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  • indicated the line he would take with the Press: No dramatic change in strategy; we will try to do better what we are doing now . Mr . Bundy suggested that until the Presidential speech (or next Pres i dential press statement) all present should be guided
  • grew when we began our bombing. This bombing is effective in that it reminds Hanoi of the increasing cost of the war to them. As to the effect of the bombing pause, on balance it was neutral -- not all good and not all bad. As to the press, thanks
  • South Vietnamese For eign Minister said publicly that a separate North and South Vietnam is acceptable to Saigon. USIA Director Rowan: The world press is still critical of our alleged use of gas in Vietnam but there has been some turn - around
  • at once. We must double the number of those in the Rural Development cadres. The manpower needed a small claim on military resources. Bill Moyers: Curr e nt press speculation is harmful. No comment should be made to the press until Ambassador Lodge
  • , particula rly in view of the fact that he had read in the press all about what it was sup ­ posed to contain. He expres Bed his irritation that war plans leak to the pr es s. He had gotten almost to a point where he hated to meet with Foreign Ministers b
  • to be issued by the White House was approved and g iven to George Reedy for release to the press.) Secretary Dillon: If we encou ra ge an air strike by the South Vietnamese, e veryone will think it is a U . S. attack. Therefore , we should send along U.S. plan
  • of Shelepin 1 s visit. USIA Dir ector Marks summarized world press reaction to the peace offensive. The USIA summary is attached. ln general, the peace initiative is welcomed but doubts are expressed that it will produce results. Some writers think the p eace
  • it as hard as we can. Senator Dirksen asked whether the press reports coming out of Saigon were accurate . Secretary McNamara replied by saying that there were a host of wars going in Vietnam . Each dispatch is right but covers only one facet of the problem
  • rity in maintenance, leadership, training and discipline rather than numerical superiority. The President then went on to read a statement later released to the press (attached) , establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council to deal
  • WHITE HOUSE Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary to the President McGeorge Bundy, Specia l Assistant to the President Donald Hornig, Special Assistant for Science and Technology Bill Moyers, Assi stant to the President Jack Valenti, Spe cial Assistant
  • by Foreign Minister Spaak, the text of which the State Department is to obtain (copy attached). 1. France -- The difficulties we are encountering with France in NATO are limited to the military field. We should press France to support NATO in all other fields
  • Bundy: In addition to these recommendations we should have an e stimate of the reaction to various courses of action we might take . Under Secretary Ball: The situation in Cyprus has reached the crisis stag e . Even though someone leaked to the press
  • of officers . USIA Director Marks: World press reaction to the Paris talks has been good . A study made by USIA of the world press supports this conclusion. Under Secretary Katzenbach: Turning to the German problem, he first commented on recent Italian
  • - 2ls against the dron es . Secretary McNamara replied that great pilot skill is required i( a MIG actually shoots down a drone. S ecretary McNamara 'said that the possibility of our using drones was leaking to the press. This disturbed him greatly
  • before our election is over. Ambassador Ball: Secretary General U Thant's press statement on halting the bombing in Vietnam upset many UN delegates. There is no serious effort to introduce a Vietnam resolution as a result of the Secretary General's
  • leader recommends anything other than proceeding with this program. The President: Would General Taylor give me his views . General Taylor: I a 1n optimistic. I think we have to press hard on all four fronts - - economic , political, military
  • to President Jahr.son's letter which rr..ay indicate tC.e Greeks are prepared to give way , thus per::nitting conti.-1..uation of bargaining. The UN Secretary General 1 s press conference was not helpful i.n t hat he said that the Cyprus Gover:iment had
  • suppliers should be press ed to make pa r ts available. There was a short discussion of the Congo situation . The Pr e sident adj ou rn ed the meeting . (;} ~ .Cj,~ William J . Uo{:)en -&E GRE T­ 3, L IST OF ATT EN DEES, NSC MEETING, AUGUST 9 , 1967
  • which they originated; and to provide press guidance that put a positive cast on prospects. Mr. Martin had done much the same in calls to his Dutch and Swiss counte rpar ts. Deming had called his counte rpart in the UK Treasury who had had mixed
  • . Senator Dirksen asked what use could be made of the information which he had h eard during the meeting. The President replied that he had instructed McGeorge Bundy to talk to the press, telling them as much as he possibly could without affecting
  • into the Southeast Asia a rea for political reasons. He ~p SERVIC SECREJ:f--­ ,, ·. ,. TOP SEC.BET suggested that r ather than announce the moven'1ent of these fo r ces into the area we c o uld informally gi v e the press the list of U .S. forces which
  • be en exaggerated. The security situation is much better th;-in as reported in the press. In the n1ost i·ecent large engagc1nent; the Vietnamese stood and fought very well. General Wheeler said he agreed. He called.·attention to a page one story
  • disposit ion of Soviet troops in Cen tral Europe. '/ • ·' Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction t o the c risis. The press has already p rinted that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances
  • USIA Carl T. Rowan, Director WHITE HOUSE George Reedy, Press Secretary to the President McGeorge Bundy, Special As sistant for National Secur ity Affairs Bill Moyers, Assistant to the Presi dent Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President Walter
  • la~ge n bas·! foe Tur!-.s zet ~d ,-,hcthcr it should b'3 soverdgn or c;i a long torm l o~sc . lt'o not cle~r that v:e h:wa )'\!t s=-dd cvc:-ytr:.!n3 .,,,~ shculci to press Gr~~!
