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  • : That was when Chancellor Erhard was here at that time. I think that was about the last it surfaced in the press. L: Yes, I think that's right. The Chancellor was here also in 1966--Chancellor Erhard was, I recall. M: That's one of the issues on which
  • in their mind they already knew what you were going to answer, and I think still did in later years . If you gave them a different answer you really got pressed on why . [than what they expected], then They both were tremendous egotists . They both were very
  • Head Start; domestic program; War on Poverty; contrast between John Connally and LBJ types; LBJ's frustrating life as VP; sale of Weslaco radio and TV station; death of Sam Rayburn; LBJ's problems with the press; LBJ's temper; Walter Jenkins; Bobby
  • This was absolute anathema to all those on high, with the possible exception of George Ball. When Lyndon Johnson in his John Mr. Rusk was the worst offender. Ho~kins speech spoke of'~nconditional discussions," Mr. Rusk took the press aside afterwards, I
  • Biographical information; contact with LBJ; briefing LBJ while VP; Indochina; Vietnam; Diem; Roger Hilsman; William Bundy; Mac Bundy; John McNaughton; Interagency Planning Staff; Tonkin Gulf Resolution; peace negotiations; press leaks; bombing; "Why
  • know. They'd believe what they hear. There was a lot of speculation--I'm not sure when it begins, but from very early times--about advisers engaging in combat. We were constantly, I understand, having to reassure the press that this was not the case
  • a mission in and because for American reporters covering Phnom Penh the war, we rarely went anyplace where there was a North Vietnamese possible contact, just about everybody who went to Phnom Penh least a pass in at and the guy, day, in the press
  • Time limit in dealing with Vietnamese situation; the Tet Offensive; Weyand's role; press reaction; impact of Tet on South Vietnamese forces; intelligence; Cronkite's visit to Vietnam; the pacification programs; decision to write Tet!; subsequent
  • of business in this case? A: Yes, in some degree socially. M: What about his press relations in those days? very good. A: I seem to recall they were Is that your recollection? They were very good in the sense that he was much admired, but he
  • Early acquaintance with LBJ; how LBJ related to the press as a senator; Alsop's interactions with LBJ; Alsop's support of LBJ in 1964 against Goldwater; Alsop's and Philip Graham's role in JFK's selection of LBJ as the vice-presidential nominee
  • to contradict that impression . At the time that you went to Saigon with Mr. Rostow, there were rumors that there was trouble in the country team. carrying stories. The press was There were beginning to be hints that all was not well between Ambassador
  • on this. Can't we just talk?" he knew Johnson a lot better than I did. But he knew his man, Whether it was for fear that he would be further put out to pasture or whether he just felt that it was not his prerogative to do it, he did not press the issue
  • , really. The American public and the press doesn't, I don't think. So therefore the public should learn much about it, what a war of national liberation is all about. That's a technique that the Soviets developed a long time ago. They've perfected
  • wouldn't say Khanh leveled with him on the preparation--but whom Khanh sought out the minute the fat was in the fire, yes. G: You don't recall the name, do you? F: I don't, but it's a matter of public record. time. It was in the press at the LBJ
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 4 was very strongly for his selection as Vice President. I remember going on the floor of the convention in Los Angeles, [and] making a statement to the press that this showed the wisdom of our new President in selecting
  • really had something to say or whether it was going to be a case in which I simply restated what has been said to them repeatedly, but we felt that it was worth taking a chance. I tried here to keep the press from building up my trip out there, and I
  • of the press. I saw that, and 1 talked LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh
  • ; Rather’s comments on LBJ’s choice of advisors; evaluation of LBJ’s press secretaries: Reedy, Moyers and Christian; LBJ’s role pertaining to Kosygin and Middle East; LBJ as a role model to rather in gathering all information available and representing hard
  • on the sidelines. He never takes a very active He did make it very clear to many people, the press and others, that he felt this way. It was carried in the press at the time that Senator Johnson was his choice, and he stuck with this for quite a long time
  • . This was in the fall of 1963, shortly before President Kennedy was killed. And curiously enough, I had been pressing for several weeks for that kind of a proposal and my senior colleague from South Dakota led the opposition to it --Senator Mundt. M: GM: M: GM: I
  • was part of the reason that he resigned from the military. And that's just a part of the John Vann story that I'm sure Neil will cover, chapter and verse. G: What were press relations like in those early days, 1962, 1963 and so on? Let's start off
  • Jacobson's opinion of John Paul Vann; Vann's work for Agency for International Development (AID) in Vietnam and his death; Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) relations with the press, including Joseph Alsop, Don Oberdorfer, Peter Braestrup
  • activity through computer capability; CIA; Robert Komer and pacification; the Tet Offensive; Westmoreland press briefing after Tet; the media; infiltration; the importance of Cambodia; Sihanouk; problem of interpretation of intelligence; body counts; Sam
  • on and so on. It just developed in a very natural way to the point where we forecast that there would be a Chinese nuclear explosion within a reasonable period of time. This was covered very fairly, accurately, honestly by the press, and by the time
  • of imagery. P: And according a certain respect to women in general. A: Yes. Public image is important today in communications. For instance, when I went to Denmark, I think that the photographers, the press photographers, were far more interested
