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  • Type > Text (remove)
  • Series > Transcripts of LBJ Library Oral Histories (remove)
  • Subject > Tet Offensive, 1968 (remove)

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  • might find that he did. Why did Mr. Johnson decide to appoint you when Francis Bator-K: I think you may also find that before Kaysen, Rostow had it. M: You went back that far? K: 1961. M: I thought they used a lower ranking title. K: Negative
  • , at any rate. F: Was there any essential difference between working with Bundy and working with Rostow? K: I didn't work with Rostow as intimately, of course, as I did with Bundy simply because I was Bundy's interim successor as Special Assistant
  • ; differences between Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy; Komer taking charge of Vietnam issues as Special Assistant to the President; the quasi-military character of “the other war” in Vietnam vs. pacification; unifying the management of the war; using the term
  • ? N: The San Antonio speech, for instance, was drafted by many different people, and I think the final drafts were worked out by Mr. [Nicholas] Katzenbach, Mr. [Walt?] Rostow, LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY
  • it was not dealing directly with the President? McC: Walt Rostow. McS: Only Mr. Rostow? McC: He was the main one because he was his assistant for military affairs. Naturally, he ~as the one. anyone else, I believe. All of us worked with Walt more than LBJ
  • . These would be Cabinet meetings, National Security Council meetings, and then, when Walt Rostow became the special assi stant for nat; ona 1 security affai rs, President Johnson started the so-called Tuesday Luncheons, which I always attended. the regular
  • oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 7 Walt Rostow and four or five other representatives of the government to examine the situation and make recommendations--which turned out to be a rather historic mission because
  • -centered, touchy about his assimilated rank of ambassador and its four-star prerogatives, and devoted only to his own advancement and his own mission. II Now, that shows you. I do, though, say, as Mr. [Walt] Rostow did in his book, The Diffusion
  • appointments with a very long, solemn, "Joe, I know the President values your opinion. This grave decision is going to be made about--." case it was about [Walt W.] Rostow and [Robert] Kintner. think that these are wise appointments? very much." In one
  • had the same question as I went through it. know why we used that. I don't I believe the President was briefed, which if 1968 is correct would have meant that Walt Rostow was in on the thing. "To determine the validity of the opposing viewpoints
  • in 1961, yes. He had quite an argument about what ought to be done out there, because he did not agree with the Taylor-Staley [Taylor-Rostow?] mission approach, which was pretty conventional: build up the conventional army. That was another thing
  • G: That thesis I think Walt Rostow proposed some time ago, that this is what makes the guerrilla's job so easy, all he has to do is break things up. P: Yes. G: Now, an alternative--I should sayan antithesis--has been propounded, which
  • was the press secretary, [and he met] purely so that he would be aware of what was going on. Walt Rostow, and, occasionally, Vice President Humphrey would attend. time, Justice Fortas would attend. From time to Before he was secretary of defense
  • it with, and I stuck that comment on it. But the memo went to Carver, and Carver slapped a cover memo on it basically saying that the CIA headquarters didn't really agree with the Hovey memo. And this whole package went to Walt Rostow on the fifteenth