Discover Our Collections


Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

426 results

  • would have been near the end of November 1967, we had noticed some unusual activity in North Vietnam. I don't think it had any relationship to the trail, that is, the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos. We went to see General Westmoreland and told him
  • : it institutionalized the presence of [North] Vietnamese troops inside Laos, and it institutionalized the Ho Chi Minh Trail . LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More
  • from him or from Rusk that they regarded the U.N. as unimportant. HO\AI could they? ~{o president of the United States could regard it as unimportant even if he felt it had only a publ ic relations importance or a propaganda importance. It still
  • Chi Minh's birthdayv, to fto Chi :Vli:rJi, . reporting a message/from Pr~~e ~inistel{;~ expr9SSi..rl~ ·the hope lr..at QTE the Vietnamese ·people will have tlle good fo:..~un3 of havtn~ Ho Chi. Minh 1 s wise and dedicated leadership to gu.ide them
  • of Ho Chi Minh's closest and most trusted advisers. Although Ho Chi Minh did not mention paper during group's audience with him, Hong Tu made certain revisions in draft which Quintanilla believes based on former•a discussions with Ho Chi Minh. Hong Tu
  • travel by your staff - - I do not think this is something which can be done by anyone from the outside. ' W i h o ~~ )l~ pp.~.ove--a u- ·e -mia-aa.r,¥ ~ho.1il.dr,.g.0:.:.to-~Geil"n -1 &11~ ~ .In And I think he should tell Erhard, albeit gently
  • at the moment in Manila. I think he was probably the last American journalist to interview Ho Chi Minh, in 1946. And he was in and out of there; he based in Hong Kong. And also in and out about that time, but I'm not sure of the dates, was Tillman Durdin
  • southwest of Hanoi], and the Rabbit, and this was about 1969, just before Ho Chi Minh died. The camp commander was speaking through an interpreter to me. That son of a gun; he could speak English as well as I could, but he didn't want anybody to know it. He
  • ur ION AS TO THE POWERS or THE PRISlDlNT' AND I'f 1S THE KIND or DEAL THAT COULD EASILY COME UNSTUCK IN A atUNCMe -< BIG MINH A SECOND MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IS THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY PA PERS HAVE BEEN FILED IN BE HALF OF BIG fl lNH t Ii lt H t HE
  • , • •U. PW mll~•r lo ••pport y -ab me ho • at to • .··••lo . --~••ta ( l , k, _ •). -SECRET TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR SUMMIT MEETING Monday, April 10 11:00 p. m. .Depart Andrews. DE CI.1 S IFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4(b) White House Gu.idclincs
  • to the North Vietnamese and sought their views. They did not respond to our suggestions and the exchange culminated in my February letter to Ho-Chi-Minh and his flatly negative response, which Hanoi chose to publish. Since that time, despite additional efforts
  • trouble than we get gains. He said we'd bombed Hanoi within half a mile of Ho Chi Minh 1 s hous e . (The President pointed toward the Washington monument as he said ". "That's as close as those people down there, and him sitting there oil: .' his front
  • government under, let's call it a form of democracy as contrasted to that government offered by Ho Chi Minh, which presumably would be properly classified a communist government. There were, in my judgment, many, many people who didn't just volunteer to go
  • to the conclusion that Ho Chi "Yes, I do," said FitzGerald. _ • . '...,' powerfulspokesmenofwhatDwightEisenhower : Minh and Company should ha\'e "mo,·ro to a "But why?" said _McNamara. ,. • ,· • • • .' • called "the military-industrial complex." •• '·. settlement
  • HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND T h is Eiaterlal c o n t a i n s I n f o r m a iln n a f fe c tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se o f t h e U n ite d S t a te s w it h in t h e m e a n in g o f t h e E sp io n a g e L a w s, T itle 18, U ^ .C i
  • a person in his division, his name was Colonel Y, spelled just "Y," that he didn't quite know what to do with. The person had been formally, and that was many years ago, with Ho Chi Minh, and [he] was perhaps somewhat concerned about his loyalty
