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Memorandum # 345, Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966 (Item)

in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus

Memorandum # 351, Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, 6/10/1966 (Item)

to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need

Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 6/5/67, 5.45 PM (Item)

is roughly moving shorten it by getting at the substance possible time. the Iranians in Israeli's favor, I believe we can of a settlement at the earliest

Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 6/13/67, 3.55 PM (Item)

. The Israeli negotiating position. He said that a month ago there was no serious crisis in the Middle East; 10 days ago they felt they were being throttled; now there is temporary euphoria and relief at the military victory; but they have not had time to think

Memo, Davis to Rostow, 6/9/67, part II (Item)

saboteurs., and some Syrian made no charge orders had been given The Secretary General read reports frai, the Israelis had geen issued to cease fire and that all fighting in self defence. The UAR Representative hour at 8 p.m. local time. charged

Memo, Davis to Rostow, 6/9/67, part I (Item)

the same. Fedorenko suggested a one-hour time limit for the Secretary General to inform himself that firing had ceased and report. Rafael of Israel asked whether Iraq or Kuwait had agreed to a cease-fire and repeated that Syria must also give orders to its