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  • ,AS· 01,RSR 01,/068 W l2~122 Q1 2719392, QEC 68 Zi;"F~ F'Mi AMEMBASS:Y KAMPALA TO SECSTAT~ WASHDC IMME~IATE 3571 UNCLAS' l
  • this cable and save LBJ's time? It's consistent with past handling and still makes sense as long as we're going to stay out of the Kurdish business. HHS OotiFIBENTlAL -SECRE~ Mildred :,.r April 30, 1965 A. you requested, I returned Mr. Vanli's I had
  • by a relatively small number of full-time leaders who largely by dint of personality are able to bring their constituencies together in steer_ing committees like the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. For manpower, ·they look
  • questions concerrdng i d e n t i t y , ndssions, dep'i-oyrient times, and lo c a tio n of a d d it i o n a l tvxo brigades i-'hich i n e f f e c t i s r e t e n ti o n o f the 173rd Airborne Brigade, you should explain t h i s re t e n t i o n s t i l l
  • and civilian. He is especially high on the Marines with whom he has spent most of the last year or so.. He is a close friend and admirer of General Walt; is not quite sure that General Cushman is of the same caliber but agrees he should have time to settle
  • IN THE MIDST OF A SEA OF ARABS AND, · IN THE LONG RUN, WOULD LOSE THE WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE TIME HAS COME TO WORK OUT A. GENERAL SETTLEMENT. l O DO THAT WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF DIPLOMATIC SKILL, PARTICULARLY ON THE .PART OF A MAN LIKE YOU. TO HUMILIATE
  • in the course of' time. Despite the impartial and objective ~ttitude of' delegates like your own, however, it transpired, unf'ortunately, that justice and equity were thrown overboard on the basis of' the votes of a minority of state members of the U.N.O. which
  • to their is favorable no doubt attempt the unpopular cause. to bring who are likely nuclear ownership greatness "merchants have to be discreet, officers since pressure de Gaulle's connnitted than de Gaulle. these also time they on the general's
  • APPROACH ~AST EUROPEANS RE I NTERCESSIO N, GI VZN LACK OF RESULTS TO DATE FROM OUR EFFORTS WITH YUGO SLAVS, IiJD IANS, ALG ER IANS, IRAQ IS AND TUR XS. 2 . HOPE D E PART M E~T WILL GIVE ERIC PACE TR E AT.E NT I N -RESPONSE PRESS. I NQUIRIES. STORY LO W KEY
  • together. Z) Hawaii in this case again serves as a bridge between the US and the Orient. l ) This is not a one-time occasion-this telephone cable will serve e very day year in and year out as a means of instantaneous communication b ringing
  • on the appllcaUoo. and i& ta DOI poaalble to ••Y wbeG action will be ta.kn.. "I a. Cubu. Hellcopt•r •• We have compltrted ouw-eamlutloa of tu CWl&llhelicopter. We have told the CtallaD• that we are wUlln1 lo P'" it them. if u., l'MUWD a llaht USAF tl'alnlaa
  • 124] President Intelligence S 3 pp. information & Memos, A & Memos, 7:3Q p.m. 11/21/68 A - -1-1121/68 -A 11/21/68 A 11/21/68 A AJc.:n/1.Ac.. o'a.-
  • . At that time the Department of Defense made certain suggestions not here relevant. As actually issued, however, the memorandum departs substan­ tially from the version coordinated with the Department of Defense. In our opinion, the version issued
  • time comes o I also / ment ioned your suggestion that this seemed kind topic which warranted preliminary go-round in ( \ Standing Group. Dave quite agreed. . I· of I'll keep tabs on this, because o nly way in which can of worms can be tackled
  • House, this would be an inopportune time to effect any changes to a NASM. It would be better to defer revisions of NASM 283 until after new staff has taken over. In the interim, the SIG will issue necessary instructions. Revised wording to be developed
  • to expand the growth in the level of economic act_ivity -- to continue pressing the absorptive capacity of the areaTs resources and productive facilities. Over time, this is the best and perhaps the only way to absorb labor in the area
  • £ CAHIAkE CONCESSIONS, FORKE IS KNOWN. AS A HAWK ANDIS TRUSTED.K£ VASREADY ANDANXIOUS lO GOro✓ PARIS. YETlit OURIEETINBS 1111TH HIii"ANDTHIEUHIS lNTERViNTIONS ·vERE • . NEITHERHELPFUL NOR✓CONSTRUC?IVE. Ce VASIt .BECAUSE HEWANTED THIEUTO BOXHIMSELFIN ONTHIS
  • ~·~ -"'-'" :.\.¼~:-_·/ :~·:,.~.(-~-/)~:'. : _.:.•\,~.!~>-, i.,· .· . ...... :~.-~;...•'.. -- ' ._.- . ;;. •-_ ;: . • ' ,' ' . .,'.:,.~:.._-~,;,;.~..:\:;•.~.. ·,';: ( THIS O?FER WOULD APPLY AT SUCH TIME AS SAFEGUARDS ARE APPLIED HJ No r·J-i l UCLEA~-vJZAPOr; ST ATES UNDER AN EFFECTIVE 1 SAFEGUARDS
