Discover Our Collections


Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

417 results

  • was Ho Chi Minh an Asian Tito or could he have been made into an Asian Tito, all LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories
  • their lives miserable for twelve to fourteen. Second, to restrict and make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. political. The third reason was both psychological and It was to remind Ho Chi Minh and his
  • President Johnson's policy in any way? H: No, I don't think they influenced his policy. I think they may have influenced Ho Chi Minh's policy, and the Russians' policy, and the Chinese policy. M: In what way? H: Well, by indicating that the United
  • had an interpreter from the State Department, a man whowas more than an interpreter probably, a responsible fellow at the Embassy in charge of Far Eas~tern rna tters. And apparen tly ~1a.nac 'h told them that in his opinion something that Ho Chi
  • very cordial with me. F: He took your advice, as far as listening-- Y: He didn't follow it but he took it because he'd question me. He said, "Look, Sam, I've got an envoy in there talking to Ho Chi Minh; he has been in there about five days
  • for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow
  • a guerilla war, and all of these whiz kids--of which I was one--[were] trying to figure out how do we measure a guerrilla war, and this and that, and believing that we could measure that stuff, believing that you could turn the screw a half a turn and Ho Chi
  • Source: 25X1X II I 25X1A (!UMMAJ\ Y: Two Sovi,t otticiah ladlcat~d independently theb a.Ue! that captured American flier• 'in North Vietnam will aot be· executed. They intimated tllat their aovernm.eat llad or would atr••• thi• view with Ho Chi Minh
  • . so URCE wHo :-HA~_.:-_:·~:··.';-· :p,._FURNISHED ·.RELI ABLE- INFORM AT ION IN THE~ PAST, - AND:_J~HO-1S •CLOSE'.'·TO\:.(i;~:i]:-:--:,::_/~ -·~ ''. ~tr:_ ;~ ;f·sr ANLE.Y· ~EVI SON,· CON~IDENT I_~L ADVI~OR ·T9.:·MAR,!IN/L~HER -~ ~.NG;.A~H/{/,.!~4
  • TO VIET-NAM, WANT THE FIGIITING TO CEASE? UNLESS THESE TWO BIG POWERS, OR ONE OF THEM, EXERTS .. DIRECT INFLUENCE, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT, HO CHI MINH WILL AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO us. GENERAL DE GAULLE: IT DOES NOT, INDEED
  • , whose nationalists gained obvious encouragement and learned from Ho Chi Minh's techniques of revolutionary warfare. France, of course, was fighting for colonial reasons to stay in Indochina and Algeria while we hope to get out of Vietnam once it's
  • privately proposes a decisive strategy in early 1967: Cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, hook through North Vietnam, get the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. No response from the Commander in Chief. Essentially Lyndon preferred to fight that war and talk about
  • BLY : · -· :.l .. BIG MINH), AND NOW THEY NA,D "THIS KHANH". HE · SAID THE . . :: .- ... :1 HAR IN ESSENCE WA S THE SAME ONE THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN '. . . I FIGHTING SI NCE THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II; THAT THE VIET- · . "\ '-. NAMESE HAD NO TASTE
  • wear most of the time, just ordinary civilian clothes or sometimes black pajamas, but always, you know, rubber sandals, Ho Chi Minh sandals. And we drove throughout Long--to each of the seven districts in Long An province and interviewed people
  • in the course of the upcoming NPG meeting in Bonn. Although the § Jtrrcip•~r r ·e;J.:.~.on· fo r iny_]-iiiiY{~~J9._Jittinu:.a~iff..'~J~i.-·n1.~gt ~~o.f "t_!f1f.:~AT.Ct 'Ji :.Chi~fs _.of .Staff l n .Brussels1 which was called '.1 -*~onsiaer ·""the-~~p)i.cat ~::J
  • the ofter yoG make la your letter to me ot Juae, 16. lt ie my laueat -- aud my co11vtetloa •· that the cootlngeacy ahall not ,a rise. Slncuely, Tbe Ho®rable Sohn Keneth Galbraith Harvard Umveralty ·C ambridge. Maa·e achu••U• LBJ:WWRostow:rln
  • '!ES£ TARGETS ,: I.N :1R£TALiATIO?f:,fOR ~:V.I£T.: - co»G ::BOMBING-: Qy\:A:,'. U~s • ..BARRACKS: AT QUr--·· ~HO~i;; '...TH£.:c VICC:' ·PRESIDEEMT ;"ATTENOEIJ~\BlJT :. 5£CRETAR't · . RUSK-·WAS •srriL :otiT .·. or: TOWN~ .; · · QUOTE ., l~f: RESPONsf
  • leadership. I was working with him and so on and he would encourage me to go on and work with them. One of them, I had Trinh Minh The and, oh, I forget the Cao Dai [inaudible]. But they were in town, and I was trying to tell them to break up a liaison
  • h is tiiinking on th e introductiou of in te r ­ national f o r c e s . Wc found that ho v/aa fu ll of the su b ject, having d is c u s s e d rci&x)y a s p e c ts of the m ilitary' rsanpovver sh o rta g e with G en era ls T h ieu and Minh o v er
  • forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both Air Attache and I. de spite our several years• experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The "t:tall. fJ even
  • that ·such a ·t;aboo rno u n cls o ( books great d es s:,! r v ~ -~ to th.e thioJ it tvith you some good long the book is shar~ ~I is . burni·ng agains~t that ••• lo h g -s ho u l"d have destroyed: b c 0 k th a t you t!ler'e is_ so
  • that contained in Ho Chi Minh' s letter to me of February 15. The reasons quite apparent. 6. Q. • General A. why that formula is unacceptable are, I am sure, What is the purpose of the consultations with Ambassador Westmoreland, and Ambassador Komer? (see
  • 'Ith St:re•t. • C. h'&Uli'., ,1 1,VU LBJ / WGB:mm 2 15 / 68 • 1 a ntiuhi.t• 1• oa ,-.r •leotloo •• S.CJ'eial'J 0.•n.l ef U.. o,... tU~_at1oa A • r _aa ••· TM ollle• 1• oa. special cballe ge d oppo, .. t..Ur •• the re lo l ho , ente.r • • MW
  • the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea and respecting the waters, respecting the demilitarized zone and waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone ·and to this land UNQTE. ·The PUEBLO engaged in no ho~tilities at all~ What provision of the Armistice
  • CTIO N WITH iHE CHANGES IN PROVINCE CHI EFS, HE SAID THAT THE PRO- - P ~1riH'x---t~2S-f.-i' e E e2 rre r , INCE CHIEF I N LA M DONG HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED AND THAT HE PLANS TO GO AHEAD -WITH OTHERS. 3. I ,'\ SKED THIEU HOW ·HE FELT ABOUT THE NEW
  • lea.twee of till• plae•om•••l ••c••• l■ that the "9rwtt.bnl .. pl'oportlaa of tile•• tnck "kW• .. Ila•• NeD oa rtNte• 911ud 912 la tile aol'tllel'IIIDGat ••aclae• of the Ho CM M1ab trail etract1are. Stace a ''kill" l• DOt cn41tecl -■le•• tu ft.lakle l
  • Vietminh battalions marched on the C:entr:11 Hi~hlands or what is now South Vietnam for attacks on Kontum and Pleiku. Although a decade later there were still many newcomers in Vietnam who refused to believe it existed, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become
  • memory on that. G: For example, didn't President Thieu write a letter to Ho Chi Minh? B: He did write a letter. The question came up of how it was to be delivered, I remember. I'm not sure whether we ever reached a solution, or that he ever did
  • TV TO DRAW THEM OUT ON SUBJEC TS SUGGESTED IN LA ST THREE PARAS OF R E F T E L . FRENCH EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMESE S ITU A TIO N IS THAT I T I S , IN ONE WORD, HO PELESS. FRENCH EMBASSY O FFIC ERS CLAIM TO KNOW FROM FIR ST-H A N D EXPERIENCE
  • TORTURE CAME TO SE R£GARDSDAS A "ORMAL PRACTICE DURING PARTY ORGMHZATION. ft ft AS A RESULT OF THIS OPPRESSION, IN NOVEi'laER 1956 A S?ONTMlEOUS PEASANT RE3ELLION BROKE our IN PRESIDENT HO CHI MINWS HOME f'KOVU~ce:: AND HAD TO BE PlJT _Down.BRUTALLY
  • there will be great pressure at the outset of the nego.tiations to stop the .fighting as the first order of business, we might consider initiating i::n.'"llediate cea·se.fire negotiations by the opposing military commanders on the pattern of the French Army-Viet Minh
  • Tlauaday. Fel:tnaary 5:25 p. m. a. 1968 Mr. PreaW.nt: Herewith Ho'• order of the tlay for the Tet offea•lve. I l>elleve Ile meaat e"Ntry word. w. w. B.oatow Sal1on 18562 . GE>NPl&ENTIAL WWRoatow:rln DECLASSIFIED E.O . 12356 , Ser , .4(b} \~'h:it.e
  • -uce b .J:.-c~odsb.edp I c:li.~e a 11e.got:latS.cm in wl:d.
  • started about your second trip at the time that Kosygin was supposed to arrive in London. Had you seen, when you went back over there, any kind of draft of what became president Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh? C: Yes, I did. letter. I saw, as well
  • conomy is such t hat Rollin~ Thunder can affect directly only a small f racti on of the ponulati on. There is very l ittle hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government ..,ill l ose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The l essons of t he Korean War
  • greater nurubar of men. wngELEll: J 'l'he more men we have th~ greater the 1 tke: l itwod of smaller loafl,.,B. JlHESIDENT: What makes you think if we put in 100, ono meu Ho Chi Minh won't put in another 10~, 000'? WHEELEH: which will allow
  • 579A C 0 ..N i I D E N T I A.. L ASKED ABOUT FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF MOVEMENT, QUANG LIEN REPLIED HE IS SENDING SEPARATE LETTERS TO GVN CHIEF OF STAIE, PRIMIN, fRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND HO CHI MINH EXPLAINING HIS PROGRAM. ALSO XAD INTENTION OF GOING