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Folder, "October 15, 1968 - 1:20 p.m. Tuesday Luncheon," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

be willing to do. We hear from travelers and from self-appointed spokesmen from time to time this and that. On occasions we have attempted to confirm it, and we have negotiated directly with them. I think the last position stated by Mr. Ho Chi Minh is a safe

President's Daily Diary entry, 3/21/1967 (Item)

Christian Discussing D March 21, 1967 the release by Ho Chi Minh of the correspondence between the President and him. Joined in the State Room by ————— General Maxwell Taylor Hon. Ellsworth Bunker Hon. Eugene Locke Hon. David Lilienthal j Hon. Averel l

Folder, "JCS -- SIGMA I‑66, Final Report, 9/66," Agency Files, NSF, Box 33 (Item)

) ~he fellowing material is Secret,not for foreign dissemin based on an inter.agency., ation. SIG?IA I-66 is-. hypothetical, politica.1-mili~ary game conducted in the Pentagon between 13 and 22 September 1966. (Briefer) SIGMAopened with Ho Chi Minh

Oral history transcript, Sid Davis, interview 5 (V), 11/28/1990, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

that was presented. And he tried to offer the middle course between doing nothing and doing too much. And the middle course was a reasoned response and they were hoping that Ho Chi Minh would say, "Okay, we'll stop." And Lyndon Johnson was trying to find out what

Oral history transcript, Walt W. Rostow, interview 2 (II), 1/9/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

together in Moscow. Mao made only his second trip out of the country. He only made two, both to Moscow. He came. They were all there, including Ho Chi Minh--I don't know whether Ho Chi Minh himself came; I don't think he did. But in any case, they decided

Oral history transcript, Paul D. Harkins, interview 1 (I), 11/10/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

that bring up any memories? H: No. G: That's what certain people I know called the Ho Chi Minh.Trail. H: Oh. That's a new one. I hadn't beard that before. a good name for it. G: Do you think it's a good name? (Laughter) It's LBJ Presidential

President's Daily Diary entry, 4/15/1968 (Item)

y (includ e visited by) crowd, and they would drown them out by saying, "We want Johnson. " One protestor held a sign -- very large -- that bore Ho Chi Minh's picture. Just before the President came on the balcony, boy scouts on the second level

Folder, "[Briefing Papers for] September 4, 1968 National Security Council Mtg," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)

Secretary of State, Pope Paul VI, and Ho Chi Minh Top Secret 1 p. FPesiaeBt to Oh8:fl:eelloP Kiesingap___; 'Possible ela~sified informa_tion--. ©fis:I1callor Kiesiriger to PresideR-t Possible classified inrormatlon Rostow for the President 8/Jl/68 Top

Folder, "[November 2, 1967 - Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Vietnam]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2 (Item)

Lodge -- Bunker should be well publicized when he returns. Robert Murphy - - We need a hate complex directed at Ho Chi Minh similar to Hitler. General Omar Bradley -- Our troubles can be blamed on the communications media. We need patriotic slogans

Oral history transcript, Douglas Pike, interview 1 (I), 6/4/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

the best organized and can most successfully disorganize the other side and stay organized itself. Diem simply didn't have the organizational skills that were necessary to win. He was up against Ho Chi Minh, an organizational genius in terms of forming

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 103: Nov. 1‑4, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 41 (Item)

Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1b (I), 2/10/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)

of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. And then finally, to remind Ho Chi Minh and his advisers in Hanoi that they were no longer sitting in a sanctuary directing a war without paying a price for it. And that little by little

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 47, October 21-24, 1967 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 24 (Item)

have expressed their appreciation for the information you furnished me last week about a possible message to Ho Chi Minh following your inauguration. We agree fully with your view that it would be advisable to avoid the kind of message that would either

Oral history transcript, William E. Colby, interview 1 (I), 6/2/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

of the Diem role was his feeling that he had to establish a Vietnamese nation. Otherwise he was always subordinate to Ho Chi Minh, because Ho Chi Minh had captured nationalism in the struggle against the French.Then they had been so 5 LBJ Presidential

