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  • of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2. 11 The conclusion was that Castro prefers to try to halt the U -2 flights by pressure at the UN and else ­ where, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down
  • rlln Castro out of weapons. Secr etary McNamara said he was. For example , we might use non ­ photographic drones which would be less costly to lose. Mr . McCone said the idea of running Castro out of SAM missiles would depend on whether he used MIG
  • !CJ 3 . In Cuba there remain about 2 , 000 Sovi ets . All weapons are of Cubans but the Russians may r etain some control of the SAMs. Castro sub ­ version in Latin American countries continues . -!. L"l Cyprus , Maka :-ios is still t rying to get
  • CUBAAROUND WILSON HIMSELFWASWORKING IN CUBAAT THETIME ANDWASJAILED BY CASTRO BEFOREHE WASDEPORTED. IN PRISONIN CUBA,WILSONSAYSHE METAN AMERICAN GANGSTER GAMBLER NAMED SANTOSWHOCOULDNOTRETURN TO THE u.s.A. BECAUSE THEREWERESEVERAL INDICTMENTS OUTSTANDING
  • / .. , .· '• · ... : '/ , : -~- :· ._.:. Herewith are two intelligence reports on Cuba of particular int_e rest. 1.S(c) ·:. .-,·-·'. _-·. I I ~ ••. • •• ~• 3.4(b)l1) \: .:: : ..:. ...! -:_I" .'.. , ~.:-.-:... - .... ,; 1,' . ~ /.-·,'( , ,,.., _.. ,·._ . ·" :···_· ·_,.: of the Castro
  • should try to get adva.Ace amhority so that we do not have to go back to the OAS in the event of another action by Castro. In response to Mr . Bundy's question, Mr. Chayes. aa ~e State Depart· m.ent Legal Adviser, pointed out the legal di!ferenc:es
  • to control rural areas serving as access routes or bases for insurgent activities in neighboring countries; Venezuela needs to expand its security capability aga i nst the likelihood of a sustained Castro-supported subversion threat. S_Ee~EI _ SECRET 5. 3
  • 7 on Cuba;** that is, 11 . we believe that Castro does not intend to force the issue until after the US elections, when he will seel( UN action. If this fails, there is con- 8 9 10 siderable danger that he would order a shoot-down, calcu- 11
  • week were the notable progress toward elimination of the rebel zone in the Do·m inican Republic, the labor difficulties in Uruguay requiring emergency security measures, and the favorable _..: though qualified - - response of Castro to our proposal
  • for Europe our Cuban policy . He explained to them that our economic denial program was not expected to result in Castro's downfall, but wa s an effort to prove that there was no future for Com­ munism in this hemisphere. He said he explained how the standard
  • Laos (Sanitized 6/29/00, NLJ 99-40; more released than previous sanitization) 52 memo Bundy to President re Castro announcements (Sanitized 2/10/00, NLJ 96-106) (duplicate #52a, this file) 52a memo Bundy to President re Castro announcements
  • • . FO RE IGN OFFICE SITUATION. ARAUJO CASTRO LEFT OFFIC£ YESTERDAY AND FRAGOSO IS ACTI NG FOREIGN MINlSTER . AIR FORCE LINEUP . ACTING MINISTER IS RANCISCO MELLO FORMER COS. COWDR THIRD AIR ZO NE RIO DE JA NEIRO IS DARIO CAVALCANTI DE AZ AMB UJO
  • trained in Cuba landed in a Cuban fishing vessel. Several Cubans were captured~ I • I '. On March 13, 1967, Castro openly stated his determination to support such activities. ' The Venezuelan government is determined that there shall be effective
  • to the United States His Excellency Ilmar Penna Marinho Ambassador to the OAS Castro Campos ALLIANCEFOR PROGRESSMEETING FOREIGNREPRESENTATIVES AS OF 10:30 A.M. 2 NOVEMBER 26 -2CHILE His Excellency Sergio Gutierrez-Olivos Ambassador to the United States His
  • ORGANIZED IN JANUARY 1964; DR. -ARRIGO GUAR~If CONTE, ~HO HAS A LO~G HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH CO~MUNISTS AND WAS AN ORGANIZER OF THE VANGUARDIA DE ACCIO N NACIONAL, A PRO-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY GROUP; AND DR. GUSTAVO TEJADA MORM\N FORMER TREATY NEGOTIATOR
  • . Rostow FROM: Robert M. Sayre SUBJECT: Possible Additional for Castro. ~1 17, 1967 DECLASSIFIED Jl-1.1ihe11H?.:) t=.0. 11652 SEC. GfJ\\ and '(D)1 . ~y~ .,;.-f British , NABS, Date )/ ':~ f- ])j Credit Guarantee we have reliable reports HMGis
  • of the shipment of arms by Cuba. 5 . The United States avoided arm - twisting . 6. We hope the message contained in the Resolution will get through to Castro , as the Punte del Este Resolution did not. 7 . The meeting was a success from our point of view
  • Training to Cuban Nationals (4/25/61) 44 Caribbean Security Agency (4/25/ 61) 45 Coverage of Castro Activities in the United States (4/ 25/ 61) 46 Attitude of Various Governments during the Cuban Crisis (4/25/ 61) 47 Soviet Assistance to Cuba 48
  • that lay behind US policy toward Cuba and said that Castro's policy was a great threat not only to this hemisphere but to Western security as a whole. He said it was important that 1 this fact should be understood. Mr. Wilson replied with classic British
  • by Frei. IV. Cuba Our long•r!Me objective is to see the Castro regime replaced by a non-communist government which would not be a threat, direct or indirect, to us or to other Hemisphere nations. Our inmed.i.ate object,ives are to prevent the use
  • leaders chosen in free elections. 2. Castro has failed in his domestic program and Cuban-sponsored sub­ version has been checked. ' The OAS economic denial program, and .Castro's own mismanage­ ment, has kept the Cuban economy stagnated. In July 1964