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  • the advantage of immediate delivery and coat only about $130, 000, contraated to the 18-montha lead time and $3. S million for new vehicles. I am checking this with you mainly becau•e of your per ■ onal battle for the new APCs laat apring. I asaume, however
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • , and by certain vested economic interests who fee l more secure under a government -SE~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/LIMDIS ,.- ~TjNO FOREIGN DISSEM/LIMDIS - 3 ­ dominated by th8 King than under the junta or liberal politicians. time, the Kin[; feels particularly
  • to their new role in the world. , I, ,, ,.,,, . !' ·1 NL~ P v __..._~~- . j SECRET/~ENSITIVE - 2 ­ .-SECRET /SEMSI !Iv E A. The UK is steadily withdrawing from its security commitments in distant areas but at the same time is giving more support
  • a ■mailer plant than we initially con■ idered: He believes that the next logical •tep in developing the technology of large- ■ cale deaaltlng would be to build a 40 MGD plant. Thi ■ wowd be enough larger (more than S time ■) than pre ■ ent plant• to provide
  • that ·.-: ·' ' ·., .· .i. depending on their reaction we could determine how to :· :,.· _·_ . . .. ,· , '. ·: proceed. Thia is in process. '. ·;; · · -' · -' . (2) .There are other points on the loan which . I would have liked you to consider at the time you .had
  • ••• ON THE OTHER HAND, IF VE WERE RIGHT ·1N THINKING THAT THE DMZ IS A FIRST-RATE . TOPIC WITH WifICH TO SHOV PROGRESSAND Ai tHE· SA;"!t TIME NOT • REPEAT NOT OFFEND TH£ GVN; THE' Ft.LL DELEGATIONS WOULD·FIT ... IT ·MUCH·· BETTER. THE·-SAl'E-·IS·TRut ·or-·otJR
  • . This is an enormous problem. It is clearly a matter for the conscience of each family and each nation. We will never dictate an answer, nor intrude on the decision others must make for themselves. But many countries have voluntarily decided that the time has come
  • Callte·Loac ameadmeata. of TIie Puc.ll urnchn.at N91irea tJaat payment be made at tile time of delivery la all amouat to cover U.S. Meda, except •be• it woalcl N iacoaaiateat with tbe:;,-rpoH• of P. L. 480. 01U' local curreacy requirema,IK la Korea for nest
  • • a flttlaa coacl••laa •alcl Nfen, IMy •• &IMIoar face~• atnqtll camfert t• me la time• wlllcJl llaft ud 11, 1969 Aa I Ila•• talk• -- Ila•• lteea a aovce ol aot alwa1• bNa •••1 for .w.. .. of ... a .. c_.aet •• War. Ture alMI--. ud Clu1rcbW
  • be dellver Arranaeme.ata for meetua1 ·• ht or 1th General Abrain • Time AtteDdaace, lf aay. s. Alel'tly meaaye to TCC Am-••adore. (Tab C) 6. la Preaeat Text of Jolat A.mlouac:emeat Acceptable? (Tu.) 7. Text of Prealdeat'• etateme.-.t. s. Test
  • on uncleared memcon and is subject to revisiono Discussion of possible times for rescheduling 1oint Cabinet Meeting brought out difficulties for US before late January or February, Japan between late 1anuary and ·April. difficulties for It was agreed
  • generally bad advance lnd!catlons that a raid waa ln the wo~b. Tale time there was no prior ln.telUgence. Cwitoms, FB1 and CU. are checking to see wh.ether the alt-craft ml ht have co~• :fro.m u. s. terdto • 3,3(/,){1) W. Vi. Rostow SANITIZED · E.O. 13292
  • . McCone does not believe the dangers of another coup (except as a result of a possible assassination) at this time are as serious as he be­ .lieves this paragraph implies, 5. l 'I·- - "SECRET · -~- ., .. - ...., ,,,. -----~-~- ~--~ -- I . I b
  • Administrator Gaud requests your approval to pledge a program loan of µp to $65 million for CY 1967 at the Turkey Consortium meeting, now scheduled for Janunry 27. Gaud also requests your approval to negotiate this loan, probably some time in February
  • count:r.lea to­ wa.r d the end of this year, with delivery date in late 1969 or 1970 (lead time 11 20 months). use ou:r economic assistance :a s a lever in getting these countHes not to go, supel'sonic until th-en. I recommend that you approve. the $15
  • Union, and, to a leaser extent, COmmuniet China. •••The caan•miet movement in Latin America bu lost ground in recent years. Much of the initial enthusiasm for Caatroism baa cooled and factional rivalries have produced divisions in · In 1967, cCX1Dunist
  • with Harrim&'\ on July Bill ' 2-3 days and tben returning.. staying I .an~ then go on with Cy, so that all • fully in touch with each· other's ' l three of us, so to speak,_would be at the smna time. tltinking 4 .. Needless to say, we aro
  • traaclle. W• caaaot. of co•r••• predict Coacr•••ioaal ffacUoa to 01ar worldwide credit ••l•• ,....... at till• time. 'Wttll r•1••• to th• ,._,. •• yo11may lie .,u• that tbe Uat&ed State• coatiaM• to reaa,d lt• mllltary .reiatt ... ~tp •ida lraa •• ma&\lally
