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  • Taylor: How are you supplying Khesanh task force? General ·w estmoreland: By air and land, air drop extraction. General Wheeler: I feel that playing offensive low-key was prudent and wise. Press discounts MACV briefL."lg session. The time has
  • to a non-mandatory apportion..~ent for peacekeeping costs above the one-third limit governing. our mandatory assessment; (b) keeping adequate • . air trans­ port units available at all times for U"N airlift; and (c) proposing a U.S. program to train units
  • and that country were being ta.ken to people's hearts. Moreover, he took !lrm position• on the great is&uee of hls time. Be in no doubt whatsoever: the new governr,"lent wlll carry forward the pollclea that Harold Hold had lnltlated. through to the end
  • Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk to "watch this very carefully." On the matter of armed shipments to the Middle East countries, Secretary Rusk that there was going to be a very tough time on this issue with the Congress. The President said, "We must
  • divisions which are located above the demilitarized zone would come in and wipe out 30, 000 Marines because they failed to get the support they need. I wish everybody would stop saying what President Johns on should do and spend a little of their time trying
  • . Secretary Rusk: I talked with Hedley Donovan of Time - Life. As you know, they are coming out with an editorial next week in Life which calls for a halt in the bombing. Donovan thinks a lot of people will have their minds changed with a pause. We would
  • to Vietienne was delivered. to Bunker has not be en. The message THE PRESIDENT: Somebody asked me how I read accurate accounts of what Hanoi is doing. I tell them I read leaks from the State Department in the New York Times. SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We may get
  • .. ~ &A~ -- There must be('' in shoi;t o c (rV-.- $',:v: ~ I a settlement that is c01npatible with the principle s of the Geneva Acc or ds of 1954 and 1962, u nder conditions which - - this time ·- - guarantee that those agreements will b e effectively r:tJ,9£~ ~r
  • peace. He said there is evidence of movement among the Arabs toward some sort of settlement. While hotheads might think of war, war has been tried three times without success, he said, so it is the Israeli position to try for peace. He said
  • . For the time being, the government was asked to use its own planes by the U.S. Ambassador. The President asked for a full report on this situation, particularly how many women hostages were being held, from CIA Director Richard Helms. Helms said he would get
  • , some withdrawal from the DMZ and inquiries to the Swiss Govern.­ ment on what it has done to arrange talks. The re have been several hard line editorials in Hanoi and a Polish remark that "This is a L bad time for contact, "~ The Secretary concluded: 7
  • . The coordination of programs is very important. Secretary Rusk: At the time of the Asian Development Bank, the Soviets hinted they would participate. Secretary Fowler: The Soviets sat through the initial meetings. They have not done anything. However, it has been
  • it to the NVA in general meeting tomorrow and let it get around to NVA indirectly. Secretary Clifford: I had not seen the cables before. This is a bad time to come out with a threat. I would do it privately first in any case. Director Helms: Communists believe
  • to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you
  • Permissioa «>£ (g,..,,right Holder. W. l'heMas Jehn$0n Secretary Clifford: Bus and I had a wonderful time with Ike this morning. General Wheeler: He was alright on Vietnam. He was concerned about the political situation in Saigon. He said if something
  • changes such as giving more authority to local elected officials. 11 The President said that he learned a long time ago that a project is worthless unless a city or a community shows some interest and financial participation. The President said he did
  • nobody on the Committee would help him except Long. 5. Health Legislation. The President suggested that Senator Long have hearings on drug prices. Long said he agreed, "That you pay about 100 times the cost of manufacture. 11 6. Government
  • but to lower veterans' and welfare benefits at the same time. The President remarked that there may be fields in which the Americans are the equal of the Germans and there may be fields where the Americans were better than the Germans, but the fiscal
  • to up-value, otherwise the pound is in trouble . The questions is whether I should tell Kiesinger this is the most serious situation in some time. Walt Rostow: Right now this is premature. The President: What is our offensive strategy? recommend
  • a comfortable time when I was a child. I remember sitting on the porch and listening to my father giving political counsel to the neighbors. In 1922 he went bust on cotton. He lost $100, 000 in 3 or 4 years. He died making $150 a month as a bus inspector