  • Europe went well. The Committee w i ll not now press for adoption of the resolution. T he President, arr iving at 12:50 P. M ., said the purpose of the me eting was to discuss the problems we face down the road in our relations with Europe. Other meetings
  • those commitments . Director Mar ks said there were thre e main problems reflected in press comments in Japan and Okinawa. They were: ( 1) The offenses of US personnel; (2) the absence of a collective bargaining fo r lab or; and (3 ) the nuclear
  • and launched int o a discussion of whether or not we should press for Security Council action on Vietnam, but then returned to explain the devel opment s on the Middle Eas t in New York since July. He concluded by indicating that the non-permanent
  • of the inadequacy of their treatment of U. S. correspondents. As for the U. S. press corps in South Vietnam, most responsible correspondents support our goals, even though they may be critical of certa in actions which we have taken. Turning to the other two
  • discussions on the ABM with the Soviet Union. He felt that Kosygin had agreed at Glassboro to have such discussions . A brief exchange followed on exactly what Kosygin had a g reed to at Gla ssboro . The President felt that he had pressed over and over
  • on the press. They did not. The Pres i dent: Wasn't this hard to swallow? CIA Director Helms: Yes . the troops could move in. Military exercises were designed to s ee how The President:Should the Secretary talk to Dobrynin tonighti CIA Director Helms: Yes
  • a firm determ­ ination to achieve them. We would stress the dangers we see t o both of us in Chinese expansion, and we would recognize the Soviet need to fol low a course wh i ch does not destroy its leadership in the Corrmunist world. We would press
  • resolution. 4. African Problems The pattern of these questions in the UN is relatively unchanging. In their desire to produce movement 'and to force change s in the status quo, the black African dei'egations press for measures which go beyond what we can
  • is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula , the catalyst , for training and inspirin~ them into effective action. 2 . Recommended actions. In such an umpromising state of affairs , what should we do? We must continue to press
  • , and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, went to his office where a draft press statement was revised and lat e r issued. (Copy attached) Bromley Smith SEC RET--­ .. IMMEDIATE RELEA3E Office of the White House Press Secretary
  • White H ouse Press Officer , Tom Johnson Harold H. Saunder s Roland Inlow, Central Inte lligence Agency Cyprus. The President asked Secretary Rusk to· report on the latest in our efforts. S ecretary Rusk, a fter saying how fo r tunate we have been
  • people and the D.R.V..., l' • ga.ses, and toxic chemicals to Government. r wish to ex-A b urn down villages and mas­ press our deep gratitude to sacre 'the civilian population the people and Government ot 1 in vast areas ot South Viet­
  • political lesson from the intense Con ­ gressional opposition to the decision to send in the C-1 30 1 s ? Unde r Secretary Katzenbach shou ld background the press. The domestic racial issue k i cked off the Congressional debate. Senator Javits should be seen
  • and it is our task to see that it does not happen . NOTE: There is attached a copy of the transcript of Press Secretary Salinger 1s press briefing which was author ized by the President following the meeting. 'i!OP S EE R 8 'f GODJ; N OllD J\:'f T J'LC WM E
  • some ground with the Greeks duri.ng that vi~it. Mr. Bundy felt less opti.lnistic , notir1g Greek peevishness over the President' s latest letter . T he President recalled that Papandreou had pressed for a US formulc.. when he was here. Mr . B all