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663 results
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 56: Jan. 1‑15, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 27
(Item)
- . Vietnamese government at all levels should be steadily pressed to assume greater and greater re~ponsibility, both political and military, for the defense and pacification of the country. To achieve this purpose, the United States should seek every opportunity
- he raues· in hi• year-end report. 1..S(,~)(c) 3.4(b)(i )(~) Ben also sent along some mementos o! your visit to Karachi: a collection of all the ~overage of your visit by the (government-controlled) press; a copy 0£ Ayub'~ official 1968 calendar
- with 40 Joel Le Theule, November 7, 1963, Journal officiel, p. 6729. 41 Journal officiel, p. 6735. 42 July 23, 1964, press conference, Le M:>nde, July 25, 1964. 43 Sondages, 1963, No. 3, p. 104. 44 charles de Chambrun, Journal officiel, p. 6765
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 47, October 21-24, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 24
(Item)
- know how pressed you are and we will keep these visits to a minimum, but l believe this one is special. To save your time, the Vice President could give the lunch. W. W. Rostow Still no Yes_ See me ~ ERF:mst (Vice President to give lunch_
- 22ND BUT IF TE/1'1 WISHES, PREPARED ADVANCE HOUR UPON ~f.~.J~T.. VISIT CAN 8£ CONl'INUED THR QJGHOUT 22NO AND AS LATE INTO EVENING AS TElfl WANfS. HCMEVER ·, GOI UNAlLE EXTEND V ISJT FOLLOWING DAY. 2. PRESS GUIDA~E DEPARTMENr. •s 804, USEf> LAST YEAR
- par ies in Ai., fric and L t~n America presently organized and combin to press the Kremlin to d ori nted. All th s factor v lop a fresh political nd c nomic pproach which i ultan o ly t kes into ccount t dwindli g ideolo ic 1 al of the Co h'le e
- there i s a response, u n t il the aggressors have indicated th e ir w illin g n e ss to t a lk , we intend to press on. Our p atien ce and determ ination are m ending. This i s why t h is r e s o lu tio n ,th a t you p a tr io tic men and women so
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 77: May 15‑19, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 34
(Item)
- about 60o/o greater than in March, not two or three times as suggested in press reports from Saigon. An updated and slightly revised version of the PSAC report will be available in about a week's time. I would then like an opportunity to discuss
- FOR THE REQUESTING AND SUPPLYING OF SUCH INFORMATION. ~• FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN PANAMA LEARNE D OF MY MEETING WITH ARIAS ANO INQUIRED TODAY OF PAO DAVIS• I AUTHORIZED A REPLY TO PRESS INQUIRIES TO EFFECT DR• ARIAS HAD INVITED ME TO ~I~ HOME1 I MAD ACCEPTED ANO WE
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 104: Nov. 5‑8, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 42
(Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 61: Feb. 10‑13, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 29
(Item)
- the French alone. In this war, the Thieu-Ky government shares with the U nitecl States and its other allies the status of the designated enemy. To raid provincial capitals and to kill senior officials and to press the attack into the capital and major cities
- matters, the present work projects of the Habib committee -- PsyOps, anti-infrastructure, AID-CORDS relationships and US leverage -- carry forward recommendations earlier pressed by this office, relate to staff sections of Komer' s field organization
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 91: Aug. 11‑21, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 38
(Item)
- , a communique in the narne of the saying that those meetings were entire polithuro a good piece of work.· The Soviet leaders seem fQr their shortly thereafter to have scattered usual summer holidays. The.Soviet press stood down its att·acks on Czechoslovakia
- Ginsburgh 4 NMCC 4 Ginsburgh memo, 4 Ginsburgh memo 5 White 5 to President, Report, authority Viet Cong account msg, in Saigon suburb VN situation, handling on Chau Doc City handling press SEA operational gravel
- . be emplyyed close to the border and the operations should be conducted in such a \Vay as to have no press exposure. It is important tha.t the targets selected be worthy of the political risks involved. The Commander, US ?v1ACVwill prepare contingency plans
- before announcing a new ~abinet. Arias has tbreataned to press for a he~~ing on ~e charge.a if Robles fails t.P come across. s. ~bles was last reoorted to bo· a~ the Gua~d headquarters, along with representatives of both factiot\S. His moves ovc.r
- a feasibility study brought about by the French, British, and U.S. SSTpro posals being publicized in the Western press. By 1962 Soviet press articles car ried sketches of an SST obviously derived from the Bounder bomber prototype. Al though not an economical
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 28, May 16-24, 1967 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 16
(Item)
- NOT HEARD OF IT BEFORE YOUR-· CABLE ARRIVED, ALTHOUG~ I UNDERSTAND THERE IS A SMALL ITEM IN 7HIS MORNING'S PRESS. LIKE THE MOSCOW CC},'MUNIQUE OF LAST JU-LY, IT WAS SILLY, STUPID AND MISGUIDED. 2t MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS .TO GO DIRECTLY TO MRS. GANDHI. H
