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  • moment in Los Angeles, to urge him to put Mr. Johnson on the ticket. And this was thought to have had some influence on the decision--in my opinion, it had about the influence of a feather in the balance--but it was a very narrow balance. Bobby Kennedy
  • . 1970 INTERVIEWEE: CHARLES ROBERTS INTERVIEt1ER: JOE B. FRANTZ PLACE: Mr. Roberts office, Washington. D. C. I Tape 1 of 3 F: Mr. Roberts, you were in Dallas at the time of the assassination, November. 1963. R: Ri ght. F: Did you have any
  • . He gave it to the TV Guide people, and they gave it back to him after they'd used it, and then he gave it to--gosh, 1 think to the Los Angeles Times. I don't know, the latter is a guess. And again, in let's say September 1968--1 don't know what
  • Sanh at a later time. --- We had a report of Frog Missiles being mounted on the front of enemy tanks. These missiles are similar to our Honest John. They carry an 800 pound warhead. These could pose problems. - - - In Hue there is still fighting
  • and Secretary Clifford have followed this meeting closely. I want to hear from people who are not regular advisers from time to time. I asked General Abram.s to come here today . . General Wheeler has been conferring with General Westmoreland. I want to hear
  • . As a matter of fact, Patton at one time had been the regimental commander of the Third Cavalry, in the pre-World War II days. After the war I went to Leavenworth, and upon graduation from Leavenworth was picked up in the staff and faculty in the School
  • Tuesday night, because we are accepting Secretary Rusk's judgment that there are enough activities going on to make it prudent to wait until that time before you speak. We rejected the idea of a personally delivered message to Congress because proposed
  • of nickel, platinum, beryl ore, magnesium, and castor oil, all cur­ rently in short supply in the commercial market. 3. Accurate, comprehensive, and timely statistics are ~ential to the development of sound economic policies by government, business
  • COMMITMENTOF FORCES. THERE WERE, OF - COURSE,M0DJ.FICAT!0NS IN VARI()US AREASFORLOCALREASONS-~ 5. THENVAD!VISI0NS IN NORTHERN I CTZWERENOT .COMM!"!°TED DURING '!HE TET OFFENSIVE.THEREWERESOME CONTACTS NEARCAM LO, BUTTHESEWERE DUETO U.S.- MARINE INITIATIVES
  • -\ • A NE~ INFILTRATION GROUPHASBEENFORMED,BUT.IT IS NOTCLEARAT THIS TIME WHETHER AN INCREASED RATEOF INF1LTRAT10N IS .( INDICATED. SOUTHVIETNAt1 1ST CORPS YESTERDAY, THE ENEMY FIRED 500 ROU~DSOF MIXEDMORTAR .ANDROCK~TROUNDS ON"THE.KHE SANHCOMBAT
  • intelligence which was available in the cir­ cumstances? b. Was the evaluation of the available intelligence sound and did that evaluation reach the-decision-makers in time to assist the~ in taking appropriate action? I ! ' I The answer to these general
  • and that it must gain victory this year or collapse? l. Hanoi's strategy warfare in South of revol~tionary Vietnam has always en.braced two propositions: protracted time. to prepare for a struggle-and to seek victory in the shortest of large US forces
  • in the recent readily available are included resources 3 forces. known Ho#ever, when and 'NVA units on the in the enemy manpower climb to about 500,000. r..~.:: !,_:-i'. '·; • A.,l'.1 '-"lo=l·~ \:.,..,U .. • 6 - r J,....!::1M 7
  • believes it is pos~ible ~o forge a national political movement at this time. All agree that the . .. , National Front surfaced under the leadership of Tran Van Don on . .i February 19, will not and can not develop into a real political movement
  • . At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are Hill 861 ended yesterday described in the succeeding paragraphs. 2. At 3:00 PM EST
  • . posture. either in relation to negotiating The first of these issues will be ~resented orally by Secretary Clifford at the appropriate time. Certain of the options in the negotiating areas are included in these briefing papers as indicated below
  • • . continuously, fight small and mcdiwn actions everywhere, and simultan.eously . • prcpa1•c to fight concerted big actions at the samo time. in waves~ lo make the •_e~emy incap~ble of stabilizing· the si.l-uation. again. " . . I 3. 'l'his new rcpo1·t would seem
  • , or will there not send more and the·GVN thus does not think that we are "hooked." It is a time for some good hard trading. my experience Recalling with Diem in 1963,. nnd assuming a decision 'J;QP B!CRIU - NOD!S to .,, .. - T-OP SECti!T a HODIS - 2 - send
  • of the U.S. Riverine Force swept an island iri the river immediately north of Can Tho and Binh Tuy airfield and picked up a number of Viet Cong suspects. This island has been a source of fire against river patrol craft and has constituted a long-time nuisance
  • an ...ney are puD.i.:.c.1.y 1.n.a. tnese ... ~ave .. h• as·..h ac..-muc.:1 "' . • ·-s~an A • • • 'l ~ o~currec.. .. T ne .!:>r1tis.o. amoassa d or, \V.:."lO e:x-pene=.ce, re~ar.
