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  • ample opportunity to make its intentions with respect to cooperation clear to us. I will expect you to assume the initiative in preparing appropriate recommendations for my attention to deal with the situation as it appears to be at that time
  • : Project 'suLKY In view of the delicacy of the balance of US- USSR relationship in other major areas plus the tight schedule for conducti! g SULKY at this time, the President has decided to defer fu:::ther< consideration of SULKY without prejudice until
  • , recommendations which translate this state­ ment of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to sub­ stance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possi­ bilities of multilaterallzing
  • alternative ways of dealing with this matter 1 such as limiting the size of any sale, postponing such a sale to a more propitious time, or encouraging and perhaps helping Israel to meet its needs from other suppliers. Finally, it should include an analysis
  • ­ priate time . The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prosI>ects for international negotiations. }n ~4v IS-f McGeorge Bundy CO~l FiDEN n
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However
  • of our intentions in Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe--and in Russia and Communist China, and (b) to expTh.in the good sense of the move to the Congress and the U.S. public. 6. As regards timing, I should like two alternatives to be ex­ plored: one
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • has no objection to consideration of this item at this time. z. The prohibition against initiating discussion of this subject with Canada contained in NSAM Z48 of June 3, 1963, is accordingly withdrawn. . DECIASmlED 1.0. 12356, Sec. 39' ~ 9.1·S~J
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • at this time, in view of the unsettled conditions in the South Pacific area. The limited programs, however, of economic and MAP assistance which have resulted from the reviews conducted by the Secretaries of State and Defense are essential to the national
  • , and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible. He also approves the Secretary of State's recommendation that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time. Finally, he asks that the agencies concerned
  • • .. 'r - HE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM ANSWER NAME TIME ,, ( 0 ------+-~--- --~ 5Hd u'-o ~ ,.J! --..+----=-------~--~----~-----+----- l21c/JD Fl.E.Et .tou2 ,4/?o J,._;p . Th U• $, GOYERH'ilE'iT PRINTING OFFICE
  • of the Vietnamese Gover~ment do not fall below the levels sustained .b y the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not · exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP acc9unt with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments
  • of ·this month so that there ·may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8. • " SECBE'iE' .,.
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need
  • will be appointed Deputy for Pacification {Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador. To this end the present functions and personnel of: the Office of Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of MACY. For the time being
  • to the word "DEFCON" since the time of the Cuba missile crisis. We will guidance receive given in the morning by Defense. a copy of the press
  • 7. T8PSECRET THE DIRECTOR OFCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 28 November 1963 had intended to discuss this with President Johnson but ran out of time. I am sure we will get some wild statements out of Havana if Castro's speech last night is any indicator
  • time, it is only reasonable to anticipate that pressure from the same sources, and from members of Congress, will be exerted on Government officials to give advance commit­ ments that certain products will be placed on the exceptions list. • v
  • ·each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance. 4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for opti­ mum impact. For example, I do not believe that we .i:;hould initi­ ally approach Pakistan until we have assessed
  • ; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken. · ~
  • is roughly moving shorten it by getting at the substance possible time. the Iranians in Israeli's favor, I believe we can of a settlement at the earliest
  • -- the friendly access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the right of Israel to use the Suez Canal. These were uppermost in their concerns. There were some that talked about boundaries but recognized that this was a subject that would take a great deal of time. I was pleased
  • international or private agencies, With regard Secretary Rusk said it would be serious to pull out of the FAO. On the other hand, with American personnel coming out of countries like the UAR, voluntary agency programs might have to give for the time being
  • , including those in the South West Africa ­ !CJ problem. 3. US Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure
  • of NSJ:.M 143 and NSJ~M 197. UNCUSSIFIED -3­ 3. In order to pl
  • funds at this time - - it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA. 3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12
  • overseas programs and activities. ,. -- • • .. 60lw'illENTfil -3­ The SIG will meet in the Department of State regularly and specially.at the call of the Chairman. The Chairman will be supported by a full time staff of personnel furnished on his
  • ' -·-...,. ' THE DIRECTOROF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 2.5, D.C. 28 November MEMORANDUM THROUGH: 1963 FOR THE PRESIDENT Mr. McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Time prevented me from mentioning this morning
  • . The Israeli negotiating position. He said that a month ago there was no serious crisis in the Middle East; 10 days ago they felt they were being throttled; now there is temporary euphoria and relief at the military victory; but they have not had time to think
  • Mr. Watson: I talked to Lem -- said these people are en route here - - he does not know at this time exactly when they will be here or exactly when they will make the request. Will call you asap with this information. mjc 1 :09 p. m. .- I
  • saboteurs., and some Syrian made no charge orders had been given The Secretary General read reports frai, the Israelis had geen issued to cease fire and that all fighting in self defence. The UAR Representative hour at 8 p.m. local time. charged
  • to those of the distinguished Americans who are gathered to honor Rabbi Bern­ stein this afternoon. "I know of your concern at this time of international crisis. Let me assure you that your governrnent will do everything in its power to see that peace
  • the same. Fedorenko suggested a one-hour time limit for the Secretary General to inform himself that firing had ceased and report. Rafael of Israel asked whether Iraq or Kuwait had agreed to a cease-fire and repeated that Syria must also give orders to its