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  • ROSTOW SUMMARIZES HIS CONVERSATION WITH DEAN RUSK, WRITES THAT RUSK IS SENDING DETAILED REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH ANDREI GROMYKO TO WH VIA COURIER; ROSTOW WRITES BRIEF SUMMARY OF RUSK AND GROMYKO'S DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM, MISSILE TALKS, AND MIDDLE
  • to Cabinet Room and escorted group from Cabinet Room to Oval Office- -Meanwhile Amb Llewellyn Thompson in through MWsoffice Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko Secy Rusk Walt Rostow Photogs in for pictures MW came through and took in to meet Gromyko: r
  • Soviet counterpart helped me out; he told me what it was. It was a little bit indicative of the way he and I had worked together over the years. I worked with him beginning in 1963, with Dean Rusk and [then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Andrei
  • 1:36pm | j | i | of the Soviet Delegation-H. E. Premier Alexi Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mrs. Lyudmila Gvishiani, daughter of Chmn Kosygin H. E. Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, The Minister of Foreign Affairs H. E. Anatoli y F
  • of the U.S., Great Britain and Russia, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Andrei A. Gromyko, the Russian ambassador, and Sir Alex Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 8/25 Paris is liberated. 8/29 LBJ has lunch with P.L
  • Lady Bird meets with Roy Rodman, chief landscape designer for Texas Highways; arrival of Canadian Prime Minister Pearson; Lady Bird takes Mrs. Pearson on tour of LBJ Ranch; Winston Churchill's illness; Pearson relates story about Andrei Gromyko
  • v i e t structure is built that way, there's not much point in trying to do business, say, with [Andrei] Gromyko, whereas you can occasionally with Kosygin. This was truer in the days of S t a l i n than I think it is now when you really have
  • Biographical information; Vietnam War; Clark Clifford; Paul Nitze; Dick Helms; DeGaulle; Phil Farley; Henry Kuss; morale problems; Wriston Report; McGeorge Bundy; Christian Herter; Walt Rostow; Dean Rusk; McCarthyism; Yalta; Andrei Gomyko; Kosygin
  • in its present form, was done by the Director and Mr. DePalma and Mr. Bunn, mostly in New York. Once or twice here there was a lunch; there was a dinner with Mr. Foster and [Andrei A.] Gromyko, I believe, in Washington. But there were a good deal
  • 1964 Presidential message to 18 nation Disarmament Commission; Pastore resolution; William Foster; MFL; Walt Rostow; Aleksei A. Roshchin; George Bunn; Sam DePalma; Tsoraphin; Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter; Ambassador Knappstein; Mr. Gromyko
  • had been the head of the Soviet delegation to the UN at one point. He was one of their top-level diplomats, right up there with Andrei Gromyko and the others. I do not know what ever happened to him. Big man. And so he--this was just something to note
  • DECLA~IFlED 12356, Sec. 3,4 E.O. M.J Bv~ q1-1~ . NARA, .D ate Zit f1Y -2via Gromyko. 6/21/67 You may be abl e to smoke him out a little in advance. 5. With respect to ABM-ICBM, Kosygin is in a position where he must give you a simple Yes
  • Folder, "HOLLYBUSH ‑‑ June 23 & 25, 1967, Glassboro, New Jersey, Kosygin & Gromyko conversations," NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, Box 10
  • in Rangoon if we were prepared to do so; or he may be conducting a black operation. He may be trying to deceive us in some way. I had several talks with [Andrei A.] Gromyko immediately following that episode, and there was never any indication from Gromyko
  • a problem with the Soviet Union. There isn't going to be any settlement of the German problem to which the Soviets don't agree. I talked with [Andrei A.] Gromyko many times about the German problem, and tried to show him what vast changes in the situation
  • Director Poster discussed the s u b ­ ject w it h F o r e i g n Minis t e r Gromyko. He told him that the U n i t e d States had no Intention of extending the armaments race to outer space and would welcome a joint declaration or agreement that neither
  • think we would all have been somewhat impatient . And in the end, about the 18th of March, [Andrei A .] Gromyko gave the British as cold a turn-down as you could get . That's an interesting episode in hindsight, whether the Soviet hesitation indicated
