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- powers in technological and arms control matters. 2.. Three additional points should be kept in mind: a. If proposed U.S.·Soviat talks about slow- ·1ng down the strategic anns race should lay the basis for a new and perceptible degree of restraint
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows: 1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between Route 12 and the area
- be required. The Secretary has worked out an agreement wit:4 Minister von Hassel under which our Joint Chiefs will work with the FRG military authorities to make a new joint study of the potential military effectiveness of ADM 1 s. The Secretary 1 s • request
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- might hold for a period w1' th our help 1 but would be under grave pressure. Even th e Philip p in e~ wo uld b~cch'\e s naky, and the threat to India to the west. A~ s tral ia and New Zealand t o the south, and Taiwan 1 Korea, and Japan to the nort h
- . NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 1429 (6-85) NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL GO~TFIDEPf'FIAis 22 October 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CLIFTON As I mentioned this morning I have drafted a new NSAM on exercises in which I have tried
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 101: Oct. 23‑28, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 41
(Item)
- to have a clear majority in the Venezuelan Congress, it may well, in any event, be a partner in the new government coalition. Tejera is close to President Leoni, former President Betancourt and AD Presidential candidate Gonzalo Barrios. He, himself
- the and official does represent expansion; of be overemphasized. role for the main barrier, would take on a new perspective the creation regarding cannot limited 11 political to any significant and the use of nuclear symbols of nationalism
- to explore questions some of the fundamental and iuvolved. from ~hose intereeted We are requesting conaents in ACDAand in the State ~partment. However, because of the immediate concern with the subject in New York,, I thought you might be interested
- the potential and intention of the recipient country to engage in a national program. No new control mechanisms or formalized inter-agency committees are required, but improved coordination, exchange of views and centralized compilation of case-by-case
- • TE M D E N C IE Sj KY I S L IK E L Y TO COr.STINUE TO TA KE IL L -A D V IS E D ACTIONS FROM T IM E TO TIM E SUCH AS H IS BREACH OF R E LA TIO N S W ITH FRANCE ' B U T I T I S J U S T P O S S IB L E THAT HE W IL L B E A BLE TO CREATE A NEW OUTLOOK
- • document. lCI CloHd In •ccordance with rMtrlcrlona contain.cl In Ille donor'• dMd of gift. 1/22/2010 Initials LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Doc# DocType Doc Info 25h draft Page 3 of 5 Classlflcatlon Pages draft State cable to New Delhi
- the new equipment making possible the relighting of the engines w : thout the descent. He said we are on the very far frontier of knowledge and there are many problems remaining. Those who had operated the pl anes were unanimous in agreeing that it would
- be engaged in fighting under the new progra m . He also asked whether U . S. planes were being adequately maintained, adding that many people had ex pressed their concern to him on this p oint. Secretary McNarnal'a r eplied that U . S . soldiers
- ious crops . Country per.:'or:r.;.nce in developin5 food resources will be a priority self-help condition for AID assistance . invest~ent In concert ¥ith these efforts , the President has proposed a new Fooci. for Freedom program, which will be closely
- the enemy militarily; we must make demons trable progress in pacification; at the same time, we must add a new ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position by gett ing ourselves into a military posture that we credibly
- zed but have no interes t in the control of conventional a r ms . Our immediat e p r obl em is to gi ve King Hassan a sense of stability. Therefore , we have r ecommended a $14 million a rms sale and a new food ag reement. In this p r ocess , however
- .~ should develop between them, howeve!", the implications for Korea and for I~do-China would be profotuld. , If Comraunist China were isolated, it would be weakened, and there wouJ.dibe a new situation in the Far East. For this reason, it was important
- $4.5 billion in new appropriations and anticipated carryovers of $300 million more. $3 billion was appropriated and carryovers of $684 million are now estimated (including reappropriation of $127 million of last year's Contingency Funds, which we had
- , not to create a new agency for covert pperations, but, subject to direct ives from the NSC, to place the responsib~ity for them on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter espionage operations under the over-all control
- the Fr 1963 total. The FX 1963 AID program totaled $)6.6 million in new obligations; HAP was $16.6 allllon. Tho reduction of these programs as compared with initial pl.ans tor n 1964 bas been even eharper. The initial FI 1964 Congressional Presentation
- be infonned :In advance of contenplated new 'CEO effort. Premature public revelation~ Mission would adversely affect USG relations with t9orego1ng entities 1 thus pre judicing their full coq>eration with conciliation endeavoro END FYio ENDo '~ \)J
- : r D o f 0 6 S ta te I COLLECT CHARGE TO UNCLASSIFIED 85 O rig in P ACTION- CIRGUtAR (ALL A2IERIC.\!i DIPLOMATIC POSTS ^ POIADS, A>^D USU:^ NEW YORK) G H AF ARA EUR FE NEA 10 ^ JS IA INR DOD b^?pre5 f e io SS F o llo w in g e x c e
- -, ARA, Date J- -J-~1b. ...... .. Au ---------........-~------- -~ ~ I !' I ~ • SECREi Even the Philippines would beco m e sha ky, and the threat to India to the we s t, Au s tralia and New Zeal a nd to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japa n
- govto in 1963., he has efforts to dominate form.so to say that USOis concerned about Telegraphic transmission k to reveal of politic-al by his or course Opposition of power under new constitutional 2o You are authorized Drafted by, • easing
- EVER REACH THAT DESTINATION OR WHETHER WE ARE ON A t r e a d m ill. SEE MORE CLEARLY THE FORM OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO AM OF THE OPINION THAT mtt mht rnMMTT nnR5^-l.vrc; EUBLICLY WITH REGARD TO THE ACTION OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. I HAVE RECOMMENDED
- to the Soviet bloc without attaching 1peclal new conditioue. Su::h action would acc:or1 with President Kennedy's decision in r#iay 1963 on an a!moet identical case (forage ba.rvetters) in which the sarn e argument for quid pro quo conditions waa advanced
- , hardened Work con- and elements in the During the summer of 1968, hard-line Soviet Politburo accelerated development of MIRVs, depressed • • orbit ICBMs, Communist China came under new leadership with the death of Mao. Managers and technicians assumed
- and Japan 9 vitbin a framework of active U., S .. ~Japaneae aocial development of the Ryukyua.. cooperction for the economic and Thia cooperation,. to be carried out wtt.b "' in well-defined limit& embodied in a new Japanese ·U.. So e.g.reement
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- ------ ~:;;. Special Ambassador to the New York Times and Washington Post SECRE'F - ·~ THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 24, 19 64 ~EI~ITIVE SECRET - MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: On March 6 we sent the Secretary of State a memorandum asking for a strong plan
- • we )lave ,-tten. Ual• ••• aot •w-ar to M the ca••• Tber.lore. 11111•••aomeou can ••tabUah tut tbl• lan•t ao. or that the Fr•adl p1aa to••• it on a new Muaa• W-1' da&t ba• •tnteatc: Y&bae. da•r• would •••m lo be little maAMI-W.l'laa ll'OUd I.or u here
- u s and p o l i t i c a l groups appsar to endorse the GVN progran and are q u iescen t. The GTO had f i r s t sought to make c le a r to the people that the new government would be reso lu te In prosecuting the war. In winning ultim ate v ic to r y
- abotJt the "technologica l gap" hus led to various s tc:te:-.1ents and suggestions for corrective i:ct.ion . Jl.znong these is the "Itali2n 11 proposal , on '.·rhich the President cor;t.rnented favorably in the Erharc5. communique and in his New Yor
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- are: -----· to to to to to strategy in.stead generate a massive popular uprisinz in the cities; administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/ FW forces in the field; destroy the government2l apparatus o! South Vietnam fron,. top to bottoi.n; create a new popular front, dominated
- Ap OLLO VI I I ANOI I TS GALL~NT CREW I S AN HISTORIC STEP' IN MAN•S SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE IN WHiICHHE LIVES, AND'HER~LDS A BRIGH;f NEW ERA OF EXPLORATION AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION• COL~ BORMAN,CAPT~ LOVELL~ AND Lit'• COL• ANDERS
- . Best regards on this You ]_· :i:; ..t.1;1,·le l!qomn 1.:• .~in_gfon 1%4MAY2 AM10 33 ' \~~ \/ THE WHITE I ' HOUSE II WASHINGTON April 1964. 27, I I' Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am delighted at the news of your successful oper
- that a new effort to make the present arrangements work should be undertaken. McGeorge Bundy ®ffirt gf tqt~lfntn~ ~tttttal mas¥ngfou1lll .
- ~ Assume. Chile plus Peru .a nd/or ·Ecuador are denied. ~. Establish two new stations, .one in Hawaii, and one in either Fiji Isl.8.nds or .ADieri9an .Samoa. · ·A. mob-ile . station for' spe_c ial equatorial ·coverage ·.would possibly · be required. · 2
- : \/ 1. NESC would be discontinued. V 2. Studies similar to those done previously by the NESC would be carried out by Defense with State participation. 3. The NESC staff, minus General Johnson, would be used in pre paring the new studies. The first
- DESTRUCTION EXACT RATE OF ACCELERATION I S A NA TTER OF JUDGNENT BUT WE CONSIDER, ROUGHLY 3PEAXING, THAT E^-CH SU CC ES SI VE WEEK SHOULD INCLUDE SONE NEW ■ACT ON OUR PART TO INCREASE P R E S S U R E ON HANOI. AS INDICATED A T T H E O U T S E T , UE ARE ‘:ORK