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  • military forces and limit the size of U. S . forces. Political fragility continues in South Vietn am. We hope that the political situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh
  • ':ie following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong Summary -- Plans for the VC Tet attack on Danang City were outlined to a group of select cadres on 22 January by Ho Phuoc, Secretary of the Quang Da-Danang Spec i al Zone
  • -revolutionary strategy. f •. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and cap­ tures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdevel­ oped countries such as South Vietnam
  • -revolutionary strategy. f •. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and cap­ tures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdevel­ oped countries such as South Vietnam
  • Chi Minh' s objectives are to divide us from our allies and to divide us at home. We should be cautious in making statements about what we expect to come out of the Paris talks. UK Fo r eign Minister Stuart may get something during his coming visit
  • York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol­ lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
  • )>25Vrs Conditions in Hanoi ED 12958 3.4(bl[1)>25Vrs (CJ ED 12958 3A[b)[1]>25Yrs -Z- (CJ I 4. H•> Chi Minh, President of the I;>RV, did not appear for the May Day celebratia.s, nor did he appear for the 19 May celebration of his own birthday
  • is so serious that it calls for more inmediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: . "(l) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on K~anh's efforts to activate the military and civilian establishments. (2
  • several hours a secret message from Ho Chi Minh, relS¥ed to the White House by President deGaulle, has announced North Vietnam's unilateral decision to halt hostilities. Ho demands reciprocal action by the United States. In Vietnam, American, RVNand other
  • said was that the Asians believed the ir enemy Wbo is the enemy - - Peking or Ho Chi Minh? The Vice President : The Vietnamese know their enemy is the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Wounded South Vietnamese soldiers know who the enemy is . Senat
  • ) ~he fellowing material is Secret,not for foreign dissemin­ based on an inter.agency., ation. SIG?IA I-66 is-. hypothetical, politica.1-mili~ary game conducted in the Pentagon between 13 and 22 September 1966. (Briefer) SIGMAopened with Ho Chi Minh
  • have expressed their appreciation for the information you furnished me last week about a possible message to Ho Chi Minh following your inauguration. We agree fully with your view that it would be advisable to avoid the kind of message that would either
  • that that they must 'come to the assistance" of the North E-6 , S- - NOFORN NO YES example of this new means or disguised aggression. Ho Chi Minh has had a long associ­ ation with the communist revo~utionaries in China, . particularly with Mao. He has been
  • ,:Ln Viet-~tam remains -difficult. 1 J:' kn~w. we ca.n .· · , . :~ · '._: {· with this grave .t hree . of . our NATO . allies. . '! .. l the:r~ .· . Event.~» ho~7~ver~ .· conti~ue _to c'!1.II'l~ . I ] t' : Ir! -,;:· • We ·a re tirmly
  • aradual cuts in economic aid. Our objective ia to. keep the proeaure on Europe to increase its contribution and on Turkey to increase importa from the US and are working to that end. Acting Secretary Barr'• momo (Tab C) underscores these concerns. Ho
  • ~ lAtelli.g enca lnformltt.ioA tells ui. ho le tryin.J ha!'"d lo'l!" a victory -- thi year, if po••lbl&. l Gcre.a e-d guerrilla .a ctivity 1n V · ne~uela~ C-c lombia •nd 2.o Uvia Februa~y and the me.etin1 of •ll Latia America• natictJ.al U.beratioa me-vement
  • ; ...·•. __,,,,_ ___.....,~--------_,__ ..... ---.·. ......... _• .._,____ ,.. ___ ., ,. ..:.. ~ - ~ ·.. .' · .'. ! ' \ ::·.. ·.-:~ ...;.:_._ \ ,... , ' . I • •,: I • Jj, /C1- ··1\ ~ '. . • ', ; ~ . .: I March 21, 1967 I !· . r · . . ,. l . t ,. (, i !' -~ • •I Wo do not know why Hanoi chose at this time to release Ho Chi Minh' s ri :.} ) -.\ -.\- / · / · E~~:l~~~~i;~:tig:;~~~i