Folder, "King, Martin Luther [1 of 2]," Aides Files of Mildred Stegall, Box 32 (Item)

can withdraw since he is convinced that his plea would be rebuffed by Ho Chi Minh. King says that he must get back to civil rights. One of King's advisers is still Stanley Levison who is a long-time Communist. Marvin DECLASSIFIED E.O. 129514Sec.3.6

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13, August, 1965 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 4 (Item)

Oral history transcript, John A. Gronouski, interview 2 (II), 2/10/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

no political. . . . But anyway, Bud Sherer went over at 10:00 a.m. And what had happened is that Ho Chi Minh had released to a good many countries, including the British and the Poles, a statement on its position, and this statement was 10 LBJ Presidential

Folder, "[August 18, 1967 - 8:35 p.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Vietnam]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1 (Item)

Wheeler said it is not necessary to approve this target tonight. - 2 The President said he should go ahead and approve it. "If we send a McNamara to talk to Ho Chi Minh, we don't want to approve it after he gets there." Wheeler said the weather

Oral history transcript, Lyndon B. Johnson, 8/19/1969, by Harry Middleton (Item)

authority from the Congress-anything we think necessary. We took that approval from one August to the next August--one year-trying to avoid using it. If Ho Chi Minh ever made one overture to avoid conflict, I never knew it. We had several bombing pauses. We

Oral history transcript, David Halberstam, interview 1 (I), 11/1/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

to say, So every once in a while you'd have a glimmer of the differences between you. G: That's interesting, especially since I understand Ho Chi Minh made his living doing that kind of thing. H: I wouldn't be surprised. G: Tell me about John

Oral history transcript, Carroll Kilpatrick, interview 2 (II), 5/24/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

. I have no doubt still that we were trying to get negotiations and that the President thought that he could get negotiations and that he could sit down with [North Vietnamese President] Ho Chi Minh. I think he thought that right almost to the end

Oral history transcript, Benjamin Spock, interview 1 (I), 10/23/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

her morality but I obviously get indignant the same way. And to hear, for instance, that at the end of World War II the French government first promised Ho Chi Minh that they would stay out and allow the country to be free, and then they secretly

Folder, "JCS -- SIGMA I‑66, Fact Book, 9/66," Agency Files, NSF, Box 33 (Item)

that that they must 'come to the assistance" of the North E-6 , S- - NOFORN NO YES example of this new means or disguised aggression. Ho Chi Minh has had a long associ ation with the communist revo~utionaries in China, . particularly with Mao. He has been

Oral history transcript, Frank McCulloch, interview 1 (I), 5/13/1980, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

, but in terms of just the attitude of the Saigon population in general. M: Right. The thing that struck me over and over again then seems to be reflected in stories that are coming out of there now, from Ho Chi Minh City, by AFP or by the occasional American

Oral history transcript, Samuel T. Williams, interview 2 (II), 3/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

. W: They were the top-ranking, yes. For instance, Big [Duong Van] Minh who later became the instigator of the coup d'état--the man who had Diem murdered--he'd been a first lieutenant in the French army, colonial army. Don, who was next to Minh-G

Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

,:Ln Viet-~tam remains -difficult. 1 J:' kn~w. we ca.n .· · , . :~ · '._: {· with this grave .t hree . of . our NATO . allies. . '! .. l the:r~ .· . Event.~» ho~7~ver~ .· conti~ue _to c'!1.II'l~ . I ] t' : Ir! -,;:· • We ·a re tirmly

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 19, January 15 - 31, 1967 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 12 [2 of 2] (Item)

aradual cuts in economic aid. Our objective ia to. keep the proeaure on Europe to increase its contribution and on Turkey to increase importa from the US and are working to that end. Acting Secretary Barr'• momo (Tab C) underscores these concerns. Ho

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 34, July 11-15, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 19 (Item)

