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Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- is so serious that it calls for more inmediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: . "(l) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on K~anh's efforts to activate the military and civilian establishments. (2
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 2, March 1-31, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- ,:Ln Viet-~tam remains -difficult. 1 J:' kn~w. we ca.n .· · , . :~ · '._: {· with this grave .t hree . of . our NATO . allies. . '! .. l the:r~ .· . Event.~» ho~7~ver~ .· conti~ue _to c'!1.II'l~ . I ] t' : Ir! -,;:· • We ·a re tirmly
- and teat thls v:as why the ARV.N had been so success.fa! until recently. 'The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were ten years back or even ten months back. Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh tal!\:s of a twenty
- has trav e lled extensively and spoken to a large number of audiences since he took over . But more importantly, as a former (until early fifties) Staff Officer for Ho Chi Minh, he can and does take on the American protest m.ovement with conviction
- political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh 1 s political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- BLY : · -· :.l .. BIG MINH), AND NOW THEY NA,D "THIS KHANH". HE · SAID THE . . :: .- ... :1 HAR IN ESSENCE WA S THE SAME ONE THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN '. . . I FIGHTING SI NCE THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II; THAT THE VIET- · . "\ '-. NAMESE HAD NO TASTE
- forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both Air Attache and I. de spite our several years• experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The "t:tall. fJ even
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18, January 1-18, 1966," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [1 of 2]
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- -uce b .J:.-c~odsb.edp I c:li.~e a 11e.got:latS.cm in wl:d.
- FOR PURPOSE PRO."rECT EVACUATION AMERICAN CITIZENS.:~·~·!~'~· · ·:~~/'/(. 1 I !.-_ . ._. :· · . '-'E HA 'J.l; JUST BEEN TOLD BY. POLICE CHI EF , FOR INSTAN,CE, THAT .·.":.,.:, .. ;':~:· ~;::: .'. \.':·; :'-::~~ : .:. !-:.":'.:·..:··:. HE CANNOT· PROVIDE
- problem than they themselves realized. The second "fifth column" in Thailand was the North Vietnamese. Those Viet Minh who had fled Laos in 1946 with the return of the French and had settled in Northeast Thailand were partisans of Ho Chi Minh to begin
- with. And trana.for of ma.tedalo and atomic weapon& pa.rt.• to, die Unked ~ pursrw:4 to tho /\gno• m.mt bet.w04D &ho Cio\fCJtmllem oi Che UnUcd State• of ,;\.meftca And the Oowrnmam of tbo UDUed Klagdom of ONot Britda and Norehorn lrelaod tor Cooperation OD tho Use
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3, April 1-30, 1964 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows: 1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between Route 12 and the area
- • the future of South Vl·e •aam and &ho hope• of it• owa poo}lle. Ou Jtegloual Devolopm.~uit Plan l• aimed at lte attractloo.• I.or Ham>l; 1 think we ued to •1'ai.-p•u tb.e Idea that &he people who nall1 ueed Tender LoviDg Care are the ricdm• of tbe •tn.aste
- Committee. 4. Algerian Message to Ho Chi Minh - Algeriahas released a message trom Boumedienne to Ho Chi Minh which, inter alia, condemns our air strik es on North Viet Nam, suggests Viet Nam is under colonial occupation, characterizes the NLF as the sole
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4, May 1-27, 1964 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 1
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- the Hana Chriatla.n .ft ndersen collection. If he will indicate his preference, we can easily draft a letter either way. McCieorge Bundy · 1 MEMORANDUM /I THE WHITE HO U SE ~ ~ - WASHINGTON Wednesday, September 29, 1965, 7: 15 PM MEMORANDUM
- -American Peace Force • - - _, ?_? . { . ~ :· =--~ · :-c:. ' ,•·· \:::~ Ir~"' ' - ':\\ I .. 'I_ "' " :Ma.J. · Gen. ·Alvaro ·; ·« Alves da Silva Braga, .f a veteran .,career inili tar:~( rrian - ~- .. . ·. ~ · '!.~ ~ ;.~~-. ~ho is :said
- , since it covers only a fifth to a third of what we'd normally give. Nor does this money flow till we actually sign the loan; ; t wu1..dci Oh ll b t o:d ho r , ·6 d ~tow . D. The Indian PL 480 agreement also expires 30 June, and the pipeline will begin
Folder, "McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21, March, 1966 [3 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 6 [2 of 2]
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- -GOl'~PIDEMTI~ THE WH ITE HOUSE WASHINGTON C~NE IDENTIAL March 14, 1966 Monday, 6: 15 P .M. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT President _:S enghor of Senegal wrote to inform you (Tab A} that Ho Chi Minh was in touch with him. He did not reveal
- because it seams better to send him your as actuat declslon after the NSC. Bruce ha• now presented our ~thlnking to Vlllson. (Our telegram la attached at Tab A). Wilson aald ho would 10Udly support our policy• but he ha• alao expreaaed deep concerft
- FELDMAN Israel - (top level) Johnson Plan (Arab refugees) FORRESTAL Southeast Asia - especially Laos Vietnam Indonesia (including former Thailand Burma Far East - especially Chi na Mainland and Taipei Japan Korea Philippines Pacific Trust Territory
- . Although Quat has told me that no decisions have been taken, the press and our informants have it that the Council confirmed General "Little" Minh as Commander-in-Chief (he holds this post now on an "Acting" basis), selected General Huynh Van Cao as Chief
- the government. J 6. The triumvirate of General Khanh, General Minh, and General Khiem, with the support of most of the rest of the military leadership, has successfully and peacefully dealt with this particular episode. The troops ha+e been taken out of Saigon
- troops had ample rations and had a little pocket money; their families back ho~were all provided for also. Thus, the real problem was that the Brazilians were over-paid (higher pay than U.S.} and General Alvim wants to take the heat off the Brazilians