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49 results
- Paul VI, Pope, 1897-1978
- RRESPONDENT S OR TITLE .... .-.~ DATE RESTRI CTION r
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21, March, 1966 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [2 of 2]
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- nations· Yho seek th~ restorati)n o:i. peace in Vi et- 1fa.m. "-/t,3 he.r. e in the Soma~.~ Re_;/1;.~lin -f'i·c -~ y believe that .: t i·:;; ~1h~ ·"'-•"A7.J en all Gov i-j:cm... :;_c.t:3 iri:t ... :.t~1~1, ttorial ore'-~n·· sa t · ons o,r.'1 :Lnd~vi:,u
- re talk w/Dobrynin c 2p 1/5/65 A #l&Memo Btmdy re German vis i to-rs c 2 p lf5/65 #128 Memo Btfflf!y re Harfllman l~ 1f41-65- -A #130 Memo Bundy re Pearson visit c l p 1/4/65 A ~ -€ 2 p- State of t:Jnton message -s Ye Alsop
- ean di vis i o n and brigade into Vietnam. The loan com t.nitn1en t is $ 5 million higher than we would probably make in normal c cur se 11 but is much cheaper than any of the items on the lorg i s t 'he K oreans requested. M oreove r, Park must show
- lutely required if a further military buildup is likely. Among actions which might be considered would be an appeal to the Pope; a cease fire; contacts with the Liberation Front in Algeria; a longer suspension of the bombing. Political actions
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21, March, 1966 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [2 of 2]
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- . Agricultural output, which needed to increase, was drastically reduced. Not since our own dustbowl years of the nineteen-thirties has there been a greater agricultural disaster. Indian leaders have rightly turned to the world for help. Pope Paul VI has
- iif ·- more likely an FY 67 or 6~ m~~rf ~d poeelbly .-:JOmt}. j~t~ •.. '. ·. ' ~. . . dd tc ~ l.st':U~l ha~ a'ver;;l~gt">d .\ro.u nd .$AO annwn ·-= rxlllJ.i_o n pe;;~ . ~961~65~ · La.Bt year · we ~ ·!\VI:! ~3, (~ inlUiun (~?.O .million. ih DL
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18, January 1-18, 1966," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [1 of 2]
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- .'HE WHITE HO US E WASHINGTON Tuesday~ January 18, 1966 4:20 pm MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESID ENT I chased after Congressman Gallagher to get an answer for Paul Finley and UPI 118, but Gallagher is in New Jersey today. I then consulted with Doc Morgan
- . to the Pres. lp 2/26/66 A 2/25/66 A ~siJ.Je , Ja:gifiee infotmanott:- C.tt n~;d~ n4 u:t/ #22 President Johnson to His Holiness Pope Paul VI lp possible classified information etter A ~f-'l:frl:e 1178b letter #60 memo Pres. Diaz Ordaz to Pres
- ~ - · - -· - - . f4 ~. ;. . - , : • , .• ·xg~-~j;~~----· .. . •: January 2,Hl 1'}t 6 - Thursday 2.:00 p. m ~ ,M EMORANDUM FOR 1~HE .Pll.ESIDEtrr VI r-r VrtC(C ()/rt-i3li Tl SUBJECT: Latin Amertcan Loan-Signing Ceremcny On January l l I sent you a 1nelll0
- are trying to help force them. off s.urface ships. The question . ·of who then . . says I what to whom becomes very difficult. We . . would need a very explicit ..understanding on that score with Wilson before he left town. VI. Wilson's Intere·sts East
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21, March, 1966 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [2 of 2]
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- . to reinuu.e iueh a. 41.scu:s aion whenever it eeemed app•op·r iate. Officials of O\Ul' Governments could 111;eet ,i n Waebiagtea,, C..aber-. or VI ellington. without publicity ae they el4 in London. Any Qleetin.g on the Fo·r eiga Mblieter level \v.ould
- be tough. to his hop
- , New York Phone - Paul Smiths 26-F- l DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL WASHINGTON ~(_ .. /~M~ u.:t ~ ().. k.t..'~~ . a:,~~~~~ ~1~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ a-r -~~~~r~~~ . ~~~~ ~~c_ ~ ?ft ( ~~ /'- "'- ~~~,~ 9~7~#.~. />v4.-~ cP~u~ loy
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- that advantages of a national interest character .might, however, properly be sought in a general negotiation with the USSR on economic matters after the election and ~fter due consultation with the Congress. J "..i ..SECRE'f' · \ f EXPORT CON ':'ROL R2:VI
- in this connection is membership in the United Nations. 2. West Atrica is probably the f'asteat changing area in the world today. New countries are springing up vi th startling rapidity and the people of the area are determined that control ot West Africa
- clients and the banktt, it would be necessary for the government to d ramatize the b a lance of payments program as part of the total effort connecte d with the Vi e t Nam war. What he m1 would like to say-- for the first time tomorrow at the press
