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  • time. thel"efne, to try to aepti&t• •llicldy aa Allied Declarati- oil Berlla aloaa ti.. Uau of tJla memo we ant yo.a oa Sept.miter IT (attacMd). A• J'01I bow, thla l• wut tile Oermau r•• , ...ted. TIie Declaratloa W081d be aepttated with tile UK, th
  • and flag vessels and air­ craft were not permitted to enter the Trust Territory without the per­ mission of the Navy. At that time, the President directed that only applications for entry of aliens and foreign flag ships and aircraft may be vetoed
  • Donnel l ey Lo ~e d , ,~~ ~ --1t;Jj: )//.S 91- l(t/(o -c 4 pp. -:38b memo 4Q memo Hostow to the Pres. re Ah ica .--1.JI e 2 .Pf) ~ 1-o:Lo~, 3 AJLS , 1-.,. ~ {_&,-p, ~ ~ ~ - 's:!1 J.,,/(o 7 ' ] Ha: meme ,-za Max~ell 'Pai' 101 to the Pres. re t
  • ; undermining their morale and discouraging the creative initiative which is so essential to a successful foreign policy. At the -3same time •we have resigned from our respom~ibility in the · shaping of policy and the defining or its purposes, submitting too
  • BY THE INCONSISTENCY.· OF ·' SEEKING ENTRY INTO TiiE -· cot1MON MARKET' At ·:·THE'. SANE TIME THEY WERE THREATENING !O ~ITHDRAW TROOPS FROt1 THE: 'CONTINENT• THE · uK WOULD THEREFORE .. LIKE IO ARRIVE AT A SITUATION WHER~ THE GAP WOULD &E COVERED ..so THEY WOULD Nor
  • ::::, Kampala1429 f1\t\\ Nldl~c \l(.)·i-t0 secret~~~ 1 p 02/20/65 A -...◄=-'P"l'ff'ffT'f-+!!-'1--0f(Nt i ,o·,,t-ll.c)\Mc lo·3"° L FILE LOCATION NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Country File Uganda, vol. 1 RESTRICTION Box 101 CODES (Al Closed by Executive Order 12356
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • the possibility of our denial being effective, at least to hinder the timing of the French nuclear effort. Therefore I would withhold approval until the British had been approached and given a brief period to respond. The IBM computer is in a much different
  • thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks . His report largely reflected the State Department memorandwn submitted prior to the meeting. One of the principal
  • I th in k tim e i s im p o rta n t, b eca u se th e lo n g e r we w a it , th e more i t lo o k s l i k e a campaign docvimento Could you ta k e a lo o k a t i t t h i s e v e n in g , and l e t me know tomorrow what you think? The h i s t o r i c
  • ? should be said about the possibility o! calling up additional units? 3. 2,,/ ~f~. Size 0£ the call-up How many units between the strengths Vietnam? Are these .the call-up affect the ·1/. \\'hat Time factors I-low long \1.ill the units be needed
  • a letter ~f designation. The designation has these antecedents: From the time he took the OAS-CIAP job, Sol Linowitz has been pressing to establish an OAS Mission comparable to Goldberg's UN Mission. ARA has resisted -- as it had done with effqrts of some
  • German forces this year. I have added to Secretary Rusk's draft a personal note on page 3, The urgency is this: Kiesinger ough~ to get it before Secretary Rusk sees Willy Brandt on Mondayand in time for him to relay to Brandt your message. B . .PM Wilson
  • the advantage of immediate delivery and coat only about $130, 000, contraated to the 18-montha lead time and $3. S million for new vehicles. I am checking this with you mainly becau•e of your per ■ onal battle for the new APCs laat apring. I asaume, however
  • --+-&esmw--te-a~Pfe51tde!tt;-2~-rr.m . . Lp #6a letter ~ o..ji 3/o ~ TS Chancellor Kiesinger to LBJ Official translation e : ~ lo\,, s-10~ tv ..::r 't)~"\ ~ 3p TS 09/17/68 A .m. e -tp ' . (duplicate, #68 , NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 8
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • for your information. A 26 minute summary is also available on 16 mmfilm and we would be happy to show it at a time and place convenient to yourself and interested members of your staff. 2. (U) The participants in EPSILON I-65 and those of us in the Joint
  • . 42., 5/24/64 A JtAc... cio -'1,.., FILE LOCATION NSFrCTION Memos to the Pcesideut 9 Walt CODES RESTR B.g11tgw J Vglume +8' ~(a31 lO l4 ' 19~8 Ba* 34 (Al Closed by Executive Order t2356·governing access to national security information
  • , US cooperation would be selective and subject to government-to-government agreement that launcher vehicles, components and technology would not be used for: lo Advancement of communication satellite capability other than (a) to permit participation
  • hope • tod•y~Headquarters_ol""_the ...Jfaflonal Liberation Front (NLF) more than has been felt tor months. 'l'boae who ·kept the faith may nowl)e vindicated but there is no time to philosophize. In the early hours this morning an emissary, the brother
  • in the country. At the present time, P.L. 480 wheat in India sells in retail throughout the country for approximately 40 paisa per kilo with 50 to 90 paisa for different varieties compared of Indian wheat at different cities. ••••• - 7cities. Thus