~ lAtelli.g enca lnformltt.ioA tells ui. ho le tryin.J ha!'"d lo'l!" a victory -- thi year, if po••lbl&. l Gcre.a e-d guerrilla .a ctivity 1n V · ne~uela~ C-c lombia •nd 2.o Uvia Februa~y and the me.etin1 of •ll Latia America• natictJ.al U.beratioa me-vement

Oral history transcript, Samuel T. Williams, interview 1 (I), 3/2/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

into South Vietnam to escape the to escape the communist government of North Vietnam. Now, you seldom hear or read about that, but right after the Geneva accords, Ho Chi Minh said he'd let those people go south that wanted to go south. Well, they didn't

President's Daily Diary entry, 1/23/1967 (Item)

— _12:25p 12:10p f - : s Schultz e Marvi 11:53a 12:00n 12:00n Bil , __ e t Rostow r e repor t b y a Canadia n Rabbi tha t Ho Chi Minh invited th e Presiden t t o Georg e Christian an d To m Johnso n Nort h VietNa m 10:55a ll;35 a Wal 10:58a...11

Oral history transcript, William DePuy, interview 1 (I), 10/28/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, but they weren't very good. They weren't good, dedicated communist fighters. But then later, of course, the larger issue was not the Pathet Lao but was to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So they kept their troops in there, and they did protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, August 18-31, 1967 [3 of 5]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 21 (Item)

Oral history transcript, Keyes Beech, interview 1 (I), 3/22/1983, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

was the South Vietnamese chargé, I think that's what they called and at that time, Khoi really belonged on . hadn't The real it at the time, in Bangkok, really made up his mind which side he heroes--Ho Chi Minh and [Vo Nguyen] Giap, you know

Oral history transcript, Daniel Boone Porter, interview 1 (I), 3/29/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Oral history transcript, Phillip B. Davidson, interview 1 (I), 3/30/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, of course, in the triple canopy [jungle], forget it. can't penetrate that canopy. You Aerial photographs, which had been a very excellent source in World War II, and a very usable source in Korea, were virtually useless, except out in Laos in the Ho Chi

Folder, "[July 27, 1965 National Security Council Meeting; Joint Leadership Meeting]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1 (Item)

and teat thls v:as why the ARV.N had been so success.fa! until recently. 'The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were ten years back or even ten months back. Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh tal!\:s of a twenty

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 24, March 16 - 31, 1967 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 14 [2 of 2] (Item)

; ...·•. __,,,,_ ___.....,~--------_,__ ..... ---.·. ......... _• .._,____ ,.. ___ ., ,. ..:.. ~ - ~ ·.. .' · .'. ! ' \ ::·.. ·.-:~ ...;.:_._ \ ,... , ' . I • •,: I • Jj, /C1- ··1\ ~ '. . • ', ; ~ . .: I March 21, 1967 I !· . r · . . ,. l . t ,. (, i !' -~ • •I Wo do not know why Hanoi chose at this time to release Ho Chi Minh' s ri :.} ) -.\ -.\- / · / · E~~:l~~~~i;~:tig:;~~~i

Oral history transcript, Ellsworth Bunker, interview 3 (III), 10/12/1983, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

down through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, through the jungle or across the DMZ. At best it was an estimate, and it wasn't vital at all, in my view, in the subsequent developments in Vietnam. We knew they were coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we knew

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 16, December 1 - 13, 1966 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 11 [2 of 2] (Item)

. On the political front, Ho Chi Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation. One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising aurability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the NVN regime has been counting on a. state

Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 68: Mar. 19‑24, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 31 (Item)

ano'\bar--vbat. would ban been thll oonaequenaea it we 011r ■lliur:, had nner aid \o Sou.~ Viet-Ir•! There 1a little dotM \Ila\, by' bl"Oualn now, Ro Chi Minh would haw acbiewd hi• lite-long objecniw ot iapoaiJlg a Coaunut regiae on SOll\h '11

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