- LIBRARIES) FORM OF DOCUMENT H'f'd • a~ cove1 tm~o ~ ..,, lv\ RESTRICT ION ,~ e mb t ei 116 f!'em 'I1ela vi o ~ 1/-17-9? #'fDe ea1'le A.ILS"'Jtf-f37 seeret #71 a genda Meeti ng Rith the President Secret 2 p Meeting with the President ~lfJ-8
- ./ I .-Bundy VI I t 00 !Jv7-i- }/t :W-t 1~--i~~4~ ~9-aho.vaj,~~-~--J-_~~~-r..-~ :,;.t;;,~~~~x.·· FILE LOCATION ,·,.·:·~:.. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
- and at the same time would eliminate the element of confrontation. If this should be done, every possible advantage should be taken vis-a-vis the Soviets of such action. As an example, strategic air command bomber units might be withdrawn from advance bases
- 'f 1' ~) v~ Omar George Kisti.akowsky Black - -- Brac'!.ley_~-- John Cowles Arthur Dean ----- Arthur Larson Morris Leibman Robert Lovett - 7 Roswell Gilpatric Paul G. Hoffman --- John J. Mc Cloy I -------- Teodoro Moscoso l•Me:e Pcdcins
- . Carl Rowan will be available to describe our informational and psychological warfare effort. VI the I think you will also wish to speak very briefly on Vietnam before d · · . a JOurn1ng meetmg. c.f. ~- h McG. B May l, 1965 ME.MOR.ANDUM
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4, May 1-27, 1964 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- . to McNamara. Uppmano, and myself. But Oeorge Ba.ll l an ol.d friend of VI lter'•• and you may wi'ah 1 will check-thta with you at 3 :45. unlee t.o add him in.. you call me eoon•r• .... .._., Meo. B • .:op SECRl;T attachment THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May
- defensive in our public handlbg of the tear ga.s situation, that we should remind the world that fae Vi.?t Cong slit throats anci bomb. chilcl::-en and that any hu.-nan being ·ic. orie of the Vietnam ca.ves wo\!ld prefo:- to cry from tear gas rather th.an
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- ?) To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam; II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action; v. Possible Later . Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- ~ E US ·WITHDRAW UNDER P~ESE NT CIRCUMSTANCES a DE GAUL LE ~ 1 ·~ AGREED WITH THESE TWO STATE MENT S AND SAID THEY WERE CORRE CT• · · "i I · THEN SAID THAT I THOUGHT FR AN CE COULD ASSIST THE VI ET·! UAMESE GOVERN MENT . I N THIS DIFFICULT TASK
- atmosphere of Vi e tnam. If the war !fOP SECBET-EYES ONLY T-OP SECRET-EYES ONLY -7 could be won in a year with reasonable casualties, he would not be so concerned. But he feels that it will take at least two years and the fact that we will have put
- •nmeut. The lol~owtns actlona la the poUtlcal-..,coaomtc~aoelat sap'bel!• ate. the major pH•eut 'Vi•~• element• of 1ucb a aupplementaq progfttn. :But a few loltla.1 woJt·d • ol cauticm I ... are nec:eaeuy: •· Evett ft tmpl•meltWtl i~zrHullately, mo•t
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 1, Nov. 1963 - Feb. 1964 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- ,, ( rtl ·~~ · :, ·d I .J~h , \. TOP SEC~ET ,;.: I do aot · ow EYE anyeoe·. • Tay.l~ . yout- gove nm. at"· Ueve• tt t Ge · r aa tf'!lit tll• . a:r la Vleta m· aew. The vi · q.s it. He has t b Uov -hat y fm and · U hi .. Tu e11idence en
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 1, Nov. 1963 - Feb. 1964 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- by statute or by the agency which originated the document . (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor ' s deed of gift . GENERAL SER VI CE S ADM INISTRATIO N GSA DC 73-495 GSA FORM 7122 (7-7 2 ) .. F ebruary 29 i 19 64 E D
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- a hand in this particular operation . . M cG. B . Ill v G,, prU 22, 1964 · .£ M , MDU F OR THE P SlDENT .e~n az_._1961. 1. Smatbe at Asia. Vietnam. ad Laos. Secreta17 auak wtn be prepa~ed to co• ment oa tM. SEA TO meedn1, oa hl• vi lt 't o ,lgon
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5, June 1-30, 1964," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 2 [1 of 2]
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Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- ~ ~ ( . . . . ; . .. . • . - . ' • ~' l " ~-'
- Vietnamese new recruiting goals and detailed plans for accomplishing them. s. An experimental program providing expanded medical ser• vi ces to the countryside utilizing mobile dispensaries. ~~ rseon ~o SYMBOL The General of the Army· Is being directed
- which you recently approved). There are political risks in holding up MAP. It has traditionally been most sensitive to the Paks; · who regard it as essential vis-a-vis India, and whose military are a major political force. As to the Indians, we could