  • . On the political front, Ho Chi Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation. One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising aurability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the NVN regime has been counting on a. state
  • ano'\bar--vbat. would ban been thll oonaequenaea it we 011r ■lliur:, had nner aid \o Sou.~ Viet-Ir•! There 1a little dotM \Ila\, by' bl"Oualn now, Ro Chi Minh would haw acbiewd hi• lite-long objecniw ot iapoaiJlg a Coaunut regiae on SOll\h '11
  • Chi Minh's birthdayv, to fto Chi :Vli:rJi, . reporting a message/from Pr~~e ~inistel{;~ expr9SSi..rl~ ·the hope lr..at QTE the Vietnamese ·people will have tlle good fo:..~un3 of havtn~ Ho Chi. Minh 1 s wise and dedicated leadership to gu.ide them
  • of Ho Chi Minh's closest and most trusted advisers. Although Ho Chi Minh did not mention paper during group's audience with him, Hong Tu made certain revisions in draft which Quintanilla believes based on former•a discussions with Ho Chi Minh. Hong Tu
  • travel by your staff - - I do not think this is something which can be done by anyone from the outside. ' W i h o ~~ )l~ pp.~.ove--a u- ·e -mia-aa.r,¥ ~ho.1il.dr,.g.0:.:.to-~Geil"n -1 &11~ ~ .In And I think he should tell Erhard, albeit gently
  • ur ION AS TO THE POWERS or THE PRISlDlNT' AND I'f 1S THE KIND or DEAL THAT COULD EASILY COME UNSTUCK IN A atUNCMe -< BIG MINH A SECOND MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IS THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY PA PERS HAVE BEEN FILED IN BE HALF OF BIG fl lNH t Ii lt H t HE
  • , • •U. PW mll~•r lo ••pport y -ab me ho • at to • .··••lo . --~••ta ( l , k, _ •). -SECRET TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR SUMMIT MEETING Monday, April 10 11:00 p. m. .Depart Andrews. DE CI.1 S IFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4(b) White House Gu.idclincs
  • HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND T h is Eiaterlal c o n t a i n s I n f o r m a iln n a f fe c tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se o f t h e U n ite d S t a te s w it h in t h e m e a n in g o f t h e E sp io n a g e L a w s, T itle 18, U ^ .C i
  • )'· I w.p~LD LIK~... j .. HO\{EVE'~,;~f.~i~; -.: . SEE ALL SUCH - CHA~GES REVIEWED· AND ·LA'!D -. ro REST :. .:· lF ... 0: . . ·:·· ' . :~; :· . . -. ·. .. . ..._ - .. ··-~; .. . - .. - ... --· . ·.....;- ~ ~"·:' . . '-'-·.!t-· . . ••'." ':"'7
  • HO CHI-MINH, AND AN EX•BAO DAI MINISTER WHOSENAME WAS SIMILAR TO !Rid~ VAN DO. CSOUR CE DID NOT RECOC~IZ! THIS NAME). 11. - DISSErt,: CI NCPAC PACFL.T AR?AC PA.CAF. 25X1A NO FOREIG!'iDISSEM .I
  • on January 6 for the first time said he would be willing to meet Ho Chi Minh at any time and at any place. The Government reels that it is now in a position to deal from a far stronger base than at any time in the past, and it also realizes that growing
  • .•P~ki-~ ta-~s insistently desire us to do. Ambassador Locke will not escape these frustrations. · We ·will- -help .him all -we .can•·---rwith~n t4~.; ~_cop e ··o,f ·our proade r ·inte re.s ts on.,_.the -Subcontinent -as a .-.w ho!~e. ~c.,.~-... ,ol
  • \'1 WHITE HO USE · :,~, ·MR RUSK ST ATE · _:_J ·r,n HELNs CIA :.-~ 0 300701Z ZYH ZFF-3 ·. : }FM -. GEN ABRAMS COHUS~·:ACV 3·" r" • • •+• i .. t • ... ~ - - (4,)Ci)(:,) , · (, ,I(
  • . PRESIDENT: Linc Gordon reports as follows: l. The Brazilian Ambassador is guest of honor at a dinner tonight. Ho,vever I he plans to take Braniff flight 501 1 arriving San Antonio 4 :Z2. a. m . after dinner. (It would be nice if someone from the White House
  • ~ •~rricea l>y- the· Commbalon and the private ow11e:-.idp ot apecial ~uclear material. . ' The new Agreement alao provide• that the laternatloaal Atomic: Energy Ageacy wll1 ho promptly re4uated to asaume reapoa.alblllty for applylag aafeguard.ia
  • has trav e lled extensively and spoken to a large number of audiences since he took over . But more importantly, as a former (until early fifties) Staff Officer for Ho Chi Minh, he can and does take on the American protest m.ovement with conviction
  • . a ---. After adopting this policy, I would renew the effort to talk, making it clear that as the infiltration .diminished, so would the bombing. It rriay be that lifting the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area will take some of the heat off Ho Chi Minh and make