  • ._>-~·-,·i;~[ ,OF THE BORDER AND BY FABR.ICATED ALLEGATIONS AND THREATS ·, ••.·:. :; .:;':.:· AGAINST INDIA. T.HE,THREATS HAVE BEEN REPEATED. SEVERAL· TIMES ··-...._·;··,.,,;:. 1·'.· /SINCE NOV 13TH. 'IN THEIR NOTE OF NOV 24TH THE CHINESE WARNED
  • ,·l-7·o4r\W East 12/31/68 A 12/28/68 A 02·Za; A .s 3 pp .. [partial Harvan #27a memo dup. Misc. Katzenbach s to the President -Ros tow --S to President, the 2 Pih a-a-----... am, l)~ 2 ~PP:.:_,;_~ lo-o2~-0'f A 12/23/68 re
  • to a time when the Sov e nion will e d·s ose to set~le in &1rope. At that time hew nts wes rn bu.rope itse r·n • al int r 1 ocutor of Mo cow. I States to b th. are physica. ly hrea end, he would say, y Sovi t-Ame are threatened hardly less, ·n a politic 1
  • he had received.same .letter from Moncade Vidal sent .also·to UPI .(EmbTel 637). Stated.that of course :gov.could not rpt .not .accept the off.er and ·.explained he :convt.nced no ,,,--rpt no harm could come to the .Colonel. Said.it ..was time
  • Ministers Pearson and Holt, President Ayub Khan, General Suharto, President Marcos and a few others. Mr. Rockefeller has arranged with the Secretary­ General to release the names of the additional signers at an opportune time in the next few weeks, but·no
  • TO LO C A TE T H E A SSIG N ED T G T , A PPR O X IM A TELY 20 OF TH E 36 MK 8 1 SN A K EY E WEAPONS J E T T IS O N E D A T SEA W ERE T H E R E S U L T S OF P IL O T S B EIN G U N A B LE TO A C Q U IR EE AND I D E N T I F Y T H E T G T . , 4 , TA S K
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • ample opportunity to make its intentions with respect to cooperation clear to us. I will expect you to assume the initiative in preparing appropriate recommendations for my attention to deal with the situation as it appears to be at that time
  • : Project 'suLKY In view of the delicacy of the balance of US- USSR relationship in other major areas plus the tight schedule for conducti! g SULKY at this time, the President has decided to defer fu:::ther< consideration of SULKY without prejudice until
  • , recommendations which translate this state­ ment of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to sub­ stance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possi­ bilities of multilaterallzing
  • . Israeli planes raided airfields in Cairo and other areas bcginnirig at about 8:00 AM local time (2:00 ~M Washington time). Cairo has just been informed that· at least five of its airfields in Sinai and the Canal area· have suddenly become "unscrvj_ccablc
  • alternative ways of dealing with this matter 1 such as limiting the size of any sale, postponing such a sale to a more propitious time, or encouraging and perhaps helping Israel to meet its needs from other suppliers. Finally, it should include an analysis
  • ­ priate time . The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prosI>ects for international negotiations. }n ~4v IS-f McGeorge Bundy CO~l FiDEN n
  • of the decision to make a reprisal strike only. The President: We need to know the ex-tent of the damage c aused by yesterday's strike . Thi s will have a bearing on future decisions. We should g ive considera ­ tion to Taylor• s recorrunendation but for the time
  • in the )bnthly Follow·up Report and have requested the Bureau o't Inter•Acierican Attairs to prepare a :pl'OSreB& report on these directive$·, from timo to time. However, in llsht ot recent developments, and the continuing high-level interest in a much changed
  • , but it is a day- to ­ day problem. The Greek Cypriots are trying to delay progress in order to throw the entire problem into the G eneral Assembly. Turkish military intervention becomes more difficult with the passage of time . Secretary Rusk : Dean Acheson has
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However
  • of our intentions in Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe--and in Russia and Communist China, and (b) to expTh.in the good sense of the move to the Congress and the U.S. public. 6. As regards timing, I should like two alternatives to be ex­ plored: one
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • 1N PART 1s PROHIBITED EXCEPT w1TH PERM1ss10N OF 1ssu1NG OFFICE PAGES TIME Of RECEIPT OF 1 AE5 7 2 15 62 NOV 22 SECRET (Whm fi/bd i11; DAn: TIME GltOUP 2220132 NOV 63
  • are effective. We received assurance at 3 A .M. Washington time that Israel fully intended to achieve actual cease-fire on its side. Consistent with this assurance, UN Security Council that its authorities were of UN to make all arrangements for cease-fire