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Oral history transcript, William E. Colby, interview 2 (II), 3/1/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

military would not solve the problem, such as cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sometimes they were wrong. They were spectacularly wrong on Cambodia, because the analysts said that the supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail were enough to satisfy the needs

Oral history transcript, Thomas K. Finletter, interview 1 (I), 10/29/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

. And that was the American policy. But the trouble is we yielded on this and no sooner had Ho Chi Minh and General Giap had defeated the French at Dienbienphu in 1954 that we took on morally and publicly the responsibility for seeing to it that Ho Chi Minh and company did

Oral history transcript, Daniel O. Graham, interview 1 (I), 5/24/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, the VC are in terrible shape." We could read the communications along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it was perfectly obvious that they were having one terrible time, because people from South Vietnam were going to go back up that trail come hell or high

Oral history transcript, Daniel O. Graham, interview 2 (II), 11/8/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

running the Ho Chi Minh Trail, screaming about their inability to keep people under control, going the wrong way up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They were in terrible shape. But as soon as the President came out and said, "No more bombing north

Oral history transcript, George McGovern, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

and the Japanese were involved in of bucking up against Vietnamese nationalism. We gave Ho Chi Minh the perfect out, the perfect opportunity, by trying to set up a kind of a unpopular and unrepresentative puppet regime in Saigon--which is exactly what the French

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 52: Nov. 26‑30, 1967 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 26 (Item)

. MAURER THEN WAUNCH.ED INTO WHAT .. WAS VIRTUALLY~~,rJ,wo·-:HOUll .,MONO-LOGUE HE SAID HE DID ·o·ur· ·or.~--~A~~~T.HREE~:~Ho•u-:'rt::~b--1scuss"fo:N:: . ~~T-KNOW DIRECTLY WHY SAN ANTONIO OFFER HAO BEEN TURNED DOWN SINCE~' • SPEECH WAS GIVEN ON LAST DAY

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11, June, 1965 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 3 (Item)

political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh 1 s political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period

Oral history transcript, Orville Freeman, interview 3 (III), 7/21/1969, by T.H. Baker (Item)

and with Ho Chi Minh, and that that had never reached the President when it had been sent to the State Department. And the allegations of some people, and frankly some people in very high places and some people that were in Paris that President Johnson sent

President's Daily Diary entry, 4/4/1967 (Item)

,, Freeman y Stewart Udal l (b.2 replacement \ ) re Charle Luce resignatio n his re sCharles Luce resignation his \ Senato Minh r Henr y Jackso n (b . 1) - r e Charle s Luce , releas e o f correspondence b y Ho Chi , Lati n American Resolution , an d

Oral history transcript, Leslie H. Gelb, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

was Ho Chi Minh an Asian Tito or could he have been made into an Asian Tito, all LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories

Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)

their lives miserable for twelve to fourteen. Second, to restrict and make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. political. The third reason was both psychological and It was to remind Ho Chi Minh and his

Oral history transcript, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, interview 1 (I), 9/19/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

President Johnson's policy in any way? H: No, I don't think they influenced his policy. I think they may have influenced Ho Chi Minh's policy, and the Russians' policy, and the Chinese policy. M: In what way? H: Well, by indicating that the United

Oral history transcript, Frank F. Mankiewicz, interview 2 (II), 5/1/1969, by Stephen Goodell (Item)

had an interpreter from the State Department, a man whowas more than an interpreter probably, a responsible fellow at the Embassy in charge of Far Eas~tern rna tters. And apparen tly ~1a.nac 'h told them that in his opinion something that Ho Chi

Oral history transcript, Samuel Yorty, interview 1 (I), 2/7/1970, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

very cordial with me. F: He took your advice, as far as listening-- Y: He didn't follow it but he took it because he'd question me. He said, "Look, Sam, I've got an envoy in there talking to Ho Chi Minh; he has been in there about five days

Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 1," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)

for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow

Oral history transcript, Joseph A. Califano, interview 17 (XVII), 1/5/1988, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

a guerilla war, and all of these whiz kids--of which I was one--[were] trying to figure out how do we measure a guerrilla war, and this and that, and believing that we could measure that stuff, believing that you could turn the screw a half a turn and Ho Chi

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 9, July 16-31 1966 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 9 (Item)

Source: 25X1X II I 25X1A (!UMMAJ\ Y: Two Sovi,t otticiah ladlcat~d independently theb a.Ue! that captured American flier• 'in North Vietnam will aot be· executed. They intimated tllat their aovernm.eat llad or would atr••• thi• view with Ho Chi Minh

Folder, "The Bertrand Russell 'Trial'," Country Files, Vietnam, NSF, Box 191 (Item)

. so URCE wHo :-HA~_.:-_:·~:··.';-· :p,._FURNISHED ·.RELI ABLE- INFORM AT ION IN THE~ PAST, - AND:_J~HO-1S •CLOSE'.'·TO\:.(i;~:i]:-:--:,::_/~ -·~ ''. ~tr:_ ;~ ;f·sr ANLE.Y· ~EVI SON,· CON~IDENT I_~L ADVI~OR ·T9.:·MAR,!IN/L~HER -~ ~.NG;.A~H/{/,.!~4

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 33, July 1-10, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 18 (Item)

TO VIET-NAM, WANT THE FIGIITING TO CEASE? UNLESS THESE TWO BIG POWERS, OR ONE OF THEM, EXERTS .. DIRECT INFLUENCE, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT, HO CHI MINH WILL AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO us. GENERAL DE GAULLE: IT DOES NOT, INDEED

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 47, October 21-24, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 24 (Item)

, whose nationalists gained obvious encouragement and learned from Ho Chi Minh's techniques of revolutionary warfare. France, of course, was fighting for colonial reasons to stay in Indochina and Algeria while we hope to get out of Vietnam once it's

Oral history transcript, Peter Braestrup, interview 1 (I), 3/1/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

privately proposes a decisive strategy in early 1967: Cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, hook through North Vietnam, get the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. No response from the Commander in Chief. Essentially Lyndon preferred to fight that war and talk about

Oral history transcript, John Peter Flynn, interview 1 (I), 12/19/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

BLY : · -· :.l .. BIG MINH), AND NOW THEY NA,D "THIS KHANH". HE · SAID THE . . :: .- ... :1 HAR IN ESSENCE WA S THE SAME ONE THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN '. . . I FIGHTING SI NCE THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II; THAT THE VIET- · . "\ '-. NAMESE HAD NO TASTE

Oral history transcript, Jean A. Sauvageot, interview 3 (III), 8/14/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

wear most of the time, just ordinary civilian clothes or sometimes black pajamas, but always, you know, rubber sandals, Ho Chi Minh sandals. And we drove throughout Long--to each of the seven districts in Long An province and interviewed people

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 97: Oct. 1‑4, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 40 (Item)

in the course of the upcoming NPG meeting in Bonn. Although the § Jtrrcip•~r r ·e;J.:.~.on· fo r iny_]-iiiiY{~~J9._Jittinu:.a~iff..'~J~i.-·n1.~gt ~~o.f "t_!f1f.:~AT.Ct 'Ji :.Chi~fs _.of .Staff l n .Brussels1 which was called '.1 -*~onsiaer ·""the-~~p)i.cat ~::J

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 7, June 21-30, 1966 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 8 (Item)

the ofter yoG make la your letter to me ot Juae, 16. lt ie my laueat -- aud my co11vtetloa •· that the cootlngeacy ahall not ,a rise. Slncuely, Tbe Ho®rable Sohn Keneth Galbraith Harvard Umveralty ·C ambridge. Maa·e achu••U• LBJ:WWRostow:rln

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 99: Oct. 10‑15, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 40 (Item)

'!ES£ TARGETS ,: I.N :1R£TALiATIO?f:,fOR ~:V.I£T.: - co»G ::BOMBING-: Qy\:A:,'. U~s • ..BARRACKS: AT QUr--·· ~HO~i;; '...TH£.:c VICC:' ·PRESIDEEMT ;"ATTENOEIJ~\BlJT :. 5£CRETAR't · . RUSK-·WAS •srriL :otiT .·. or: TOWN~ .; · · QUOTE ., l~f: RESPONsf

