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  • Goldberg, there were the Rostow brothers for another, there was Ed Weisl, any number of people. And it seems to me that an Arab would say that the President was listening to the Zionists among the advisers. Was there any evidence of this at the UN? S
  • to turn to his advisers, perhaps people like the Bundys and the Rostows more than the Secretary of State, or at least as much as the Secretary of State, for advice and counsel. And here again, I don't think there's any real doubt that President Johnson
  • appointments with a very long, solemn, "Joe, I know the President values your opinion. This grave decision is going to be made about--." case it was about [Walt W.] Rostow and [Robert] Kintner. think that these are wise appointments? very much." In one
  • me was the fact that I supported him on his most difficult, and as it turned out, fatal issue. So when I would go to Viet Nam, when I'd come back, he'd call me for a little debriefing. I'd sit with him and with Walt Rostow and just give them my
  • not guilty. Once a week I reported to the Oval Office at 6 PM to relieve LBJ's secretaries. A number of the President's Assistants like Walt Rostow brought in confidential material for LBJ to go over at night. It was known as night reading
  • he continued to be during Mr. Johnson's But that is understandable. Some of the Kennedy people stayed on, as you know: Walt Rostow, -lr( Larry O'Brien in various functions, John Gronouski, et cetera, et cetera. Those who stayed on were
  • had the same question as I went through it. know why we used that. I don't I believe the President was briefed, which if 1968 is correct would have meant that Walt Rostow was in on the thing. "To determine the validity of the opposing viewpoints
  • , Secretary Rusk and Walt Rostow. When he called Walt Rostow, I think Walt told him that he was just LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library
  • of whom ended up in the White House. One who remained straight on through the Johnson peri ad was \·Ia 1t Rostow; another, Carl Kaysen, who was for some time a presidential assistant. Then, fanning out around this were a group of people in the who my
  • job under Kennedy and Walt Rostow's job under Johnson, was not so evident in the Truman years. In addition, the nature of the national security p r o b l e m was not so clearly visible in those days, so the parallel is not as precise between
  • in Vietnam and he wanted me to go out there and see what I could do with the situation. G: Was there any aspect of your job that he emphasized at that point? B: My recollection is, and I have written to Walt Rostow also to see whether my recollection
  • was surprised at some of the questions and perhaps didn't handle them as well as he might have. I saw the presentation and I thought at times he seemed a little bit flustered, not prepared. But I know, for example, Walt Rostow spent three hours
  • it usually be, incidentally? J: Ed Hamilton for awhile--he came more often than anyone else. He was really, I guess, under the Security Council, under Walt Rostow. over and he'd be there as an observer. He'd come And whenever there was a real
  • on the White House staff? G: Right. M: Or the domestic people? G: Nope, M: These are the Rostow operation-- G: The Bundys, the Ro.stows, M: Right. the former. and their staffs. And they get to be pretty numerous sometimes, I'm sure. What about
  • : Not particularly. Of course, Harry McPherson was doing a good deal of the major Vietnam speech writing, Walt Rostow contributing. We'd get involved in Vietnam speeches more if it were on another occasion and then he would say he wanted to put something in about
  • . But it is not analyzed within the numerical count. On occasion-- well, for instance, after the October 31, [1968] announcement of a bombing halt in North Vietnam, the first batch of telegrams and some letters were analyzed for content by Walt Rostow's [Special
  • /oh 4 there of some matter that I was handling in which he was interested, that he would react to and send me a message through his special assistant. M: When he does that, is that the Rostow operation in the White House that gets in touch with you
  • couldn't win, how we were involved, how the sentiment even in Vietnam was against us . The CIA claimed that their messages were not getting through, and they blamed people who were at the White House close to the President : Walter Rostow, whom I met
  • in 1961, yes. He had quite an argument about what ought to be done out there, because he did not agree with the Taylor-Staley [Taylor-Rostow?] mission approach, which was pretty conventional: build up the conventional army. That was another thing
  • G: That thesis I think Walt Rostow proposed some time ago, that this is what makes the guerrilla's job so easy, all he has to do is break things up. P: Yes. G: Now, an alternative--I should sayan antithesis--has been propounded, which
  • and so forth, you know. I mean, evidently you saw the man with some frequency. W: Yes. I did see him, and of course he retained Walt Rostow who was working in that area. friends. Then Bill Moyers and I became pretty good So it was a fruitful
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Montague -- I -- 27 G: Well, what were you doing? What was Komer's [position]? M: Well, Komer was the special assistant to the president for Vietnam. And he really was working directly with Walt Rostow, national security
  • see, there is a National Security Staff which was Bundy's, now is Rostow's, and the Presidential Science Advisory Staff which was Hornig, will be Lee Dubridge . There I had more regular contacts because they'll ask us to be briefed on programs
  • dealt with, and dealt with quite closely, was Ed Fried, who was a staff member of the Rostow office. Ed was a member of the so-called Deming group, which was the coordinating-M: Yes. He was ·Francis Bator's successor. D: Francis was earlier
  • and Rusk, or between [Walt] Rostow and Rusk and Dobrynin. But my recollection is that at both ends--Paris and Washington--there was confirmation of the fact that the North Vietnamese understood precisely what was expected of them, and what the consequences