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  • Type > Text (remove)
  • Series > Transcripts of LBJ Library Oral Histories (remove)
  • Subject > Tet Offensive, 1968 (remove)

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  • B. FRANTZ PLACE: Mr. Komer's office, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California Tape 1 of 1, Side 1 F: Bob, let's talk about what we were talking about at the end last time. We were talking a bit about Libya, and I wanted to get Libya sort
  • : No, not in the slightest. I came down first hoping to get back to Lin- coln Center, where I was trying to build buildings for the Performing Arts in New York; and deliberately set up a very tight schedule for the investigation of the Bay of Pigs So that within a month
  • dumb. Kennedy never used this I'm sure that Eisenhower didn't. But LBJ frequently "Now, you know, you got me into this last time, Bob, but now what about this time?" Perhaps the most notable occasion of his forcing us to constantly revalidate
  • there working in the army as part of a psywar company-G: Can I get these names from you later? P: Yes, sure. Bob Burns [?] is the guy who was the psywar guy. interesting guy to talk to. He's an He's out in California. I got John O'Donnell, who had also
  • came back. The next tweaking of the eagle's tail was just before Christmas when they blew up the Brink. That was that hotel Bob Hope said was coming in the other way when he was coming into town. deaths and so on, right in the heart of Saigon
  • ? There was wild confusion on the I heard two of the shots. bus~ as there was every place else. I was sitting next to Bob Pierpoint of CBS. F: It came in clearly over the noise of the crowd? R: Well, not so clearly. point. There was not a lot of crowd noise
  • ~- Bob Glass, and I wrote a book called Intelligence Is for Commanders. It sold pretty well; it's long since out of print now, but it sold pretty well. It was conceived to be a classic textbook on the rudi- ments of intelligence. From there, I went
  • , which was North Vietnam. We did not recommend it in 1961, hoping that we could settle the issue of aggression within the confines of South Vietnam without going to the North. However, by the time I got there as Ambassador, following a disastrous
  • , the effects of this interaction on the American public and, consequently, on national policy. These phenomena are going to occupy the attention of sociologists, historians, politicians and, I hope, military career officers for a long, long time-as indeed
  • don't think in any realistic way that [Vo Nguyen] Giap or anybody on the top figured that they could throw five hundred thousand Americans into the sea. They may have hoped to foment a bigger popular uprising than they did. The extent to which
  • ; but we don't want to hurt you too bad, so we just are going kind of to nick the edges for a while," in the hopes that they would get the message. Of course the problem was that they never got the message, because they were professional revolutionaries
  • : Yes, Mrs. McSweeny, as you know I am President of the Naval Institute Proceedings, by virtue of being Chief of Naval Operations, and we have under way now an oral history program with which we hope to cover practically all activities of senior naval
  • ] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh WHEELER -- II -- 21 describe the President to you? W: Well, yes. M:. I hope we didn't cover this before, but if we did, I'd rather do it again than not. W: I may have
  • suggestive, though no people remember . that the war is People remember lost, or that it less or watch it on a powerful, than as a kind of flat announcement there's no hope or something . He didn't say that . G: How do you account for that? So
  • . Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh McCONNELL -- I -- 26 McC: Good. I hope it works this time. McS: The following part of this tape has been transferred from