  • - '{' DISCUSSION I. INTRODUCTION 5. The military junta under General Pak Chong-hui is in a stronger position now than at any time in its career. Factionalism within its own ranks and among the military in gen­ eral continues to be a major problem, but ten­ sions
  • . '11 His telephon number: area ode 202, ~8· -4220. ois N. avemb r 2. 197 r. Pra•id11nt· You may ·•h to _aa te epboned today by , at Collin• of th He aatd that a team on the Star, eluding J r ha• been workin for aome time on ,a •to,ry hk
  • in an equally short period of time. Owing to the pressure of time, it does not include material which is easily available to the Department of Stat~ from ~ther sources. We will welcome the opportunity to refine the material presented, or to expand it to greater
  • -- It w..W be laappreprlate ebjecUYe• ID tbeN MlotlaUoaa 11.oaoraltle aad •~l• detaPJDt•etlea A••• boweYer, at thl• time to dlecu• acept eater thl• hopeful aew pllaN. ol Nlf• •laOllld, before: of North VletaameN haa rl••• All ou llltelllleace 1
  • THEMEETING.WESECRETLY . RECORDED TH~ EXCHANGE BUTDO NOTRPT NOTKNOW ITS QUALITY AT THIS TIME. • 8. THE TEAMWASHANDED A DOCUMENT, TEXTOF WHICHIS IN SAIGON ·45510. BUNKER .. t 9E6RiT ... --- .. TEAM OR AT '' ' • I THEM NA~lSO MILITARY SPOLESMAN STATED THATTHEY
  • NG THE COASTAL WATERS OY THE DE"OCRATIC PEOPLE•s REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR ESPIO NAGE ACTS VIA THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THAT THE ass PUEBLO VAS NOT A ttERE 0.CEANOGRAPHIC RESEA~CK SHIP HAS SEEN PROVED UNEQUIVOCALLY BY IKE MILITARY . I
  • /icatlon presently is at same time realistic. _disillusionment and of a more representative ., Paee 3 of telegram to Amembassy LONDON Classification 4. Alternatives of heightening to US-UN favored courses and expanding Yemen conflict
  • a pretty coherent picture. November 1963. You saw Bhutto twice while he was here for President Kennedy 1 s funeral, the second time to ::-eceive a note from Ayub. You told him you were " a friend of Pakistan and would try to continue to be one if Pakistan
  • .Administrations of both political parties since the end of World War n . .At the same time I want to assure ·y our Majesty thi\t it will be m.y firm determination that ·events in the prese.n t crisis not be permitted to affect the long-standing Interest
  • . posture. either in relation to negotiating The first of these issues will be ~resented orally by Secretary Clifford at the appropriate time. Certain of the options in the negotiating areas are included in these briefing papers as indicated below
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • moat crltlcal time adcla ao al1nUlcant n11elear coatrllMatlOD to tbe exploalve rleld al tbe bigb exploalYe •J•te.m (ao al1alficant auclear Jleld baa beea 1eaerallJ deflaed aa about 4 pDllada el HE equlvalellt)o -2- In any aucb take-over lt l
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • •W. with a ,,. cOlltrol ID Octolter, almoat J time• tile pNYleu record la -· It l• a 1Nl'J' bl& atep for &a.l to accept the Tille• ,..,.rameat a• a le1ltlmate •1et1atJa1 partaer: lNt lt la alao .. r,- dlfflcalt for Sal.- to alt..._ at tile nme taltle
  • SIGNIFICANT. STEP HP,S1.'"·_.)~.i.' '_BEEN ._. _TAKEN; A MOST' IMPORT MF OBJECT IVE RE~C'HED. IN' LIGHT -rr ··,. ,_. OF' _'_THIS .. t ~ . . .. . IS N0\•.1 TIME ro REAPPRAISE OUP. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE." : ·i . . .··. SECRET ·•Ill
  • to the US. At various times in the past several years France has taken a relatively active role regarding Vietnam, sometimes in public and sometimes in private. France sent high-level emissaries to Peking and Hanoi to sound out the leaders; has acted
  • with wea­ in the A Shau· valley pons as large as the 37-mm. AAA gun. Other ground weapons which have been discovered in Com.~unist hands since the first of the year include an extended range 122-rnm. rocket supplied by the Soviet Union and a new, highly
  • there is a greater linking of the idea of talking than there has been at any time since I started following North Vietnamese matters in the autumn of 1963. (Since that time, I have talked with all of the Indians, Canadians, and Poles about their visits to Hanoi
  • attac~s !ro~ the Ton~ir. Delta to Cau i:au had tied down in de~er.s1ve bases tr.e ~ul~ or the irench Union Forcea ~c! their local auxil!aries. De Lattre had left beh!nd a tortiried line ir. t~e ~o:-Jc!r. Delta r::annec! by aux1l1ar!ea ar.d aecond line
  • COMMISSION. WHEN MISSION ARRIVED AT RESIDENCE, IT PROVED TO BE HEADED BY ONE-TIME P.M . TRAN CHANH THANH RPT TRAN CHANH THANH, AND TO BE COMPOSED OF TRAN LE QUANG RPT TRAN LE QUANG, PLUS FIVE PROMINENT JURISTS, ONE OF WHOM HAD RECENTLY BEEN CHIEF JUSTICE
  • down their levels of military spending. The Vice President:· We should get people in business and the labor unions to work on the sponsors of the restrictive amendments--i. e. , Conte, Symington and Long. The La~ American Council, headed by Mr