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236 results
Oral history transcript, Paul C. Warnke, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- the fairly brief period of time in which it was in existence were Ambassador Berger; Walt Rostow; Clark Clifford, who had been named to succeed McNamara but who had not yet taken over the job; McNamara; Rusk; and I think Max Taylor was in at Some of the early
- in the meeting, I guess he thought we were taking Kennedy's word against his. But Kennedy was talking to Katzenbach and other people, you see, as they came down the hall. Anyway, I got called up into Rostow's office and was told that there hadn't been
Oral history transcript, Harrison Salisbury, interview 1 (I), 6/26/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
(Item)
- something up, I think working through Walt Rostow. But all this produced was that Rostow said he would be delighted to talk to me but the President didn't want to talk to me. I said I wasn't interested in talking to Walt because I knew perfectly well, I
- Vietnamese army was hav ing a tough time. L: Very. G: Did we consider at least contingency plans at that time for sending in U.S. troops? L: No, not in that particular period, not in 1961. G: Now, I know that General Taylor and Mr. [Walt] Rostow went
Oral history transcript, Lawrence E. (Larry) Levinson, interview 6 (VI), 8/18/1972, by Joe B. Frantz
(Item)
- the President was at Camp David very, very few times. F: Did you ever go? L: No, I never did go, and I have a feeling that most of the staff never went either. I do recall Rostow was out there once with the President. This might have been at the time
- : Absolutely. B: He must have Did he ever get angry at the other extreme? Did he been getting an awful lot of hawkish advice. sometimes get angry at them too? M: I don't know of any really hawkish advice.I heard Walt [Rostow] one time talk about some
- the mission headed by General /Maxwell D ./ Taylor and Walt Rostow went to Vietnam, I was very active on Secretary McNamara's behalf in the policy review that followed the return of that mission . And that policy review included a number of meetings over
Oral history transcript, Chester L. Cooper, interview 2 (II), 7/17/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
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- . C: Exactly. They weren't very consequential. principle of the thing. But it was a kind of a There was a feeling on the part of some people-- M: Now, was this primarily Rusk and Rostow? C: Rusk and Rostow, primarily; there may have been
Oral history transcript, Robert B. Anderson, interview 1 (I), 7/8/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
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- directly but sometimes through Mr . Rostow, as to the progress we were making in the negotiations . In June of 1967 in this office, we initialed a proposed treaty between the United States and Panama . The treaty was really in three parts, all of which
Oral history transcript, William S. White, interview 2 (II), 3/10/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- stro_ng·, the television was the opposite view from what he . was hearing. It was alway~ my feeling that he .believed in what he was doi .ng, but he also could have done better at selecting the advisors that he listened to. Walt Rostow and Genera1
- to reach a goal of $1,000,000, 000. Joe Fowler left it pretty well up to me, I guess. quick in saying mandatory. Bob McNamara was very Nick Katzenbach- Gene Rostow, I guess, was hesitant, but went · to mandatory pretty quickly. And I guess I
- at that time was assistant secretary, asked me to take the White House Latin American adviser job, which Robert B. Sayre had occupied for about nine months previous to that. F: Had you known Walt Rostow or the President at all before this time? B: I had
- asked me to go one time. Then when we got back he had Cardinal Spellman and me to the White House for lunch, and he had Mr. [Walt] Rostow and he had I think the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and one or two others. And he asked Cardinal Spellman, "Now
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 7 Walt Rostow and four or five other representatives of the government to examine the situation and make recommendations--which turned out to be a rather historic mission because
- be devalued, and some of the foreign affairs specialists in the White House were simply tied down. There was a time when we thought Rostow was becoming interested i.n Cyprus; but then his time \t-/as taken up with the pound crisis. So it never escalated out