  • )'· I w.p~LD LIK~... j .. HO\{EVE'~,;~f.~i~; -.: . SEE ALL SUCH - CHA~GES REVIEWED· AND ·LA'!D -. ro REST :. .:· lF ... 0: . . ·:·· ' . :~; :· . . -. ·. .. . ..._ - .. ··-~; .. . - .. - ... --· . ·.....;- ~ ~"·:' . . '-'-·.!t-· . . ••'." ':"'7
  • public statements be made. 5. Tiw President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh
  • HO CHI-MINH, AND AN EX•BAO DAI MINISTER WHOSENAME WAS SIMILAR TO !Rid~ VAN DO. CSOUR CE DID NOT RECOC~IZ! THIS NAME). 11. - DISSErt,: CI NCPAC PACFL.T AR?AC PA.CAF. 25X1A NO FOREIG!'iDISSEM .I
  • on January 6 for the first time said he would be willing to meet Ho Chi Minh at any time and at any place. The Government reels that it is now in a position to deal from a far stronger base than at any time in the past, and it also realizes that growing
  • TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Helms -- II -- 4 G: I think he was one of the ones who parachuted in to Ho Chi Minh. H: I wouldn't
  • .•P~ki-~ ta-~s insistently desire us to do. Ambassador Locke will not escape these frustrations. · We ·will- -help .him all -we .can•·---rwith~n t4~.; ~_cop e ··o,f ·our proade r ·inte re.s ts on.,_.the -Subcontinent -as a .-.w ho!~e. ~c.,.~-... ,ol
  • \'1 WHITE HO USE · :,~, ·MR RUSK ST ATE · _:_J ·r,n HELNs CIA :.-~ 0 300701Z ZYH ZFF-3 ·. : }FM -. GEN ABRAMS COHUS~·:ACV 3·" r" • • •+• i .. t • ... ~ - - (4,)Ci)(:,) , · (, ,I(
  • . PRESIDENT: Linc Gordon reports as follows: l. The Brazilian Ambassador is guest of honor at a dinner tonight. Ho,vever I he plans to take Braniff flight 501 1 arriving San Antonio 4 :Z2. a. m . after dinner. (It would be nice if someone from the White House
  • ~ •~rricea l>y- the· Commbalon and the private ow11e:-.idp ot apecial ~uclear material. . ' The new Agreement alao provide• that the laternatloaal Atomic: Energy Ageacy wll1 ho promptly re4uated to asaume reapoa.alblllty for applylag aafeguard.ia
  • has trav e lled extensively and spoken to a large number of audiences since he took over . But more importantly, as a former (until early fifties) Staff Officer for Ho Chi Minh, he can and does take on the American protest m.ovement with conviction
  • , including North Vietnam, and he was convinced that ir was a bargain Ho Chi Minh couldn't turn down. rn the next room he handed me a pad and hi. own pen. ·'Now, I want to rewrite that preamble so it can be read in the pub­ lic square in Johnson City,'' he
  • . a ---. After adopting this policy, I would renew the effort to talk, making it clear that as the infiltration .diminished, so would the bombing. It rriay be that lifting the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area will take some of the heat off Ho Chi Minh and make
  • impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons .we learn for further operations --in heavily populated areas. C. Economic Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon Retail Index was down two
  • police-type action, and perhaps that's the wrong choice of words, and 10 and behold, here the Vietnamese who were running down that--what did they call that Laos--? G: The Ho Chi Minh Trail? C: --the Ho Chi Minh Trail, claiming they weren't, and we
  • the government, that they were running anything. And that just helped the VC politically. G: You'd known Big [Duong Van] Minh, I presume, hadn't you? P: Yes. G: What was your estimate of his capability? P: I liked Big Minh; he had a lot of political
  • the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul
  • a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Mlniater and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Cbi Minh. He questioned whether the threat ehould be as po•ltively atated as Lodse'a cable indicated. The basic
  • Chairman Ho's teaching: !More .diffi.culties. and har_dship~ Jo· .P.e :encounter.ed when reaching victory 11 so that they w·ould harden their standpoint and accomplish th~ir missions under all circumstances . - 2 - In regard to the Paris Peace Talks, A5
  • , to hold elections. The moral indignation· over· that looks odd coming from Commun.lats, who are hardly experts at holding the type of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. And laa.t weekend Ho Chi Minh was wrong not to let the Ame~lcans have