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  • : Tell us about our meeting in Paris. Secretary Rusk: It was standard. There was not much progress. North Vietnam blasted American politics. But the tea break produced an agreement for a Saturday meeting -- a private talk. We might press Hanoi
  • organi­ zation whose leaders in 1967 were Communist Party, United States of America, members. It was indicated that the Communist Party, United States of America, intends to issue a press release denying Sirhan has had any connection with the Communist
  • TO BE DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA FOR TOMORROW'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL I MEETING, ORDERED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET THREAT IN EASTERN EUROPE. I., 1 • PRESS SECRETARY GEORGE CHRISTIAN ASKED IF THE CALL
  • should talk to Dobrynin tonight. Secretary Rusk: For the press to know I call him in to give him our views it will be good to position ourselves publicly. MEETl~G NQTt=S COPYRIGHTED .l!whli~tion ReetYiFes SET ­ .Pe•Misttoft ef Copyright Holelerz
  • of Cubans - no mention of Guantanamo Pres.• - says no one in govt. see anyone until we settle Cuba Rusk says low level no high level on account weather. U Thant knows. we are going to survey - cancelling Press Conference - bui Ids up pressure quarantine
  • disposit ion of Soviet troops in Cen tral Europe. '/ • ·' Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction t o the c risis. The press has already p rinted that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances
  • the presence SECRETARY RUSK: North Vietnam is not clearly on board in this. The acceptance of North Vietnam of South Vietnam at the conference table is a recognition that the Viet Cong are not sole government in the South. We must press for flat commitments
  • . 2. AS THE PRESS \~ILL HAVE REPORT[D IN DETAIL., KHRUSHCHEV MADE TH~[[ :3HORT EXTEMPORANEOUS SPEECHES CONCLUDING IN TOASTS: FIRST TO SOVIET PEOPLE AND BUILDING OF COMMUNISM; SECOND TO SOVIET YOUTH, I.E., THE FUTURE; AND THIRD TO 11 AMBASSADORS 11
  • of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam? New subject: President also believes you should make sure that TV ~ cameras and press cover
  • on the press. They did not. The Pres i dent: Wasn't this hard to swallow? CIA Director Helms: Yes . the troops could move in. Military exercises were designed to s ee how The President:Should the Secretary talk to Dobrynin tonighti CIA Director Helms: Yes
  • of governmental experts, in a joint East-West study of problems SECRET • I -3of problems of reciprocity in East-West trade relations. meeting of experts is scheduled for late 1964. The next In the UNCTAD, the Soviets did not press as hard as originally
  • - Discussion on Vietnam, Robert Kennedy, Eisenhower, Alliance for Progress, role of ror. 42. 9 December 1963 - Briefing. General revi·ew. Press, McNamara, Vietnam. I 43. 13 December 1963 - Introduced DDCI, Peer de Silva., reviewed checklist. Discussed
  • designed to cope with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with the West. Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facili­ tate and sustain these changes. We seek thereby progress toward the realization of our
  • as we are going to press the offensive in the South and in Laos, and so long as we are prepared to resume the bombing if they violate the DMZ or attack the main cities, 11 he is ready to go along. •:After all,'' he said, ''the problem is not to stop
  • and it is our task to see that it does not happen . NOTE: There is attached a copy of the transcript of Press Secretary Salinger 1s press briefing which was author ized by the President following the meeting. 'i!OP S EE R 8 'f GODJ; N OllD J\:'f T J'LC WM E
  • of a certain degree of national inde­ pendence from Soviet cont rol; (3) pragmatic innovations designed to cope with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with the West . Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facili­
  • , President Kennedy stated, " ••• we must not put forward proposals merely for propaganda purposes;"). (2) In order to achieve real gains, we should press for - euNfi9ENTiAl ­ 3 substantive rather.than token cooperation. (3) Cooperation with the Soviet
  • press for flBENflAl ~--- 3 substantive rather than token cooperation. (3) Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well defined and the obligations of both sides made clear and comparable. (This will facilitate implementation as well as clarify