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11 results

  • rity in maintenance, leadership, training and discipline rather than numerical superiority. The President then went on to read a statement later released to the press (attached) , establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council to deal
  • "stalemate.'' The Secretary said that the press corps in Viet Nam are more antagonistic now than they ever have been. He said there is no evidence of a stalemate. He said that military commanders in Viet Nam told him that they believe they have made
  • the guards at the Pentagon.. You can 1t imagine how they are faced with provocations. They do anything which would further aggravate the situation .. If we are asked, I think we should tell the press that we are prepared to maintain order. It is important
  • was thought of our going to the U. N. and getting defeated. Goldberg said I don't think ·this would be considered a rebuff, although the press may say it is a rebuff. The President asked can we close off.... Goldberg said no, if they were solid we would have
  • could talk to Thieu arid get the corruption cleaned up. The President also said we are mishandling our information from Vietnam. He said Sigard Larmon has just come back from Vietnam and he is violently upset with the way the press is handling
  • made on the Unger announcement. They replied affirmatively. The President gave the announcement to George Christian for release to the press on Wednesday. McGeorge Bundy presented a document to the group on "U.S. and Jordan-Israel Settlement
  • and launched int o a discussion of whether or not we should press for Security Council action on Vietnam, but then returned to explain the devel opment s on the Middle Eas t in New York since July. He concluded by indicating that the non-permanent
  • discussions on the ABM with the Soviet Union. He felt that Kosygin had agreed at Glassboro to have such discussions . A brief exchange followed on exactly what Kosygin had a g reed to at Gla ssboro . The President felt that he had pressed over and over
  • have not succeeded and in fact have been undercut by Rhodesian and South African moves which make a peaceful solution of these problems all but impossible in the foreseeable future. . The Africans can be expected to press to have the General Assembly
  • by Rhodesian and South African moves which make a peaceful solution of these problems all but impossible in the foreseeable future. The Africans can be expected to press to have the General Assembly call for adoption by the Security Council of punitive economic
  • the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and the n decide to give the supers onic s . Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the r oad, he should refer back to Washington