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  • time to all the Vietnamese, North and South. It is a sort of a combination of Christmas, New Year, and Easter. I've been told by Vietnamese or Southeast Asian experts that this period of family reunification or celebration hadn't been violated
  • . 1970 INTERVIEWEE: CHARLES ROBERTS INTERVIEt1ER: JOE B. FRANTZ PLACE: Mr. Roberts office, Washington. D. C. I Tape 1 of 3 F: Mr. Roberts, you were in Dallas at the time of the assassination, November. 1963. R: Ri ght. F: Did you have any
  • in August of 1964? M: Yes. At that time we were doing what we called peripheral reconnais- sance, and it was conducted by aircraft, by submarines, and by surface ships. This type of operation was not limited to Tonkin Gulf by any means; it took place
  • we begin, because I think this is a time period central to our area of discussion. I have down here that in 1960 to 1962 that you were director of the Joint Staff organization within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would be here at the Pentagon. W
  • 's, I would like to make touchstones of your various services and assignments during that period. This is more for my benefit and to be sure that I have the times correct on them. Staff in 1959. You retired as Chief of This is, of course, under
  • Corps in Vietnam, is that correct? W: No. I went out to command in I Corps in May of 1965. M: And then carne back in a little over two years-- W: I carne back in June of '67. M: Did you ever have the opportunity during any of that time
  • , 1971 INTERVIEWEE: ROBERT KOMER li~TERVIEWER: PAIGE E. PLACE: Mr. Komer's office, RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C. MULHOLL&~ Tape 1 of 3 M: You were, for part of the time in 1964 and '65, the White House man on Africa as well as the Middle
  • conventional attacks for the first time. Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northerr. provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along? General
  • Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, NATO Allied Commander in the Atlantic, and the USS Enterprise Atlantic Commander. From 1964 to 1965 [you were] Commander-in- Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Another area and time period that does concern us ali ttl e
  • , except that I would like to ask you this same sort of question in regard to relations with Communist China, perhaps not in terms of relations, but developments over the same period of time since 1960. N: My mind was going back earlier than 1960. P
  • Westmoreland over the phone and received a number of cables from him. Westmoreland reported the following: - - The enemy apparently will start new attacks on the 10th. St.'1.\f\~E SET That is tonight our time. This is based on communications intelligence
  • , which was North Vietnam. We did not recommend it in 1961, hoping that we could settle the issue of aggression within the confines of South Vietnam without going to the North. However, by the time I got there as Ambassador, following a disastrous
  • B. FRANTZ PLACE: Mr. Komer's office, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California Tape 1 of 1, Side 1 F: Bob, let's talk about what we were talking about at the end last time. We were talking a bit about Libya, and I wanted to get Libya sort
  • “pacification”; comparison of Ky and Thieu; differentiating between ambassadors in Vietnam; working with General William Westmoreland; Bill Moyers; problems with being the only full-time high-ranking government official workingon the Vietnam situation; who
  • of nickel, platinum, beryl ore, magnesium, and castor oil, all cur­ rently in short supply in the commercial market. 3. Accurate, comprehensive, and timely statistics are ~ential to the development of sound economic policies by government, business
  • that coverage by a group of younger reporters, good journalists, but young mavericks, rebels, young Turks, whatever label you want to put on them. David Halberstam of the New York Times, Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press, Neil Sheehan of UPI, Nick Turner
  • . As a matter of fact, Patton at one time had been the regimental commander of the Third Cavalry, in the pre-World War II days. After the war I went to Leavenworth, and upon graduation from Leavenworth was picked up in the staff and faculty in the School
  • , yes. Absolutely. Sure. There's some minor errors in the Harper's article as to time and dates because I did it off the top of my head, but what I say now is probably going to be more accurate than the Harper's article. G: Okay. Since the context
  • was just a diplomat doing his thing, which was repeating his government's position . G: I noticed that the last article from that trip, which carries a date­ line of November 20, is one of your think pieces that you referred to last time as sort
  • Time limit in dealing with Vietnamese situation; the Tet Offensive; Weyand's role; press reaction; impact of Tet on South Vietnamese forces; intelligence; Cronkite's visit to Vietnam; the pacification programs; decision to write Tet!; subsequent
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh May 28, 1969 M: Let's begin by just identifying you, sir. You're Joseph Alsop, a syndicated columnist at the present time and author of numerous books, and you've been doing this same type work for long enough to watch
  • : Maybe so. McS: I'd like to begin by asking you if you recall your first meeting with Mr. Johnson and your earliest impressions of him. McC: Yes, of course, I'd testified before him several times in various capacities when he was a senator on the Hill
  • talks - combat President at any time. such troops 1968, peace. for that operations - forum a de-escalation revealed afterwards toward the 31st of March that the U.S. the next deployed these in the current was preparing five months
  • want you to consider and get answers to me. Those questions are: 1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time? a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Vietnam? b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Vietnam? c
  • was at wit~ end on how to get people to report the war the way it is. He said he took Johnny Apple of the New York Times with him on one all-day excursion. He said they got out of the chopper at one RF post, the re was a province chief and American adviser
  • with the President without my presence. If you get them down here four or five at a time, that is okay. The President: I would feel better if you were here anyway. Clark Clifford: The times are too serious and the public too concerned for a public feud between
  • Tuesday night, because we are accepting Secretary Rusk's judgment that there are enough activities going on to make it prudent to wait until that time before you speak. We rejected the idea of a personally delivered message to Congress because proposed
  • . At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are Hill 861 ended yesterday described in the succeeding paragraphs. 2. At 3:00 PM EST
  • under DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans]? D: Well, what happened was that I came back from commanding the First Battle Group, Thirtieth Infantry, in the Third Division because Bill [William B.] Rosson, who at that time in Europe
  • on and so on. Z: Right. G: Khe Sanh was coming in for an awful lot of attention about this time, too, and there have been criticisms of that coverage. What was good or bad about the press coverage at Khe Sanh? Z: One, on the impact of Tet on public
  • as of the time I lefto The RF and PF situation c1 ·- -/is not entirely clear. l -- The regular troops did take more casualties than the RF and PF forceso - 4 ­ -- We believe about 40, 000 enemy were killedo cormt the number wounded and missing. We cannot
  • that there was some unusual activity going on at this time, but to the best of my knowledge we never put any number on it. We didn't say twenty thousand, twenty-five thousand. G: What kind of activity was this, what form? D: Actually it was people, divisions moving
  • and that it must gain victory this year or collapse? l. Hanoi's strategy warfare in South of revol~tionary Vietnam has always en.braced two propositions: protracted time. to prepare for a struggle-and to seek victory in the shortest of large US forces
  • to their international agreements," development in cooperation. ·6. honor Actions. In order to meet the pres sure s against us, and demonstrate the unity and will of the American people at this critical time, I am asking the .Congress to do the following: -- help
  • . But by the time I got there I realized I should do a broader book. That was Viet Congo From then on, of course, as long as the war continued, I was labeled an expert on the Viet Cong and experienced in Vietnam. get out of the field. So I couldn't I spent
  • evaluation of enemy intentions (Mr. Helms) -- Situation on the ground (Gen. Wheeler) 2. Gen. Wheeler's Trip (The President) -- Objectives. -- Query: Should Katzenbach go from State? Or Habib? is one of high or low State visibility. The question Time
  • believes it is pos~ible ~o forge a national political movement at this time. All agree that the . .. , National Front surfaced under the leadership of Tran Van Don on . .i February 19, will not and can not develop into a real political movement
  • sporadic firing incidents in the center of Saigon just before midnight their· time. Snipers are around the American Embassy and near 1 Ambassador Bunker s residence •. The report is attached. ~ Bromley Smith DECLASSIFIED Authority bS/J /b-J..S-'K ' sc
  • and Secretary Clifford have followed this meeting closely. I want to hear from people who are not regular advisers from time to time. I asked General Abram.s to come here today . . General Wheeler has been conferring with General Westmoreland. I want to hear
  • intelligence which was available in the cir­ cumstances? b. Was the evaluation of the available intelligence sound and did that evaluation reach the-decision-makers in time to assist the~ in taking appropriate action? I ! ' I The answer to these general
  • . The President: That may be true. Clark Clifford: I hope we do not have to ask for a completely new program. This is a bad time to do it. On one hand the military has said we had quite a victory out there last week. On the other hand, they now say
  • did. I worked with a guy named Oudone Sananikone--O-U-D-O-N-E S-A-N-A-N-I-K-O-N-E--who was a lieutenant colonel in the army at the time, and who was a wonderful guy. some success with that program. politics and other problems. We had But that mired