  • Guard training must be improved. Attorney General Clark said the President 1 s Commission is an excellent one. He then gave a chronology of the Detroit riots beginning with his call from Governor Romney and ending with the time when the troops were
  • the aircraft in gradually you will get more out of it than by doing it all at one time or by not doing it at all. The President: The incident: Pueblo seizure, may be more than a pin­ prick. In my judgment this must be coordinated with what is happening in South
  • from what you know. We do not believe the ship was in territorial waters. We are going through some dangerous times. North Korea has a treaty with the Soviets and with China. If a man has nothing to offer as an alternative, I advise that he say nothing
  • of these deliberations and t.1.e successive steps ·;j::ic:-, are to follow until t.here is installed in Saigon some time next y .~a;c a qov~!' :-r:!r:r~. of the people fashioned according to the framework of tlle constirutior, ':'DW :: e::.:--.; drafted.. 4
  • kept one word of it. under no illusions. So I'm They're arriving in Paris with a force of 43, They have asked for a villa. This indicates they are ready for phase I and phase II. They seem to be dug in for a period of time. Secretary Rusk: Move
  • . At issues resumption of bombing against North Vietnam, and timing of announcement. -\ OM Tom Johnson DECLASSITIZD Authority NL. J ~ ~ - '-I~ JI- 7__ - ·~.3 By 1..s-c.:..--' , NARS, D3.te_;__ SERVICE SET • ; II .. . . .. .. ...... I
  • a settle­ ment which was more inflationary than the one which had earlier been outli~ d. THE PRESIDENT: Bob, I want you to spend as much time as you can with Senator Russell. Dean, you need to get your people to pull their gloves off in their public speeches
  • this leads him to conclude that the bombing is not effective in closing the infiltration routes and the supply lines. All the time, ships are lining the docks at Haiphong harbor. The Senator asked did the Vice President discuss the possible closing
  • the bill through the Senate this week so that final passage can be obtained this session. We really need this one and with D. C. problems rece1v1ng so much attention now ought to be a good time to get it. M.E.EI1µ•(; bJOTES CO?'!RIGi iTE-0 ?r1ol1cdno!i
  • Beautification. We are going to have to face this sometime. We would like to have a rule granted so that the bill can be held on the calendar and brought up for floor debate about the time your message on "protecting our natural heritage" goes to the Hill
  • : He says too many times a week to too many people that he ian 't going to mount a coup. That shows it is on his mind. We should lay it on the line a bout these attacks on Saigon. our propaganda line to the fullest. We should use Secretary
  • it be the lull before the storm? General Wheeler: It sure could. The President: I think it may be. CIA Director Helms: I agree. Under Secretary Katzenbach: The response time of Abrams to mortars is fantastic. It takes only 90 seconds. General Wheeler
  • said In New Or leans, we said We are in close touch with our negotiators. We concluded we should stop bombing to test their faith Ordering it at a certain time. Gorton, Holyoake will take it. The Koreans, Thais will gi~e us trouble
  • up or down by October. Uncertainty is the worst thing of all for business. We have a close time table. The last of the public witnesses will be on August 18, and around Labor Day or after the recess. they will decide when to vote it out. I have
  • to a series the first time. We should not have an adversary approach to the report like on "Meet the Press" •. " At this point Jones departed the meeting again to get a letter the President was to send to Congressman Joe Karth. -· The President read from
  • sa)d it might have some effect on doves and some effect in Europe, bu.t would not succeed and would cause them problems. Secretary Rusk said a critical time for a peace offensive is later after the winter fighting has subsided. He said that if we do
  • planned for some time. I may have an occasion to talk to Mai Van Bo. If not tomorrow, maybe Saturday. The President said, I have enjoyed all you say and agree with it. Your evaluation and as se sment is reasonable. I appreciate the constructive attitude
  • of 100-250, 000 tons .. b. We plan to deal with this problem in November, when we have better estimates of the size of the US harvest, PL-480 availabilities, Vietnam's rice needs and the GVN foreign exchange position. At that time we will propose to you
  • many sacred cows. There For example, school lunches and the school milk program. You would have · a hard time getting a veto sustained. aggravate the situation. A veto would You also forgot to mention that the Gold War GI Bill will exceed $290
  • , although they understand the risk and see it a bit differently than do we. (3) They favor an expansion of the war. They are not afraid of us moving north of the DMZ or into Laos, if necessary. (4) They favored a summit, although no place or time