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  • for almost an hour. Secretary Freeman. that he was there." The President said, It turned out that it was "Well, I'm sorry, I didn't know Well, in any case he really seemed to enjoy the conversation and I certainly did, too. And he was very encouraging
  • mentioned that at the time, and one Senator whom I'll not name mentioned it to me personally, that this was a reason--because of the Strauss case that they would hold up Fortas. In my conversations with other members of the Senate during the Fortas crisis
  • you remember any conversations with Johnson on this? I think you and he generally voted together. G: That's right. I talked to Johnson and I talked to Knowland to see if we couldn't divide the so-called foreign aid bill into three. One would
  • . Did you see Colonel Lansdale at this time? I understand he accompanied-N: Ed Lansdale? G: Well, it would have been Brigadier General Lansdale I guess by that time. N: Yes. I saw him once in Vietnam, but I had many conversations with him before
  • on that possibility? C: Yes, we were involved always a little elliptically. In other words, I was always involved in that kind of planning, either as advisory to the 000 or to the Director, mostly to McCone himself. But I had lots of conversations on those
  • of his public posture. G: Any particular conversations with any national labor leaders that you remember? 0: No, but I vividly remember that the local CIa leaders had a meeting with Lyndon down here after he got elected to the Senate, which I LBJ
  • do recall that in connection with the conflict between the Fund for the Republic and HUAC I had a specific conversation with Johnson on the subject of civil rights. He was sympathetic and helpful to the Fund. F: You got to know his staff pretty well
  • that Moyers was undercutting Johnson, a sort of a secret Kennedy agent. That's ridiculous. In the many conversations we had with Bill Moyers, he never said an unkind thing about Lyndon Johnson. He did give out information without checking with Johnson
  • of that? Was there any carry-over into the period when you came in? After all, you came into the press shortly after that. H: Yes, there was some. Because I think of all the conversation and the people that were involved and what they said, you'd have to say
  • that this was a mistake, but I don't think I had any conversation with him. I mean, of course, you know there are limitations upon the number of times anybody, including a senator can go and tell the President what he ought to do. F: Well, I've counted a number
  • that Dirksen and Halleck agreed to a disengagement in Laos and agreed to an engagement in Vietnam. Well, we didn't agree to anything. This announce- ment was made, and there was a little more conversation and I broke up the meeting, I think, by saying: "Well
  • it off well together in their private conversation, and they came out practically beating each other on the backs. I: This is all one to one-- R: Yes, this was on a one to one basis, with only an interpreter in there with them. Sato is a good, tough
  • of that on television and all that. But I did not stay up there the next several days, and I had no further conversations with him after th.at about it. B: When he heard the news did he himself suggest or perhaps ask you to call Mrs. King or any of the other members
  • talked to me, and the conversation was just about this . He said, "Alan, I've been hearing a lot and reading a lot about the Northeast Airlines case . As far as I'm concerned, I want good air service in New England and whatever you do to accomplish
  • . " At that point he picked up the phone and called Nixon himself. don't know what he said, but I can imagine what he said. reconstructed the conversation to go something like this: I I've always "Dick, I've got as stupid a bunch of Treasury and economic advisers
  • , a summary for the President. Of that summary, Larry and I would get together late Monday afternoon or early evening to prepare--sometimes we knew in advance through conversation--an agenda: what the President should ask the Vice President, the Majority
  • to the President. I'm trying to be sure that I remember whether President Kennedy actually said, "I've had a conversation with Lyndon, and he's angry about this or wants to do that." I can't say honestly I remember nim putting it that way, but I can certainly
  • . tion. M: You don't know that you're going to 'ivin, but you kind And it seemed like a pretty good bet that this would get his attenAnd it did, almost immediately. You say it got his attention, did you have direct conversations ~vith him fairly
  • went through? S: Yes, no problem. M: And you had to find assistants to help you. S: Had to find assistants and establish an organization that would move. I took over the office. Then it was quite apparent from a few conversations with Secretary
  • at a in on this French lady, and pretty soon all of them were seated table and they were carrying on a highly animated conversation . Bodard said, "Their husbands jumped tonight at Dien G: Wow! B: I wrote a little column piece about that one time . And Bien Phu
  • on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 4 worked out to be anything. And then it was a general conversation during that half an hour about speeches and image, and television, and Newsweek and things like
  • in the previous programs that you needed to work closer together. You had mentioned during the course of the conversation that there had been changes that had taken place in the office, and in the process of the institutionalizing legislative program development
  • for the conversion of a sinner in the crowd. G: On the civil rights legislation of 1957 and 1960, he had pressure from both the right and the left: the pro-civil rights forces wanting a stronger bill and the opposition forces wanting nothing at all or a more limited
  • by letter and by personal conversation that he did not want to get in there and repudiate what was one of the main spokes in the foreign policy and foreign trade concepts of Jack Kennedy. debate in the Senate had started under Kennedy. a vote at that time
  • . Danish You see, for Bulgarian you have to learn a different alphabet, and Bulgarian is a Slavic tongue, and this was quite new for me. But with Danish I really learned enough Danish that I could carry on a conversation in Danish after about a year
  • they realized that F i n l a n d w a s just a little bit too tough a nut to crack, that there would be a lot of trouble, that there w o u l d be guerrilla warfare. In fact, S t a l i n said that once in a conversation with Churchill. said, "You cannot but a d
  • you get any Congressional pressure on converting the Army over completely to the M-16, or, I should say, to the use of it in Vietnam and the ultimate conversion of the Army? R: No. What the issue in Congress was was when units were issued the M-16
  • because it was generally conceded that he was taping all the conversations. I think that when he became chair- man, on the part of the liberals around the committee it was welcomed, because we had been under Graham Barden, who was so dictatorial. Usua