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22 results
- aid to anticipation of possible future events; b, special operations with those picked up by the .police, by giving the1n inducements for information, and building files, dossiers, and assemblies of sharply focused bits of information
- that we will try to make substantial U.S. aid resources available to them and that we intend to collaborate with them, not be competitors. U Nyun, Executive Secretary, ECAFE, has recently expressed his interest in increasing the emphasis LIMITED OFFICIAL
- then outlined the past week aa de1cr1bed in the New York T; rnee. H~ •aid that the final psragraph waa best. It •aid the President liatene to all the•c critic• but then he decide• what la right. T', ~ Pre•ident aaid that is true. The Pre•ident ri.de11 on hie
- -:----------Table 4-Aids to navigation maintained by Coast Guard, a~ of March 31, 1967 Table !>--Distribution of operating hours for major Coast Guard functions, fiscal year 1967 ---------------------------------------------- Table ~Regular Coast Guard personnel
- WITH CONVI.CTION . . t£ED' F.OR LIMITED RESUMPTION MILITARY AID POLICY OF ~SSJSTANCE J • 1 . f. .F ., WITHOUT ITEMS SUCH AS TANKS AND COl"iBAT AJ.RCRAFT FOR· PRESENT. · '. . .. ..... 1•) ;' l 6. ' APPAR°F.TNLY .DISCUSSIONS WITH KING, t\MB
- to the museum. Description of object(s): Aides Files, Okamoto "Memos to the President, 1967" Box 1 Memo, "I think Sec McNamara would appreciate having a picture of his presidential harasser," October 26, 1967 Purpose: "Okamoto" Temporary Exhibit, LBJ Library
- aides-okamoto-b01-f03
- NOT YET BEEN MADE WHETHER TO TRY ANDREAS ·oR DETAIN HU.1 INDEFINETELY. FOR THE MO:•JENT '.IJ·E BELEIVE HE IS BEING DETAIN£D IN A RURAL HOTEL. WE SEE NO PROSPECT REPORTED _ ..... • . . > .... '' ..-= : i. . SATISFACTORY. MARGARET QUESTED -AID
- The foreign Letting I reporting (at last r) hilarious gags. aid. me steal your idea. A Miracle Morning The favorable The bottle Arden's. mention. of champagne. The autographed The Peter at Elizabeth picture of Stokley Carmichael. Hurd
- aides-okamoto-b01-f07
- to transmit its views regarding Connnunist insurrections in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. While it is quite probable that orders, if they existed, were passed through a more direct channel, nevertheless the guidance, exhortations and aid given by the !US
- STATE WHC ,\ 71799 92 OR I GIN NEA . 15 . ·1 . 1%7 t'n· ;'f - · 'J 23 40 •n Io INFO EUR 20,sso 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,SP 02,ss 20,GPM 03,SC 01,NSC RSC ·rzn,L 03,H 02,P 04,CIA 04,INR 07,NSAE 00,AID 30,NIC 01,SCA 02, scs 04,0 02,SY 03,PER 02,FBO
- col1StitUJtional) the viewpoint he expressed in · and democratic government ~t.l 1947 in support of th~ Greek- puzzles me, however, that his Turkish aid program and, inci- tolerance of authoritarian rule dentally, suggests that, by the . in Greece does not seem
- MANIII and POSEIDONmissiles, carrying multiple re-entry vehicles and equipped with modern penetration aids, will be capable of inflicting un damage to the acceptable Soviet Union. It is believed by some ex perts that the Soviet con ducted extensive
- :• cu INR &; p 10 .... Fao AID A-708 PRIORITY 5ECl'USl' i-(O . HANOL.ING INDICATOR Department of s~~~\lr~~11>TE (Department PalY~~ 1 €~ _t_~ llo1fJ9g Addresse.s ) . DIA, ACSI/DFig I\ TO INFO: · JUH . COPY NO. SERIES· B
- AMEMBASSY NICOSlA 793 •• 5 ~ C R E TATHENS t -.J • i • 3683 trXD ·I S INITIATIVE '· GAVE ME COPY OF E~lS' REACTION TO THE F FE 9 l 9 • TEXT BY SEPT EL :, TOO~Y f o CANADIAN AMB AIDE•MEMOIRE G eAN~ DI AN AI D~ _ 2• FEAVER SAI6 PIPI LIS EXPRESSED
- for both Martin and Banister in recent years. w. Guy Banister and Bob Guzman Departmental files contain no identifiable information concerning former FBI agent and private investigator W. Guy Banister or his alleged aide, Bob Guzman, although our files
Folder, "Chronological Correspondence File: April – June, 1967," Papers of Donald Hornig, Box 5
(Item)
- ' ·~ ,.JCu. •~ - l'O. •-,. ._ a. ti.& - :f• -re, ""'-Y.-.. tlue~,d ·. ~ff,11:• '-k•ll· · .· • Dr. -- •kkar •' " ' - ·c;: r man, -p edlclpate LlJ contra.at ae1aU.-Meae le,r ~ o•• I , 0 ~, you wU1 ;f l ,- --•• renf'kUo.u ace-,e p aide and allow D1-. B -~'k e
- lnlormatlon to Jack~ullivan. Senator ' Administrative Aaslstant. He •aid he undersb>od and aaked 11 w - ~ .!:'ong for an adviaory co ., trip aomewhere• . , .· _ . _. . · : ,'.· / ··~3 . I . ~. . . .. . . ; ' f• I ~ A !I ' , : 1ame
- drastically reduced because of US military aid cuts and pressures to strengthen the civilian economy. The twelve ROKAand two US divisions in South Korea had, since 1970, keyed their defense plans almost entirely to the early use of nuclear weapons
- ot all liklihood, have een ottset b aide trom a relative .J necessary. The game mechanism could, perhaps, be improved by attempts to better simulate each side's decision-making processes, as contrasted with better simulations ot the scenarios, which