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  • Contributor > O'Brien, Lawrence F. (Lawrence Francis), 1917-1990 (remove)

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  • throughout the years. My people were free to do backgrounders as long as they advised me of them. That was not an easy area because after all, you would be considered by most of the press as being self-serving. But you were more apt to await press contact
  • could see them; contact with the press and efforts to publicize legislative progress; disagreement between Robert McNamara and General Earle Wheeler over the effectiveness of bombing in Vietnam; cabinet meeting updates on Vietnam; LBJ's reaction
  • company from scratch even though I had a good base to start. George Bissell, my good friend, with Murray, pressed the issue. I came to the conclusion just prior to the first of January of 1969 to drop the concept of a consulting firm in New York and join
  • to create an independent entity. And there were good reasons for it. This launching occupied a great deal of my time during that period because there was a tremendous amount of public, press, media interest and a great deal of interest on the part
  • for LBJ in California and Wisconsin; organizational structure of LBJ's campaign and O'Brien's role in it; the powerlessness of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 1967; John Bailey as chairman of the DNC; DNC finances; the 1967 Detroit riots and how
  • wanted to publicize it. It did result, as I've recounted, in this press conference. I think he felt relieved. I have no idea about the reaction of the advisers who had been negative at Miami. But George McGovern was perhaps pressured by his wife, Eleanor
  • involvement in the McGovern campaign; O'Brien's efforts to increase order and coordination in the campaign; encouraging McGovern to identify himself as a Democrat and to publicize the work of the Democratic Party; press reports that O'Brien was leaving
  • Spivak on press and Orville Freeman on issues; Al Barkan, labor; Bill Connell, a close associate of Humphrey; Fritz Mondale, extremely active; Terry Sanford, the head of the citizens committee; Geri Joseph, the woman's division. The make-up of that policy
  • statements, letters, and press releases were released without approval from Humphrey or his staff; Humphrey's agreeable nature; the possibility of presidential debates with Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace; legislation that would mandate debates; the possibility
  • for the party. I found during 1970 that Nixon had free reign. That was not unusual. A president has great advantages. I had seen that in my days on the other side. But what was disconcerting was that he seemed to be on television constantly. There didn't seem
  • with some pretty mean stuff out there [when] you got to the Clevelands and Detroits and San Franciscos around this country. You discovered that this rather narrow area of support for Goldwater had depth and commitment. It's comparable later on to the [George
  • was to make, I believe, at the National Press Club. The memo substance suggested questions to be posed to me. It was so ridiculous that upon receipt of it I dropped it in the wastebasket. It suggested that questions be posed to me as to whether there was any
  • ; identification of James McCord of the Committee for the Re-election of the President (CREEP) as one of the five burglars; press coverage of the burglary; Jeb Magruder's and G. Gordon Liddy's involvement immediately following the arrest of McCord and the other
  • support for any candidate for chairman of the Credentials Committee. Meanwhile, Pat Harris became subject to pressure. She was pressured by Coleman Young, mayor of Detroit, and by a congresswoman from New York. G: Was that Shirley Chisholm? O: Shirley
  • O'Brien -- Interview XXI -- 2 G: LBJ issued some uncharacteristically harsh public statements on this matter. Do you recall those and the reasons? O: He took the opportunity at a nationally televised press conference to somewhat berate the Congress
  • to LBJ; O'Brien's suggestion that RFK and LBJ meet to discuss their differences; LBJ's accusation that O'Brien told the press LBJ would not enter any primaries; accusations and suspicions that O'Brien would return to work for the Kennedys; O'Brien's
  • with the excuse that he had a cold. And in my presence he called Pierre Salinger in and said to advise the press that "We're going back to Washington. I just don't feel well; I have a bad cold." And that's all Salinger knew. I went back with him, and I
  • ; JFK's leadership through the crisis; keeping Pierre Salinger and JFK informed about legislative matters; press relations under JFK; Peter Lisagor; contact with John Bailey and the Democratic National Committee; Mike Mansfield's leadership style as senate
  • more adept at it and actually became widely recognized as an extremely capable communicator, particularly when he got to the presidential press conferences, the point I want to make is that from the outset it did not come naturally. In fact
  • with the Congress, their leadership styles, and how that affected O'Brien's work; JFK's and LBJ's reactions to public criticism and the press; the emergence of television as an important communication medium; how JFK and LBJ differed in intellect, background
  • have discussed, who had very negative views of Lyndon Johnson. And they probably, in some instances, had those views before the assassination, but didn't have a handle to articulate them to their friends and associates or press. I think what clearly
  • , concluded that a telegram should be sent. In any event, as this evening continued to unfold, another matter came up. Press and network people were anxious to have a spokesman for the Kennedy side in the ballroom. I was a little intrigued to find
  • approach underscores that. He was at one point going to announce me without any notice to me in a press conference. [He] told me later on that was his intention that morning at the press conference in the East Room, but during the prior evening Dean Rusk
  • in the House. It was all right for the Washington Post to editorialize and press its position. Now reality faced us, and we felt that perhaps the Washington Post had an additional responsibility to be helpful in moving the legislation.So the result was that we
  • ://www.lbjlibrary.org More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] O'Brien -- Interview III -- 5 hadn't changed my practices. G: One of the press
  • of the United States can work his will with the Congress. When the president is successful, then the press says, well, the Congress is a rubber stamp. When the president isn't successful, well, he can't seem to provide leadership, and the Congress would follow
  • or trying to avoid our responsibilities. It's a little like civil rights in the Kennedy period. You can get nice stories about your effort in the liberal press and that's lovely. In the midst of failure you're called a hero for trying, but the fact
  • name was Michael Drosnin. My first reaction was that I really didn't have the time to bother with Michael Drosnin. However, over some twenty years I had been courteous to the press and never failed to respond to an inquiry from a writer or a journalist
  • , I think there were half a dozen names that were bandied about by the press as potential VP candidates. G: Were there any other southerners considered? O: I don't know of any. It's probably somewhat remote, but only because of his position and his
  • , "The foreign aid bill." He said, "Oh." He was then trying to leave, go down the hall to the East Room for a press conference. Not all press conferences were held in the East Room but this one was. So everybody left, and I went to my office. It hit me when I got
  • that civil rights and Medicare legislation were inevitable, as opposed to education legislation such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act; LBJ's decision to make O'Brien the postmaster general of the U.S. and a press conference at the LBJ Ranch
  • opportunities, a lot of that. You were beginning to garner some press. It was early but national press, a handful, decided to take a peek, but it wasn't a great national story. G: What did you do to neutralize the opposition of the Indianapolis Star? O
  • not indicate he was prepared to discuss it in detail with me. He let it hang there. If he'd discussed this in detail with me and I'd really focused on it, I would have pressed him hard to go. I think he knew that and he wasn't prepared. We went through
  • decision which intrigued the President. G: I have a note that he took the press on a four-and-a-half [hour] tour of his various ranches during that trip. Were you along, do you recall? O: No, I wasn't. G: You seem to have maintained a policy
  • right. G: Was that how dire it was? O: Yes, we were through. The last three weeks of the campaign would have been whatever the press reported. While Nixon had a tremendous media package in place for the last three weeks. He had started his media