- Defense Minister Chavan, but he had to leave suddenly because of Nehru 1 s death. So you approved a press rel ease and McNamara - Chavan memo outlining t.1-ie ag:ree:nents reached while Chavan was here. T he b.dians had produced a Five - Year Defense Plan
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 77: May 15‑19, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 34
(Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 78: May 20‑24, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 34
(Item)
- told Kuznetsov that the US was not in agreement with the Brazilians on their proposed amendment regarding peaceful nuclear explosive devices (Pineds). He said that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had told him that the Brazilians would not press
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 92: Aug. 22‑31, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 39
(Item)
- no reason why the U.S. should have altered its plans in antici?ation of these discussions. Should the Soviets press this. issue, the U.~. should respond by inquiring whether the Soviet Union sees a practical way to provide verific~tion for any· limitations
- , recommendations Wheeler reviewing press memo, 19 -- Ginsburgh communist briefing Clarke's memo, in "Second Wave" of Rusk-Clifford target possibilities ------- target ----------- report------------------------------ talking points deployment N
- condition secret. Local press has simply reported he confined to house-with cold .. Ambassador Ashenheim may. be unaware PM's actual physical condition. McFarlane ·said PM concerned any publicity over his condition might produce unfavorable political
- of carrying television to population centers in the eastern and northern regions of the USSR. 6. In early 1966, authorities in Moscow disclosed through the press that central TV coverage of the . fiftieth anniversary would be extended to the more remote
- that -- while you are still excited by the hope desalting offers -- you realize, after painstaking personal review of the subject, that there are many unresolved questions. ··- on Shazar is not the man to press Viet Nam, and larael has strong argument
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 30, June 1-12, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 17
(Item)
- to make: this morning -- and passed ·t o Sect. Rusk -- is this: if we are pressed by Israel for spare parts, etc•• we should go hard to the Russians on. their equivalent supply to the Arabs. The reason is not merely to give us a bit of flexibility
- Huntington to the President - Charles A. Horsky 1227 Pinecrest Circle Silver Spring, Md. - Rear Adm. George G. Burkley 3507 Preston Executive Personal Press Cle .rk - William J. Hopkins. to the President Secretary Secretary ZOO15 - Jack J. Valenti
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4, May 1-27, 1964 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- Seere,ta11y I - USIA Carl T. ltowan, Director WHITEHOUSE McQ,o:rge· Bundy,. Spe·c ial Assistant to the Preatdent George Reedy. Press Secretary to the Pl"esldent Law~ence o•·Brien, Special Assistant to the President B:rornley Smith, -~ecutive
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 106: Nov. 15‑18, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 42
(Item)
- the November 22, 1967 Security Council Resolution based on agreement among the parties. We have urged the UAR to accept this concept and are pressing the Soviets and other Governments to weigh in with the UAR to this end. We have also made clear to the UAR
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 61: Feb. 10‑13, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 29
(Item)
- States to •1t a terrible price to pay for a pack o! Mr. HOS:\!ER. l\ir. Speakrr, today we ·selectively proliferate purely defensive words v.·hich could be quite meaningless re-~~!\·ed a message from the t>-residc:nt nuclear armaments to hard-pressed U.S
- should not get into the question of why we do not escort such ships . A ship on the high seas is the least provocative way of gathering intelligence. We should not cripple our intelligence effort. The press misconstrued what was said on the Sunday TV
Folder, "NSAM # 273: South Vietnam, 11/26/1963," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2
(Item)
- that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that oxpreee or implied criticism of officers of other bra.nchss be scrupulously avoidod in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically. the President approves
- is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968. SECRET s:se~T -2King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence
- what the President was going to do about aid to Indonesia. In addition, there would be press inquiries. At stake were the Administration's relations with Congress. In response to the President is question. Mr. Bundy said he would recommend signing
- of Central Intelligence Director McDermott, Office of Emergency Planning Director Rowan~ U. S. Information Age:icy Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson McGeorge Bundy, Special As3istant to the President Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary
- the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and the n decide to give the supers onic s . Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the r oad, he should refer back to Washington