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- FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel The attached memorandum (concurred in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dea ling with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. We have deliberately given you these various
- --, '. ..' ....,. ... ..... . '\ .... ' ~ TGP SECRE'f/MOBIS • -v- British Concern To Speed U. N. Action To Forestall Unilateral Israeli Forcing of . the Strait of Tiran 62 U. S. - Israeli Exchanges and the Israeli Cab i net Decision Not To "Go It Alone" in the Middle East Crisis
- Helms: No antisemitism in Czechoslovakia. Nixon: The Czech government goes to great pains to show Jewish cemetery. It is no problem. It is a problem in Poland. Secretary Rusk: Don't give the Russians a pretext for action. tough on the USSR
- ~RP ~s ~SC ACTION: zo b8a1bu y JIDDA · :'°T DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 / 03 7 ~· 91.: f.;\~ NLJ Bv ~ - NAR!\~ Date 7 ... 3o.,1j~ Jidda 202 /'' . ex••ination possibility assistinq Yemeni ftarth ·l. 2 , r ~ 4j Jidda 182
- . (_) () · -: Border incidents, raids, am retaliatory- actions between the Israelis and the· Arab revanchists operating out o£ Egypt, Jordan, ·Syria,_ and Le~non had been commn occurrences ever since the· establishment of the State of Israel·. in 1948. On only -'tw
- in this matter, even to the extent of a letter to be written by His Excellency Mr. Riad to the Minister of Oil in Iraq giving assurance of the support of our project in Iraq by the Government of the 'l!nited Arab R e public. For this action, I am grateful indeed
- with the right of collective or 3/ individual action to fulfill this obligation. Defense was made a tripartite responsibility of Cyprus, Greece and 4/ A complex constitution establishing the rights Turkey. of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was incorporated
- action and the death of President Kennedy created fear and apprehension in the UAR that the change in Adminis trations had allowed forces LmSympathetic to the UAR to gain gECREI the upper hand in Washington. 1/ The new US Administration made
- and railroads), communications, electricity, education, health, public construction and capital outlays for social welfare. The Plan includes about 235 speci fic proposals for action in the various major sectors of activity. These could be examined
- , why were they no longer shelled at the Marine site at Conthien. Secretary McNamara said he did not know if this was a result of our action or their decision. The Pre sic.ent asked if we shou1d move our people bad:;:, as ha.s been sugge s·i:e d
- to with draw their own troops. 4. The UAR and Syria sponsor various political action programs in the Gulf, although problems of distance and access make support of terrorists and insurgents more difficult than it was in South Arabia. Moreover
- are unable to resist pressures to work ever more clos~ly with the Soviets. 2. He will doubtless urge consideration of his "action program" which he has been expounding in Washington for the past eleven months. This action program contains such elements
- pass. But I don't think it will and they will say it was a rebuff because of our unreasonable and inhumane action in the bombing. On balance, that would be a loss in my judgement. Goldberg said I don't agree. Katzenbach said he agrees with McNamara
- (/} () > to ~ M (/} INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State Action G..~) Info 2;1ZCEIC815IVA327 RR JIUEHC DE RUEIVCR 63518 1111435 ,961 MA1 I~ PM 12 58 ZIY SSSSS i ll1411Z MAY 67 PM ANEMBASSY CAIRO TO UEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC llFO RUQVRA/AflEMBASSY JIDDA SATE
- will adjourn without action and throw the matter back into the Security Council. There are two questions raised by the resolutions - whether there should be withdrawal back to the situation of June 4 or simply a statement eliminating the state of belligerence
- on military actions and it is probably good that it doesn't. --- The President has strong convictions about our responsibilities in the Middle East, especially toward the people of Israel. --- There is a growing sentiment in this country to " come home
- the occasion offers. The Secretary want ed the President t o have t his repor t of staff work in progress . The President asked the Secretary to spend a couple of minutes discussing action in the UN tre day before. The Secretary misunderstood briefly
- ,, . . ... .. _5i:CRE~ - 2 - Secretary Fowler proposed: "The U.S. regrets the failure of the Govern.tnent of Israel to make clear that its actions ·in recent weeks is only provisional." Bundy objected because of the reaction to this. Clark Clifford said do not be too
- that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions the Assembly might take concerning Cz echoslovakia, there are at least three perti nent consid erations for the U.S.: what 't\lOuld b·e he lpful to the Czechs, what
- -- if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons --therefor it is difficult for us to provide them. There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we
- . US Action Consic2rations Efforts to achieve a peaceful transiticn thrcu0h creation of a broadly··lxi.sed gov-2rrn:'-'?nt are in our ir.tercst. i:·;e should do what \·:e Cili1 to foster these efforts, :rnakin9 clear to South Arabicm radicals
Folder, "September 25, 1968 - 12:17 p.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- revanchism", Viet-Nam, and the Middle East) and generally will try to place Czech events in a cold war context in hopes of silencing the non aligned countries that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions
- then asked Secretary McNamara what can he do to solve crime in the District of Columbia. The President said he asked Wirtz the same thing. "Crime will be the principal problem, even more so than Vietnam. We've got to show some progress and action. Perhaps
- going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam