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- India it is not so much one of influencing to stick tactical to a decision approach s.ee.R:e'fi HOP8:1Ul LIMITEDDISTRIBlTfION at this it has time is to S.8CRJff/NOFOaN _ LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION - 6 - accept that of using requests
Folder, "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Weapons Development," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 34
(Item)
- that the I:ldians have yet decided to begin weapons development. At the same time, evcrythiJ:1« the Indians have done so far would be compatible "1th a wce.J?.Onsproe;ram 11' at sane future date it appeared desirable to start one. 'lbis is probably no accident. One
- ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
- decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken. ~c,f~ ~~ McGeorge Bundy (page 2 of 2 pages) Septemlnur 10. 1964 NATIONAL SEQJlUTY ACTlON MEMODANDUM NO~ 314 The Sec;r.etarr of State-. TO,: Tt. Secretary c.f Dofeuo T
Folder, "Japan, Volume 2, Cables, 5/64 - 11/64 [2 of 2]," Country Files, NSF, Box 250 [1 of 2]
(Item)
- instances where market disruption can actually be proved. It is only less important that when the U.S. must act contrary to Japanese trading interests, time and effort be taken to put the best pos sible face on the action through diplomatic and other
- --on such relatively nonpo litical issues as difficult exam inations, the rolicy of eliminat ing students who have flunked three times running, and German professors whose lectures are too obscure. The prime minister is therefore reasonably free to concentrate
Folder, "Greece - Papandreau Visit - 6/23-24/64 [1 of 2]," Country Files, NSF, Box 127 [2 of 2]
(Item)
- a.m. EDT Departure from Williamsburg, Virginia, by helicopter. (55 minutes flying time) EDT Prime Minister Papandr~ou and his party will arrive at the White House where he will be greeted by the President of the United States, the Secretary
- in an equally short period of time. Owing to the pressure of time, it does not include material which is easily available to the Department of Stat~ from ~ther sources. We will welcome the opportunity to refine the material presented, or to expand it to greater
Folder, "United Kingdom - PM Wilson Visit Briefing Book, 12/1/1964 [2]," Country Files, NSF, Box 213
(Item)
- to support alternatives to him. Weanticipate that a non-Jagan government will have a difficult time at best. It will be opposed by Jagan who will try to discredit it both at home and abroad. It will be sub ject to severe internal strains because
- the proposal to reduce the 72 - hour notice proposal contained in Recommendation 12 . He ag r eed that this time should be reduced if -: i.3 possible to do so without 1·esulting in the maldeployment of our forces in the Pacific. The Pres ident asked
- satellite transmissions are considerably more attractive. This judgment involves assumption regarding trends in both satellite and educational technology. Satellite communications are developing at a time when educ0:tion · itself is being influenced
- of the runway and parallel taxiway. Three parking aprons, 13 aircraft revetments, and a dispersal taxiway were identified. This is the first sign of progress at this airfield since 20 June. Photography taken at that time showed that preparations had been made
- in the s ame time period than w ill be lost in the air s trikes. The off-loading cap acity of the No rth Vietnames e in the po rt of Haiphong would be struck. However, the Chiefs 1 view is t hat POL targets should be h it as a first priority. These att
- Gordon is having a meeting at HI>: 00 A. M. on Saturday, April 3, to review the draft and, if appropriate, to reshape it. He \\Ould like you to be present, if at all possible. 2. I have checked with Alice and have tentatively blocked out the time on your
- be reflected in a treaty, subject only to reasonable safety precautions. The USSR has sought to qualify the right of access with such concepts as nreciprocityn and agreement as to the timing of visits. b. Reporting - Our treaty article as tabled provides
- be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3 : 00 P . M . their time. The President gave the fo llowing figures on the four recommended targets : Tare: et Dong Hoi Barracks Vit Thu Lu Barrac ks Chap Le Army Barracks Vu Con Barracks Troops 6,000 150 1,200
Folder, "NUCLEAR - French Purchase of Canadian Uranium," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 32
(Item)
- On the orders of the da7: .(Tn1naration] Mr. Real Caouette
- , experience and accomplishments. At the same time, I consider it of importance to explain to Your Ex cellency our point of view concerning the problem which resulted in blood shed in our dear country, at the hands of foreign aggressors, whose aim
- or Syria which broke rel.:i.tlons with us in June 1967. In view of the accus.:i.tion by President Qabtan al-Shaabi of the People's Republic of $outhern Yemen that the United States was attempting to bring down his regime ("New York Times", December 26, page