- : In that sam:: summer of 1967 you were on a commission with Walt Rostow and with Leonard r~arks, and domestic policies. R: to name two, to examine certain U.S. foreign Just how active a group was this? Well, again, this was one of those matters whereby
- , "Who the hell gave us Johnson? us Dean Rusk? Who gave us McNamara? Rostow brothers?" ~'Jho gave Who gave us the Bundys and the You know, Kennedy did or the Establishment did. and they stayed on under Johnson and there they 1tJere. I suppose
- ?] Rostow was one of them, I believe. Who else am I trying to think of, was another one? And like George Christian, for example, would review a lot of things that not everybody in the White House saw. I just don't remember who--and I didn't always see
- , and this is one shop in the White House, and you would call it the legislative program, and really the domestic program, of the administration. They don't deal much with foreign policy or defense as such. That's more in Walt Rostow's ball park. Now, you can come
Oral history transcript, Joseph A. Califano, interview 36 (XXXVI), 9/21/1988, by Michael L. Gillette
(Item)
- on the first of August with O'Brien, Ginsburg, Wirtz, Reynolds, Ackley, Katzenbach, Douglas, [Walt?] Rostow, Clifford, and [Bill] Moyers. In and out. I guess O'Brien's reporting on where the legislation stands, and he says that Yarborough will support
Oral history transcript, Joseph A. Califano, interview 60 (LX), 1/17/1990, by Michael L. Gillette
(Item)
- -- LX -- 15 Then, for some reason on the eighth of April, we got into a discussion of--let me just get my own calendar for April 8. Christ, he's got [Walt] Rostow. Well, I was in his office for the postal reorganization thing for thirteen minutes
- for the way the place worked in general, and I started sitting in on Walt Rostow's National Security Council staff meetings three times a week, just a listener and an observer. And I began to get a feel for what he was doing. has a large staff
- deliberately distorted the figures in order to make it look good and also to deceive the President, that was the biggest canard of all, because people like Walt Rostow and Ambassador Bill [William] Leonhart LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org
- --and Shirley Clurman and Walt Rostow and I. While we were having our cocKtails, Mrs. Johnson came up to me and said, "Nash, do you think after dinner?" She knew and I ~.-ou kne~·; had a bowling alley on their esta-:e. 2) might rig up a little bowling c
Oral history transcript, Lucius D. Battle, interview 1 (I), 11/14/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan
(Item)
- -centered, touchy about his assimilated rank of ambassador and its four-star prerogatives, and devoted only to his own advancement and his own mission. II Now, that shows you. I do, though, say, as Mr. [Walt] Rostow did in his book, The Diffusion
- this far and you suddenly find, "1:-lell, 've can't do that because Undersecretary Rostow made this statement to the OECD three weeks ago." You find mechanics of success in this government don't necessarily include allowing all of your colleagues to get
Oral history transcript, William P. Bundy, interview 2 (II), 5/29/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
(Item)
- of treason. George Christian has said to me, "Damn right he's guilty of treason." Boys were dying and he was mucking up the peace negotiations. And yet Johnson apparently didn't want to go public with it. I have the impression that--Walt Rostow won't tell me
- . it would take him. I got LBJ to It took Vann just about an hour Having heard it many times, I knew [what] The President promised him that time. Well, unfor- tunately, Komer was over there and Walt Rostow was in the White House, and they headed us off
- Walt Rostow, who was then a Kennedy staff person, and General Taylor, [·Jax Taylor went out to Vietnam. There was that great picture of them on that tennis court which some historian is going to use in a satirical way sometime. came bick
- have the confidence of the President more so than others would have. H: Yes, that's true. ing of. I think it depended on the field that you're speak- Walt Rostow, for instance, in his area; Califano, in his area. Califano would fall in and out
- . If you went back to [WaltJ Rostow and asked for it, it might get you and me both in deep kemche [?J. That would answer your question. So what can you do about it? G: Okay. Well, maybe we can go back to this. (Interruption) We haven't talked about
- and then transmitted that interest down to us so that we could better formulate the program and handle the legislative priorities. M: Was there a conscious attempt to duplicate on the domestic side a sort of Rostow operation such as has occurred in the national