  • the question of when we would resume arms aid to the Paks was a quite live orie, wi th the Pentagon--as I recall--and to an extent State pressing for some resumption and the Paks screaming for it because they had lost an incredible amount of resources
  • with the press and so on connected with the introduction of all this equipment, which came in, I recall, on board these converted aircraft carriers which would anchor at the foot of Tu Do Street and unload these things. We were stopped from confirming
  • cases. R: Well, I suppose I'm one of the few people who has been appointed to a job Some months after the appointment had been signaled in the press. M: You mean that didn't mean that you didn't get it after the press leaked it? R: Evans and Novak
  • supervised elections, whatever that might mean; it surely doesn't mean everything that it implies. But [it means] at least certain supervision of the fairness of the elections. Nevertheless, most of the press interpreted the elections as another
  • the Vietnamese that they themselves had to do the job, not us. M: How could press relations in Vietnam have been improved? satisfied with the job done by Barry Zorthian and JUSPAO? Are you In retro- spect, do you think that censorship should have been imposed
  • . forces; press relations; general assessment of the Vietnam War
  • ." And he actually suggested on a number of occasions that I might undertake certain full time assignments, which I did not do. He did not press me. In other words, you know, Mr. Johnson's reputation for what he set out to get. he got [was not always
  • meeting, but you sort of sensed it in individual meetings when he was pressed to do certain things that he would sort of indicate that, after all, he was not the President of the United States. For a man who had had great power and had great energy, I did
  • and a strong-willed man, was too hard a sell from a political viewpoint, too much pressing. I was too naive, green, I guess insecure, and 1et IS say I was overwhelmed, but I was not overwhelmed sold. I was sort of overwhelmed wanting to say to pull back
  • Biographical information; Stevenson campaign; Pat Brown campaign; Washington in 1959-1960; Statler Hotel party to impress Dutton; LBJ, Rayburn Bobby Baker all for California votes; Brown on “Meet the Press” in 1959 said LBJ was too conservative
  • to hang on. It made it awfully easy for the enemy and It's exaggerated in the press. sion is greater than the actual fact. interests of the United States. M: The impres- This all works against the There's no question about it. I have read
  • pretty much today. But even when he was Vice President, of course, we weren't pressing him on legislative matters. We did have a number of contacts with him. Mu: Did Mr. Kennedy use him for anything that involved organized labor--? Me: Not directly
  • started walking . hell is this all about?" And he says, I said, "Jim, what the "It's a secret, I can't tell you ." So we went charging over to the East Room and Jim said, "Now, you all sit here ." And the President came in for the press conference
  • with Secretary Connor on a visit there which he made to speak to the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce and the Regional Export Expansion Council; and having lived in Puerto Rico, I went with Mr. and Mrs. Connor. And during that trip, I asked him about press
  • it was a great press coverage that after that vicious attack, here the man was at a state dinner. And as they were leaving the White House, the man's wife turned to her husband and said, liThe President danced with me three times tonight. Isn't that amazing
  • Hilsman -- I -- 3 substantive or anything else. But after I resigned and was a critic, friends in the press tell me that Johnson tells a story about that evening that I just don't remember anything remotely like. I know it didn't happen the way he told
  • there. But what I started to point out was this: several days after arriving in Hanoi, when I was having lunch with the head of the press department, he said, "Mr. Salisbury, we're delighted to have you here, particularly because we thought that you had lost
  • that, as a reporter, he had no political agenda; Pham Van Dong’s off-the-record comments; private negotiations between the U.S. and North Vietnam; keeping contact with the U.S. while he was in North Vietnam; press access to information Salisbury found out while
  • television set in a half hour." We were out at the motel, and so the Secret Service agents and I turned on the television set. We were sitting there, and Johnson came on and was giving a press conference. Somebody asked him about the political trip
  • understand it didn't press them very hard. He just put them on the table for consideration; and that was the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, which incidentally the British wanted very badly, and also he mentioned the Phase A-Phase B formula as a way
  • , I think, caused by some irresponsible press, but specifically, the columnists Evans and Novak, who Marvin says never met him, but who just went off on a vendetta over a period of years against him. But to me--and I worked intimately with Marvin, I
  • which, in normal protocol, "After you, Alphonse" terms, would have been hours and hours and hours . point . Well, time was absolutely pressing at this We wanted to bet the communique out, and this called for it to be redone, because obviously you
  • . Katzenbach himself? R: The President had confidence in Nick as Attorney General as a lawyer, as the chief lawyer of the Nation. pressed this by making the appointment. He ex- He certainly didn't have to appoint Nick, this was clear. But I think
  • know, counterinsurgency was stylish, and Brute [Victor] Krulak, the marine, had a similar position on the Joint Staff. Same one I had much later. So the army was very anxious to get in the act and do the right things, and the Kennedys were pressing hard
  • chiefs of staff Richard Stilwell and William Rosson; working with Allied troops from Korea and Australia; DePuy's work with the First Division; DePuy's reputation for removing incompetent commanders from their posts; DePuy's view of press coverage