  • .•!~~~~ ...... - ■ --1 II I Herewith an lnterim response by · J. Orville Freeman on counterpart funds in India. ~t !(i ' ... . .,.,...,.. 'I signalled Bunker privately to lo(>k ~ .._ . t•- into this and he signalled back that he would• -·----·-_ I spoke '
  • times that in the U. S., because of chronic ~al ­ nourishrr.ent . In Libya, a mother must have five children to have a good chance t~at one will l ive to 15 yea~ s . In Vietnam, 4o percent of the ch ildren die of disease by the age of four . 2. After
  • a C TO CONDUCT O N E - T I lI E MAXIMUM EFFORT CVA A IR SI H I K E S AGAINST S'JATO'’.' PATROL CRAFT AND PT BOATS AT BASES 3. IN NVM AMD A SUPPORTING POL F A C I L I T Y . JCS a r e CQ^^SIDERI::3 AS FU R TH ER ACTION C ERTAIN D E P LO Y
  • pre­ dominant influence on the North Korean re­ gime. At the same time, however, there has been increasing competition from Communist China for influence in both the economic and ideological spheres, and North Korea is de­ pendent in considerable degree
  • Nam. As ycu know, I share this sentiment and mysei~ many times •. Because of t.hc extent of the interest in the Senate, . to el.a.borate on the question of a l have thc-ught it advisable U ~ N. initiative, a~ I understand. it. In this connection
  • to ____________ , , ____ D E O TIA L J11?XDj:S C la s s ific a tio n F O r g a n iz a tio n , has s p e c ia l c o nc e rns and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w it h re g a rd f to th e peace and s e c u r it y o f th e a re a . • p a r t ic u la r ly c lo s e to uc h
  • after the first of the year. are consiciering it If we were to participate at th~.t time, as I stated yesterday over there to take part in the exercises. we would send some 10 or 12. 000 troops Th.:a.t woulci give us a total of some 30 to 40,000 troops
  • Vietnamon 1 June 1967 and have not returned since. I knewthe ground defenses at Khe Sanh as they were at that time but since then many changes have been made. Wehave three times as manyMarines there now·and I cannot speak as to the details
  • in the New York Times which was quite misleading in that it l eft the im.prcssion that the Viet C ong had achieved a major victory over the Vietnamese. Viet Cong loss es in this battle were sizeable . Although the week has been bloody, it has been pretty
  • . The President has directed that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, having served its purpos e, be discontinued effe.ctive this date. This directive supersede s NSC 5816. ..,, McGeorge Bundy 'lo !. i.- .• ~.5 ' . s / #$C
  • WILL BE REPRESENTED. ~ACCORV INVITED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVE • . ~-GE 4 RU MJ IR 19121 --S- E C R E f 1 -AND. 'M ED ICA[" 'SUPPL'lES .HA D:.:At:READY · BEEN DISTRIBUTED FRO M CE NTRAL .AND · REG ION WAREHOUSE . SO FAR SHORTAGES HAVE BEEN RESULT OF ISOLATED I LO
  • ISTR AT I ON NA FORM 1429 (6-85) WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) FORM OF DOCUMENT CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE DATE a.m. - -,-~~'ICJ"tt:.m~~::u.....cu:.-'--!2 ' ~9 ~ RESTRICTION Id-/'-\/ Rostow Lo President, 7.00 p.m. S 1 p ~ '+-I? .,q
  • - ) JRG - PAGE OP OSD MESSAGE PAGES C ITE NO. 1 ^ _FO «M N O _. t czc S3 58 1 REPRODUCTJCN PROH33ITED lO EN TiFIC A TIO N DTG 0 2 0 9 1 9 Z AUG 64 s e e RET ■ / MESSAGE T H E J O IN T C H I E F S C ” S T A F F PRECEDENCE (INrO) i?’ne.G£D
  • reduction to do this on their own without assistance from the de sign features of the Skip jack. At the same time, as a result of my discussions with DOD personnel I am convinced that on technical grounds alone this proposal is not very realistic
  • aid contingent are be stepped to buy time essential measures, and of agricultural has led famine the US to upon appropriate self­ countries. alone in supplying must now be given to be related a world up to tons. the US has been
  • •naUou.l D1-v1e1a ID:Wormser:fa 9/9/65 THE WHITE 'HOUSE Washington. notJ. .,.._ClleQt•• npl7 to . 332 .fllhl di•• .- _Uict:ltecounet of utt• for ·the .a ttat...­ ot u. '. • o Jettivu le · · tUb l•PMI• tuolttaa •hNcl 111 H 4-*1.,.S lo c......i • vtth
  • York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol­ lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
  • lo ent and release procedures which had been developed b '.:', .s lJ ) an en orse y the Joint Chiefs of Staff. r review o employment and release procedures has been completed. As a result of our ·review I propose the following: a. I • b
  • , develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla op­ erations and ensure availability of those forces ·in the event of war, including wherever practicable proVision of a base upon which the mil­ itary may expand these forces in time