- reductions or for certaLn. cone es sions · to be sought from foreign governments. At the same time, it is only reasonable to anticipate that pres sure from the same sources, and from members of Congress, will be exerted on Government officials to give advance
Folder, "NSAM # 280: South Vietnam, 2/14/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2
(Item)
- Under Secretary at the same time. Attachment: January 5, 1965 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NOo -----MEMORANDUM TO: THE THE THE THE SECRETARY OF STATE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATOR
- -~-ol- SE CRET --&:EC !tEI -2 The Pr esid ent introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from
- going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam
- and that the Japanese Gove rn ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided were: (1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and (2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever sion. He thought that action
- with Charlie Murphy about this several times and he continues to insist that he is unable to do anything., since Secretary Freeman personally set Agriculture 1 s position and only the Secretary can modify the Department's stand. A Solomon is clearly needed
- information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter, The S ecreta ry could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we
- a single approval action for a series of similar tests will suffice, the Secretary of State will be consulted with respect to the timing of each test. aunches involving nuclear devices ~ 'a ~ 6a ' ·-- Ji #... 'ifCuv:. J .. t The Executive Secretary
- Attach. Harriman US image memo to President ll/19/64 re Mac- ) December 12, 1964 C:Ommenta on State of the Union. This time at least WWR•a p:roae seems awfully drab--and the clichea tb:ed. To me ... pa,ochial as I've bocoine--wo need __lot
- ) are with us; some countries (e . g . , France and P akistan) are luke warm; some 11 unaligned1 ' countries are flatly opposed. The Secretary indicated hi s misg1v1.ngs with W!!EiZ r espect to an app roach to the UN at this time. He doubted that a d e bate
- .. The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some allege. Security must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop. A t the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was unce r tain but their confidence
- time until the Indians came to accep t the necessity for Western assistance; b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely by the specialis t s concentrating on arms control or by the country or area specialis ts. We must
- there were two interpretations of the Russian demand: .·' ''\. .... ,' ~. ( (1) they have decided they are not prepared to make an outer space agreement at this stage of the Vietnam war; or (2) they want to spring their own initiative at a l ater time
- East supplies. He recalled his long acquaintance with Foreign Minister Malik. He said military rule continued and was likel y to for some time. He said that additional resources after January 1 might have to be drained off from other sources rather than
- regard and the deep affection in which I personally hold you. That regard and that affection are reflected throughout America. There is no truth to the rumor that your reputation as an economist prompted us to invite you here to visit us at budget time
- active over a long period of time in trying to enlist GOM cooperation in devising ways to put the bases to use. The most exhaustive U.S. approach to the base conversion problem was that prepared in March of 1962 by an AID-financed team of 12 U.S. experts
- of payments costs for our troops in NATO are temporary . They buy time but they don't cure the problem . Ovet· the Longer term we look for the British to do mo re in Europe which could enable us to do less . We can also anticipate the UK working towa r d some
- . 'interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be • d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued. The study should balance the price of each
- the same. Fedorenko suggested a one-hour time limit for the Secretary General to inform himself that firing had ceased and report. Rafael of Israel asked whether Iraq or Kuwait had agreed to a cease-fire and repeated that Syria must also give orders to its
- not recommend movlng US combat unlh into or contiguou£ to the RVN at this time. Moreover, the intro• ductlon o{ US combnt forces whkh would alt idle could well h ;,\ve 11. p11ych9lo&ical impact on b oth friends and enernlee the reverse of tbftt do aired
- and training may be required, However, in view of the present Congressional ceiling on materiel, complete implementation of this mission may take time. We believe that only Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela have the potential