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  • administration, Vietnam was never brought up as a major topic. Berlin and Laos were the principal foreign policy problems. TG: Edward Lansdale, a figure of some repute, was in your office at this time, was he not? 1 LBJ Presidential Library http
  • partners told me once both in frustration and admiration that he felt that Morrie has an original perception. He didn't say of something; he said he lives by an original perception, and he does. He loves strategy so he goes to Korea; he goes to Berlin
  • parts of the world, the effect would also be very serious, even to the extent of affecting the morale in Berlin. Senator Dirksen asked Director McCone what the reaction of the Ch inese Communists would be . Mr. McCone said we did not know as yet, but he
  • government's attitude in the crises of Cuba and Berlin has proved her a loyal and faithful ally .... " and he charged the allied governments to adopt a joint strategic concept pledging that such a scheme would find his country 1 s atomic force coordinated
  • of the two delegates that attended that conference, and then General Clay, when he was the administrator of West Berlin, sent a plane for us there to visit. It is only the last twenty years, I would say, probably, that the labor movement became politically
  • think it a fair thing to say in the psychological context of the time that it was not overriding. In '61 you had the Bay of Pigs, you had the Berlin crisis, you had the National Security buildup, you had the Laotian problem. Vietnam was very
  • it!" I remember in West Berlin I spoke to a group of teachers there. deaf student--our first one from Germany--was in the audience. "this young fellow" was going to come over in the fall. see them shake their heads, "He can't go to college. him say
  • when he needed staff people from the administration to accompany him to, say, Vietnam, or to Berlin? F: Yes, he did take one of my staff people on this trip to the Dominican Republic ,for the Juan Bosch inauguration; along on that. Dick Barrett went
  • for him to come over, although, as I mentioned earlier, he had made his appearance on the Berlin trip, and, I guess, had indicated to Mr. Valenti that he thought that the Office of the President should be recorded in all of its nuances for history. I
  • thought he always was working . G: Let's talk some more about the man . Did he like meeting the public, do you think? W: Oh, there certainly were times in there I know that he was delighted . HIs trip to Berlin [for instance] . I think he did
  • histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh CUNEO -- II -- 24 Hitler was compelling one. F: It was being written in Berlin. C: Yes. I won't go into the details of Bob's candidacy, which is a story in itself. The President had to pullout
  • be a relatively Japan's Japan our willingness in defense Berlin, most Japanese, at least own security. There is, over the US deterrent to use it of its and Southeast in the absence however, SSSRITtNOEQRN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~ to create allies
  • dirAction chnng~~ ev~ry month. George, and make your oth~r pointn. The costs, aR well as our western Europ~an a.J lies, is not relevant to their situa~ion. Wh~t . th~y ar~ concerned about is their own security -- troopP in Berlin have reai meaning, none
  • , was flown by a Jacksonville boy, Charl_ie Ge\.rge coward, and one of the pilots on General Smith's plane, which is to :fly me to Berlin this afternoon, is Captain Shelby St'Ulklin, another Fort MYers boy. Robert H. Milton, from Mariana, Major is here
  • scene. From the day in 1916 when he took up a post as Attache in the American Embassy ~t("~~~~~~- in Berlin, to the leadership of negotiations to expand and liberalize world trade....which he was exercising to the day of his death.- he participated
  • to apply for a network--I think we may have tried NBC first. We wound up by making our big push to get CBS. We did get it. G: He went up to New York, I guess, and met with Dick Berlin and maybe Bill Paley. J: Bill Paley, and of course Ed Weisl. Bill
  • the President was very firm. The President was very clear on this, just as he was on the maintenance of troops in Europe, just as he was on the Berlin issue. But I think it was tactical from the President's point of view. I think his feeling [was that] to put
  • and let's multilateralize them. With this new necessary force let's also get the political advantage of having some effort at partnership, and so forth. Well, partly as a result of the Cuba crisis, partly as a result of the cooling off of Berlin which came
  • weapons is deterred. How ­ ever, the nuclear situation does not dete r other uses of lnilitary force, such as halting convoys on the Berlin autobahn. Neither side now has a deployed anti - ballistic missile system. It would cost $15 billi on to g ive 3 0
  • no doubt utter threats against the Turks , it would not engage its own forces in any Cyprus crisis. We: cannot, however, ignore the possibility that Moscow might see~ to exploit this crisiu of NATO through moves elsewhere in the world, i . e.: Cuba, Berlin
  • committee appointed by President Eisenhower, headed by General Lucius Clay, the Berlin war airlift hero--was to set up a government coproration which would be authorized to issue bonds for the construction of the system and have pledged to the corporation
  • of America. The Russians in the various Berlin crises have responded the same way. There was thus reason to believe, again reasoning from experience and from analogy, that the North Vietnamese would react in that fashion too. They were smaller. They were
  • Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Graham -- II -- 9 Berlin by saying something wicked to a Russian lady cop who had a submachine gun across her back. He was kind of a crazy man
  • was not. M: Either to Vietnam or to Berlin? S: No, no. M: Your most famous association, of course, is the one that came in December of 1966 in connection with your visit to Hanoi. S: That's right. M: I know that you've written a full book as well
  • the war for a year, and read the Dallas News, which was in those days a rather jingoistic newspaper, which announced with regularity that Texans were bombing Berlin and invading Italy and so on. Anyway, we came down here never supposing that the first
  • of view despite the Berlin crisis of '61 and '62; despite the Cuban missile crisis. You'll remember President Kennedy did go ahead and complete the partial Test Ban Treaty. M: You mentioned awhile ago the SALT talks--that got interrupted
  • . I remember Jack Kennedy called some reserves in over Berlin, and the Pentagon I think felt, "Gee, if we're going in this deep, we really ought to have some new troops called up and then we III get some more money and we can handl e th i ngs better
  • through Dick--well, the president of Hearst, such a good friend, I'll think of it in a minute--but he was the one I think that originally introduced Lyndon to Weisl [Dick Berlin] . He saved Hearst ; Hearst was about to go bankrupt . G: During
  • if he could break President Kennedy on Berlin. I do not see the Soviets in an ultimatum mood on either Viet Nam or the Middle East at the moment. There is always, of course , the chance. But if the chance exists it is _J)ecause the Soviet Government