Americans think of negotiations as the road to peace but there is unmistakable evidence that Ho Chi Minh thinks of negotiations as another way to fight a war-in effect, as another
  • Affairs 3. There might well be those (including perhaps the Canadians theIT~elves) who would object. to Can84a's being tra~sferred from EUR to ARA. Ho)ever,- · Canada is being drawn more and more into inter-he mispheric affairs; · there is always the very
  • had, however, kept connnunications open with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in the hope of serving peace. He had written to Ho Chi Minh stating that Hanoi could not win a military victory and should agree to a compromise s-olution. Ho Chi Minh had
  • BELIEVETHATEVERYO~E WHOCANCO~TRIBUTE TO THAT SUCf~ESS,~1usr co~~IB 1JT£. A:~:o I HAVE TRIED IM "y REf1ARKSTO . r-OVIJT OUT THftT THE SOVIET u:aoN HAS BOTH THE OPPORTUNITY AND· THE~E3?0NSiaILITY TO EXERTI~FLUE~CEOMHA~DI. ~rn.-PRESI~E~rr, I HO?~ THATTHF.PERFOni"IA
  • exchangeswith you o~ the topics which should be covered with the GVN 'f i• 1~ the light o! ~ho si~uation ns •it develops in the meanUrne. • Our main thought 1s •• I • that it. would K be use!ul to have·a.full a.ndleisurely exchange of views belwcon
  • FOR PURPOSE PRO."rECT EVACUATION AMERICAN CITIZENS.:~·~·!~'~· · ·:~~/'/(. 1 I !.-_ . ._. :· · . '-'E HA 'J.l; JUST BEEN TOLD BY. POLICE CHI EF , FOR INSTAN,CE, THAT .·.":.,.:, .. ;':~:· ~;::: .'. \.':·; :'-::~~ : .:. !-:.":'.:·..:··:. HE CANNOT· PROVIDE
  • to cooperate in dealing with national problems. However, on March 5, I found Thieu in a plainly different mood with regard to Ky. Whereas on March 2. he had laughed a bout the rejection by the Lower Ho\Be of his request for special economic powers and said