Oral history transcript, Edward G. Lansdale, interview 2 (II), 9/15/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

leadership. I was working with him and so on and he would encourage me to go on and work with them. One of them, I had Trinh Minh The and, oh, I forget the Cao Dai [inaudible]. But they were in town, and I was trying to tell them to break up a liaison

Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 3, Tabs 200-220," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)

h is tiiinking on th e introductiou of in te r national f o r c e s . Wc found that ho v/aa fu ll of the su b ject, having d is c u s s e d rci&x)y a s p e c ts of the m ilitary' rsanpovver sh o rta g e with G en era ls T h ieu and Minh o v er

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11, June, 1965 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 3 (Item)

forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both Air Attache and I. de spite our several years• experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The "t:tall. fJ even

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, November 16-25, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 25 (Item)

that ·such a ·t;aboo rno u n cls o ( books great d es s:,! r v ~ -~ to th.e thioJ it tvith you some good long the book is shar~ ~I is . burni·ng agains~t that ••• lo h g -s ho u l"d have destroyed: b c 0 k th a t you t!ler'e is_ so

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, November 16-25, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 25 (Item)

that contained in Ho Chi Minh' s letter to me of February 15. The reasons quite apparent. 6. Q. • General A. why that formula is unacceptable are, I am sure, What is the purpose of the consultations with Ambassador Westmoreland, and Ambassador Komer? (see

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 62: Feb. 14‑16, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 29 (Item)

'Ith St:re•t. • C. h'&Uli'., ,1 1,VU LBJ / WGB:mm 2 15 / 68 • 1 a ntiuhi.t• 1• oa ,-.r •leotloo •• S.CJ'eial'J 0.•n.l ef U.. o,... tU~_at1oa A • r _aa ••· TM ollle• 1• oa. special cballe ge d oppo, .. t..Ur •• the re lo l ho , ente.r • • MW

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 106: Nov. 15‑18, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 42 (Item)

. .- - ... - .... ~ ~ ~ '-

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 59: Feb. 1‑6, 1968 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 28 (Item)

the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea and respecting the waters, respecting the demilitarized zone and waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone ·and to this land UNQTE. ·The PUEBLO engaged in no ho~tilities at all~ What provision of the Armistice

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 63: Feb. 17‑21, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 29 (Item)

CTIO N WITH iHE CHANGES IN PROVINCE CHI EFS, HE SAID THAT THE PRO- - P ~1riH'x---t~2S-f.-i' e E e2 rre r , INCE CHIEF I N LA M DONG HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED AND THAT HE PLANS TO GO AHEAD -WITH OTHERS. 3. I ,'\ SKED THIEU HOW ·HE FELT ABOUT THE NEW

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 52: Nov. 26‑30, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 26 (Item)

lea.twee of till• plae•om•••l ••c••• l■ that the "9rwtt.bnl .. pl'oportlaa of tile•• tnck "kW• .. Ila•• NeD oa rtNte• 911ud 912 la tile aol'tllel'IIIDGat ••aclae• of the Ho CM M1ab trail etract1are. Stace a ''kill" l• DOt cn41tecl -■le•• tu ft.lakle l

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 61: Feb. 10‑13, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 29 (Item)

Vietminh battalions marched on the C:entr:11 Hi~hlands or what is now South Vietnam for attacks on Kontum and Pleiku. Although a decade later there were still many newcomers in Vietnam who refused to believe it existed, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become

Oral history transcript, Ellsworth Bunker, interview 1 (I), 12/9/1980, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

memory on that. G: For example, didn't President Thieu write a letter to Ho Chi Minh? B: He did write a letter. The question came up of how it was to be delivered, I remember. I'm not sure whether we ever reached a solution, or that he ever did

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 53: Dec. 1‑10, 1967 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 26 (Item)