  • . We had the cards. And they know how to play their cards. It's just pitiful. That's why I say I'm glad that George Bush, today or yesterday got around to where some of us who had some experience out there were thirty years ago talking to [Andrei
  • . We had the cards. And they know how to play their cards. It's just pitiful. That's why I say I'm glad that George Bush, today or yesterday got around to where some of us who had some experience out there were thirty years ago talking to [Andrei
  • about the agreement--[Averell] Harriman-[Andrei] Gromyko activities--until it got to the Senate. This was really not a legislative process as you would normally have. By the same token, interestingly enough, it was one of Kennedy's finest hours. He had
  • the draft of a proposed statement he was to issue as a result of Gromyko' s statement at the 23rd Communist Party Congress Secy Rusk Secy Rusk Senator (b.2) Mansfield Lynda BM To office Down the returning to his office via mjdr's room hall at 12:09p
  • am. Kosygin Lyndon B. Johnson Kosygin: I welcome your message. We feel that it is the duty of all great states to s·ecure a speedy end to the military conflict, as indicated in Secretary Rusk's earlier message to Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • EeaenUally tb• plaa i• worked out on a local baaia -­ 1otna from military to political action. RUSK Gromyko ia intereatad iD the Cambodian Conference. Sibaaoak b palliq back 011 hi• oriaiaal iDJtut.ne• tbac Vi•t Cone be repreeented at th• coderence
  • By.....__->-.. 'An,A, Da.......__.........,P'I 7 Referring to recent discussions in New York, the ·secret·ary recalled that he had informed Gromyko that while there appeared to be agreement in principle on refraining from placing weapons . of mass destruction- in orbit
  • Minister Gromyko may go. With respect to the Chinese Communist nuclear test, the short-run effect in Asia will be intense fear of fallout. A serious, long - run effect will be felt in Japan and India. Now is no time for a new policy toward Communist China
  • put Cairo right on this matter and help us eliminate that kind of needless inflammation. We have expressed to your government our views on the of Tiran in my letter to you of May 28 and Secretary of State Rusk's letter toForeign Minister Gromyko
  • (Kosygin's interpreter) __^_ __^ Minister Gromyko , Secy McNamara through Amb. , Mr. Firsov ' Thompson - mf Mr. Watson (marvin) I__ , Mr. Vorontsov -, Mr. Bundy ,_____„____________________-' Mr. Zamyatin _, , Secy Rusk (across from the President ) i Foreign
  • and that they probably had the sixty two votes to ~ct it. He said he ·had seen the ~1·;3ss speculation about a. Soviet dek: ­ g'-tion c:om.inr; to the U. N. that r:-.i .:Jht b1cluda Gromyko o:.· :~o::r.;in. I-!~ .eai.'! he h.o::w nothing mm:' e t~n w:~a.t he bad read
  • Rusk said that Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned NBC' s special show on Khr--.ishchev. Dobrynin was quoted as saying, p "Both Gromyko and I were surprised." Secretary Rusk said that Dobrynin is going back to 1v1oscow "for major political purposes
  • should go ahead. DeGaulle great problem. If we think we are having problems with DeGaulle - think what other members of are having - Belgium, Netherlands, Norway - Next move - contact with Gromyko· in Moscow envelop DeGaulle - Immediately
  • ---- -------------------------- :----------- 214 Effort to table partial draft treaty ------------------- 219 Rusk - Gromyko taj.ks --------------------------------------- 228 - Safeguards (l) ------------------------------ .------------ 231 Allied Consultations Security assurances (l
  • ............ 7 Initial Johnson Program . .......................... 8 Gromyko Missile Proposals ......................... 11 Soviet Collateral Proposals (1964). . . . . . . . . 13 Gomulka Plan....................................... 15 COtTFIDEHTIAii
  • these things to Gromyko. Is there anything we can put our teeth into? The President: Secretary Rusk: Yes, their willingness to proceed with clear under­ standing that if we don't get cities and the DMZ, we 1 ll restart. The President: What
  • to Gromyko. In it, Gromyko said he knew for sure that we had entered Korean territorial waters because the ship's captain had said he had entered territorial waters in his own hand writing. We do not believe he did. But we cannot deny it because we do