  • to their international agreements," development in cooperation. ·6. honor Actions. In order to meet the pres sure s against us, and demonstrate the unity and will of the American people at this critical time, I am asking the .Congress to do the following: -- help
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • ? should be said about the possibility o! calling up additional units? 3. 2,,/ ~f~. Size 0£ the call-up How many units between the strengths Vietnam? Are these .the call-up affect the ·1/. \\'hat Time factors I-low long \1.ill the units be needed
  • Vietnamon 1 June 1967 and have not returned since. I knewthe ground defenses at Khe Sanh as they were at that time but since then many changes have been made. Wehave three times as manyMarines there now·and I cannot speak as to the details
  • Sanh area during making little contact with the enemy and receiving fire. rocket fire and 21 rounds of mortar Heavy fighting is reported Xuan Lo c and Phuoc Le. present time. the day with patrol units only three rounds of in two provincial capitals
  • ..::-could--aecfde --:--1:..0_J!lO;le,:J.n. ..ag ain_J.iii.th..· tr.a j·ocf O r-ces •k l. ·- • ,, .. I i l... -2No Dissem ·• \ COPYLBJ LIBRARY The. ~Co:;.1..:--:n;mist.s -~•1i11 .. 2..!.so •be ::eavily e:igaged .tin rv,.n,_.. 1':; to cc
  • before the weather changes; but the condition of our Reserves does not permit us to get much to him in this time interval(p.a.-J...~ps 30, oc:> 0 ). • - - Th:iriS~cr;a..c.ffo~qu:fa,.-~-ua~~econ~iituu:ilie:JJ.Js:icJst~ate~ ~e..lft~~he exact scale nor
  • we begin, because I think this is a time period central to our area of discussion. I have down here that in 1960 to 1962 that you were director of the Joint Staff organization within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would be here at the Pentagon. W
  • 's, I would like to make touchstones of your various services and assignments during that period. This is more for my benefit and to be sure that I have the times correct on them. Staff in 1959. You retired as Chief of This is, of course, under
  • Corps in Vietnam, is that correct? W: No. I went out to command in I Corps in May of 1965. M: And then carne back in a little over two years-- W: I carne back in June of '67. M: Did you ever have the opportunity during any of that time
  • , 1971 INTERVIEWEE: ROBERT KOMER li~TERVIEWER: PAIGE E. PLACE: Mr. Komer's office, RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C. MULHOLL&~ Tape 1 of 3 M: You were, for part of the time in 1964 and '65, the White House man on Africa as well as the Middle
  • conventional attacks for the first time. Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northerr. provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along? General
  • Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, NATO Allied Commander in the Atlantic, and the USS Enterprise Atlantic Commander. From 1964 to 1965 [you were] Commander-in- Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Another area and time period that does concern us ali ttl e
  • in August of 1964? M: Yes. At that time we were doing what we called peripheral reconnais- sance, and it was conducted by aircraft, by submarines, and by surface ships. This type of operation was not limited to Tonkin Gulf by any means; it took place
  • , except that I would like to ask you this same sort of question in regard to relations with Communist China, perhaps not in terms of relations, but developments over the same period of time since 1960. N: My mind was going back earlier than 1960. P
  • Westmoreland over the phone and received a number of cables from him. Westmoreland reported the following: - - The enemy apparently will start new attacks on the 10th. St.'1.\f\~E SET That is tonight our time. This is based on communications intelligence
  • , which was North Vietnam. We did not recommend it in 1961, hoping that we could settle the issue of aggression within the confines of South Vietnam without going to the North. However, by the time I got there as Ambassador, following a disastrous
  • B. FRANTZ PLACE: Mr. Komer's office, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California Tape 1 of 1, Side 1 F: Bob, let's talk about what we were talking about at the end last time. We were talking a bit about Libya, and I wanted to get Libya sort
  • “pacification”; comparison of Ky and Thieu; differentiating between ambassadors in Vietnam; working with General William Westmoreland; Bill Moyers; problems with being the only full-time high-ranking government official workingon the Vietnam situation; who
  • time to all the Vietnamese, North and South. It is a sort of a combination of Christmas, New Year, and Easter. I've been told by Vietnamese or Southeast Asian experts that this period of family reunification or celebration hadn't been violated
  • that coverage by a group of younger reporters, good journalists, but young mavericks, rebels, young Turks, whatever label you want to put on them. David Halberstam of the New York Times, Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press, Neil Sheehan of UPI, Nick Turner