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  • and [Spiro] Agnew were vulnerable--their leadership qualities or lack of them, deviousness, harking back to the fur coat, the Nixon-Kennedy debates. So I saw a potential for very powerful spots. Now the record shows that they were powerful in the attack
  • bombing halt; the end of LBJ's presidency; Humphrey's opinion of Spiro Agnew
  • nothing as a result of that. We'd pursue this from all aspects. George Mitchell brought up the possibility that Muskie should challenge Spiro Agnew to a debate. Presently there is no Wallace vice-presidential candidate so we don't have the third candidate
  • of vice-presidential debates; Spiro Agnew's reputation; Wallace's support from organized labor; money to promote voter registration in New York; the campaign status in September 1968; campaign committee meetings; the recording and release of the Salt Lake
  • . Meanwhile, as I became more active, I focused on the role that [Spiro] Agnew had assumed on behalf of Nixon. He traveled the country extensively. He was riding high in 1970 and so was Nixon. They envisioned making a significant breakthrough in the off-year
  • to get television time; O'Brien's televised speech regarding Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia and reaction to the speech among Democrats; Spiro Agnew's attacks on O'Brien; Frank Stanton and CBS agreeing to give the DNC four thirty-minute loyal
  • met [Spiro] Agnew, although I was a senior member and chairman of a committee. F: Where were you when Kenn~dy was assassinated? Were you here or were you up in Washington? C: I was in Washington. F: How did you get the news? C: I think I'd
  • of Spiro Agnew, which did indicate I was having some impact on the White House. He became personal in his attacks on me, which I relished because I felt that was evidence I was having some modicum of success. During that time I was repeatedly demanding
  • did. There had been five calls made by Agnew's plane, none to the South Vietnamese Ambassador, none to the Department of State and I advised the White House that there hadn't been any in that regard and that's all there was to it. This matter was blown
  • Commission; the 1964 Democratic National Convention; allegations of microphone on Nixon’s plane; calls made from Spiro Agnew’s plane; Anna Chennault. DeLoach’s relationship with Walter Jenkins, Marvin Watson. Jenkins’ departure from the White House staff
  • tendency in a campaign. Your own people are apt to react strongly to hard-hitting spots. We had that with [Spiro] Agnew and then Nixon at a later date, by the same Tony Schwartz. G: Oh, really? O: Yes. G: Which spots in particular? O: We had one
  • ] Humphrey and Mr. [Spiro] Agnew would say the same thing. In fact, there's a picture of those boys, with the exception of one or two of them, there on the wall where I gave a luncheon for them after the campaign. And the President was kind and gracious
  • to tell you. Because we were down at the White House after Mr. Nixon was elected. They invited the committees down there, Science and Astronautics and Science and Space, or Space, Science, and Astronautics in the Senate. Council, one Mr. Spiro Agnew
  • in terms of the bigness. A favorable decision and the opposition of the Justice Department is simply because of bigness. He goes on to say, "There is another internal memo. It follows the 1970 [Spiro] Agnew meeting, which suggests that Kleindienst
  • [Spiro] Agnew. RG: Yes. G: William Safire's book-- RG: That's strictly speculation. I do know that she knew about it. 18 LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID
  • of say, "Well, we expect you to say that," you know. But you know--while the "New Left" calls the New York Times and the Post the Establishment press, Spiro T. Agnew doesn't. Nor does Richard Nixon. Maybe we've come a long ways when the supporters
  • like that. But it became kind ()f obvious that Romney ,vas a Spiro Agnew in disguise, and was not :>'Icn a good candidate. think the general feeljn~~ ;.12.3 At that point I that he'd rather run against Nixon than LBJ Presidential Library http
  • off, and with them, you see, they took the whole communications elite-- I mean, it's not Spiro Agnew's argument that there's one vast network here. There isn't a vast network. But what you have is a subculture which tends to accept certain values
  • national prestige, all I can say is he was better known than Spiro Agnew. But nevertheless, he did have some national prestige, particularly with small business. But as time went on, it became more and more apparent that he had to have someone who could
  • /exhibits/show/loh/oh poor people in America, and I think he has got to maintain that. G: What prompted that question was Mr. Agnew's statement about "like the surgeon who doesn't consult with the patient in making a decision." I gather Mr. Nixon and Mr
  • , the Democrats were also highly disorganized, and if they had had a better state organization, which we also wished we had had here, the story might have been different . In any event, Humphrey carried Maryland ; Agnew didn't carry Maryland . M: Well, what's
  • a great deal of uncertainty right up until the convention-­ E: In fact I was there when--we left the night before President Nixon and Vice President Agnew got to Johnson City to confer with the President. F: Did you ever hear the President express
  • or justwhenever--? K: Whenever anybody becomes available. They have Cabinet officers and senators and bureaucrats. F: Are they sought or dodged by the principal involved? K: Both, both. refused. We've asked both Nixon and Agnew to come. I believe all
  • : Nixon, Johnson, and Agnew. Does the vice president cut any ice, really, in the Senate? G: No. Not until he has a tie vote, and nine times out of ten he's off playing golf someplace when you need him. Agnew, I must say, has been the most consistent vice
  • it pol it i call y . G: Did he think that Nixon was behind it? J: (Pause) G: That's a good answer, actually. J: I think he was ambivalent about that. G: Yes. J: He was certain that Agnew was involved, for a very good reason. G: Did he tell
  • and talked in much greater detail about this. I also had a call from a mutual friend ",ho asked me would I come to see the Vice President-elect, Mr. Agnew, which I did. It would be completely inaccurate for me to say that he told me
  • on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Griffin -- I -- 5 the Senate he was quite a contrast from Agnew and Rockefeller, neither of whom seemed to have had much experience with parliamentary procedures and rules
  • a relationship that is not close. Recently I read some columnist in which he painted out that the Nixon-Agnew relationship was much closer and Nixon was trying to break Agnew into the Presidency, quite contrary to the Roosevelt-Truman relationship. Tru:nan Has
  • and emotional agreement on all this. C: I would say generally so. F: So there was no collision of any sort there between Defense and Justice? C: There was no conflict there. For instance, neither one of us felt--that I remember former-Governor Agnew
  • effect in Saigon, and I knew that she was representing herself to Bui Diem as speaking for Nixon. In fact I was told that Agnew in some eccentric way or another got into the act, but I was told this in very great confidence and on the basis
  • to backbite Kennedy, or leaking a lot of information, or making unauthorized speeches, or going off in the Agnew route. He just never did that. The fact is, I think the only notable speech that Johnson made as vice president-well, of course
  • ?" The invitations do go up. They go up much less in the case of the Johnsons, moving from majority leader to vice president, than they would for Agnew moving from governor of Maryland to vice president of the United States, so that she had had a taste of the world
  • it at all just because of that." So then we had Vice Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Humphrey, and Agnew. [They] were all in charge of the council until 1973, when Nixon had abolished it by a reorganization plan. So I think all of those reasons [were
  • of years. In the 1968 campaign, I came up with the One about Agnew says, "If you've seen one slum. you've seen them all." I say, "If you seen one slum, you seen one too many." F: That's good. M: So whenever I see Humphrey, he says, "Write faster; write
  • a candidate from the West as a vice president . I think Mr . Johnson was right . I honestly believe, and the facts haven't shown otherwise, that John went back to the Nixon group to become vice president, and then Agnew's financial immorality blew up